Tschantz v. Ferguson
Decision Date | 22 August 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 89AP-43,89AP-43 |
Citation | 550 N.E.2d 544,49 Ohio App.3d 9 |
Parties | TSCHANTZ, Appellee, v. FERGUSON, Auditor; The State of Ohio, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A determination of whether an employee acted within the scope of his employment is a question of fact.
2. R.C. 2743.02(F) requires a plaintiff who potentially has a claim against the state as a result of a state employee's or officer's conduct to file first in the Court of Claims for a determination of the state's liability. If the Court of Claims determines that the employee or officer acted outside the scope of his employment and that the state is, thus, not liable, the plaintiff then may bring an action in a court of common pleas against the employee or officer. However, the Court of Claims' determination on the issue of the employee's or officer's civil immunity under R.C. 9.86 is not binding in the court of common pleas action.
3. A party claiming to be an appellant must show that his rights have been adversely affected by the trial court's judgment in order for him to be an aggrieved party and for an appeal to lie.
John E. Duda, Cleveland, for appellee.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Simon B. Karas, Columbus, for appellant.
Defendant-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing this action and raises a single assignment of error as follows:
"The court below erred in holding Mr. Ferguson not entitled to immunity under Revised Code § 9.86 where the court so held without conducting a hearing, without requiring plaintiff to meet any burden of proof, and without finding whether the allegations of the complaint were true; Revised Code § 2743.02 requires the Court of Claims to 'determine' whether a state officer or employee is entitled to civil immunity."
Plaintiff originally filed an action against Thomas E. Ferguson, the State Auditor, in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that he coerced plaintiff into a sexual relationship with him and also into engaging in improper fund-raising for him. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of these alleged acts. The Cuyahoga County court dismissed plaintiff's complaint purportedly because of the enactment of R.C. 2743.02(F), which requires that such a complaint be first filed in the Court of Claims for an initial determination of whether the state is potentially liable.
On June 14, 1988, plaintiff filed this instant action against both the state and Ferguson in the Court of Claims. Ferguson was dismissed as a defendant because the state is the only proper defendant in the Court of Claims pursuant to R.C. 2743.02(E). The Court of Claims proceeded to "determine initially" whether the state was a potentially liable party and eventually dismissed the state, finding that:
" * * * [I]f Mr. Ferguson committed the acts set forth in the complaint and affidavit, such conduct was obviously outside the scope of his employment and thus he is not entitled to immunity under the wording of R.C. 9.86. * * * "
For these reasons, the Court of Claims dismissed plaintiff's action.
By R.C. 2743.02, the state waives its immunity and consents to be sued according to the provisions contained in that section. Specifically pertinent here is R.C. 2743.02(F), which provides in part:
"A civil action against a state officer or employee that alleges that the officer's or employee's conduct was manifestly outside the scope of the officer's or employee's employment or official responsibilities, or that the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner shall first be filed against the state in the court of claims, which has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine, initially, whether the officer or employee is entitled to civil immunity under section 9.86 of the Revised Code and whether the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction over the civil action." (Emphasis added.)
This provision in effect requires a determination that the state is free of liability for the alleged conduct prior to the filing of an individual action against an employee or officer of the state. However, unless this statute be interpreted to be applicable only when there is some allegation that the act is at least remotely related to the employee's or officer's scope of employment, illogical results could follow. It is absurd to contend that this statute would apply to a set of facts where there is no possible way to construe the employee's or officer's conduct as being related to his employment.
For example, if an employee of the state, who is on vacation and acting completely and unquestionably outside the scope of his employment, negligently causes injury to another individual, it would be completely illogical to require that individual to file first in the Court of Claims to determine if the state may be liable. Under that situation, there could not be an allegation that the state would even be potentially liable.
Thus, R.C. 2743.02(F) need be construed to include only those cases in which there is some basis to allege that the state employee's act, which allegedly caused the injury, is related to his employment. Here, plaintiff stated in an affidavit filed in the Court of Claims:
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff's allegations that her promotions were connected with the alleged sexual relationship are sufficient to warrant the applicability of R.C. 2743.02(F). Therefore, it was appropriate for plaintiff to file a complaint in the Court of Claims naming the state as a defendant. 1
Furthermore, although R.C. 1.58 prohibits the application of an amendment of a statute to pending actions, such is not the case here. Plaintiff instigated this action in the Court of Claims on June 14, 1988, which was after October 20, 1987, the effective date of R.C. 2743.02(F) (see 142 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3134, 3136). Plaintiff contends that the effective date of that statute was after the filing of her complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and therefore, the statute does not apply. However, that issue must be raised and determined in Cuyahoga County because the only action before this court is the complaint filed in the Court of Claims, and it was filed after the effective date of R.C. 2743.02(F). Thus, the application of R.C. 2743.02(F) is neither prohibited, nor retroactive.
Having established that R.C. 2743.02(F) applies, we turn to the actual application of that section. The Court of Claims specifically determined that, based upon the allegations of the complaint and plaintiff's affidavit, Ferguson was not entitled to civil immunity pursuant to R.C. 9.86. However, for the reasons which follow, that decision cannot be binding upon Ferguson.
In order for a prior judgment to be binding on an individual as to estop that person from relitigating an issue arising out of the previous action, mutuality of parties is required. Specifically, in Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 978, the first paragraph of the syllabus holds:
"
In other words, only a person who is bound by a judgment is precluded from relitigating an issue. Therefore, if Ferguson were bound by the judgment of the Court of Claims, he would...
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