Tucker v. Resha

• Decision Date: 10 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. 80991,80991
• Citation: 648 So.2d 1187
• Parties: 19 Fla. L. Weekly S570 Katie D. TUCKER, Petitioner, v. Donald George RESHA, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1187

648 So.2d 1187

19 Fla. L. Weekly S570

Katie D. TUCKER, Petitioner, v. Donald George RESHA, Respondent.

No. 80991.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 10, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 30, 1995.

Brian S. Duffy of McConnaughhay, Roland, Maida, Cherr & McCranie, P.A., Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Richard E. Johnson of Spriggs & Johnson and William A. Friedlander, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, amicus curiae for the Dept. of Ins., Div. of Risk Management.

Barbara C. Fromm, Leonard J. Dietzen, III and Jennifer Parker LaVia of Parker, Skelding, Labasky & Corry, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Florida Sheriffs' Self-Insurance Fund.

James K. Green of James K. Green, P.A., West Palm Beach, amicus curiae for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc.

HARDING, Justice.

We have for review Tucker v. Resha, 610 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), wherein the district court certified the following question of great public importance:

IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL ASSERTING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS A DEFENSE TO A FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM ENTITLED IN THE FLORIDA COURTS TO THE SAME STANDARD OF REVIEW OF DENIAL OF HER MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS IS AVAILABLE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS?

Id. at 467. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, and answer the certified question in the affirmative.

Katie Tucker was the executive director of the Florida Department of Revenue. Donald Resha owned and operated various book stores and video stores in Leon County, Florida. Resha was also involved with organized labor and organized law enforcement, including several campaigns for the presidency of the Florida AFL-CIO against Daniel Miller, Tucker's husband. Resha filed a multi-count complaint against Tucker, alleging that Tucker ordered an audit and investigation of him without any basis and that she spread rumors that he was involved in a number of illegal activities.

Four of the counts survived Tucker's motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment. The two counts at issue in this case involve claims of deprivation of Resha's civil rights based on 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Resha claims that Tucker violated his first amendment right to join and participate in a labor union and that Tucker participated in a civil rights cover-up to deprive Resha of his right to obtain redress through the courts. The other two counts, defamation and invasion of the right to privacy, are based upon Florida law.

In her first motion for summary judgment, Tucker asserted qualified immunity as to the federal claims based upon the qualified immunity granted to officials of state government acting in their discretionary capacities. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The court denied the motion for summary judgment on some of the counts, including the two federal counts. Tucker filed a second motion for summary judgment on the remaining counts, again asserting qualified immunity as to the federal counts. Summary judgment was denied on the Friday before trial was set to begin. In response to Tucker's petition for an emergency writ of prohibition and petition for a writ of certiorari, the First District Court of Appeal ordered a stay of trial on the two federal counts. ¹

In her petition for a writ of certiorari from the district court, Tucker sought review of the trial court's order denying summary judgment on the federal counts. Her petition relied in large measure on the established federal appellate mechanism for interlocutory review of orders denying summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. ² The district court determined that there is no analogous Florida appellate procedural rule which would permit Tucker to appeal the non-final order denying summary judgment. Tucker, 610 So.2d at 462-63. Instead, the district court evaluated Tucker's petition for the two prerequisites for review by certiorari: 1) whether a full and adequate remedy is available by appeal after final judgment; and 2) whether the trial court's order departed from the essential requirements of law so that it would cause material injury to Tucker throughout the trial court proceedings. Id. at 464-67. While the district court recognized that Tucker's claim of qualified immunity from suit involves a type of protection that cannot be adequately restored once lost by exposure to trial, id. at 464, the court determined that the order did not depart from the essential requirements of law because genuine factual issues exist as to both counts. Id. at 464-67. Thus, the court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 467. The district court also denied Tucker's motion for rehearing, but certified the question of whether the federal standard of review is applicable in the Florida courts. Id.

While this is a question of first impression before this Court, a number of other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. However, the decisions reached by those courts have been less than uniform. Some states have adopted the federal "collateral order doctrine" ³ and permitted immediate review of orders denying motions for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity. See e.g., Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130 (1992). Other states have denied review because their state appellate rules exclude such non-final orders from interlocutory review. See, e.g., Klindtworth v. Burkett, 477 N.W.2d 176 (N.D.1991). Still other states have granted relief through different vehicles. See, e.g., McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035 (Okla.1990) (issued writ of prohibition to judge to prohibit proceeding with section 1983 action); Henke v. Superior Court, 161 Ariz. 96, 775 P.2d 1160 (Ct.App.1989) (accepted jurisdiction on special-action petition and ordered trial court to dismiss section 1983 claim).

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(B) provides that the district courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction over "non-final orders of circuit courts as prescribed by rule 9.130." An order denying summary judgment is not among those non-final orders reviewable pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130. ⁴ Thus, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Florida's appellate rules do not provide for interlocutory review of such orders. Tucker, 610 So.2d at 463. However, our analysis of this issue does not end with a discussion of Florida's appellate rules. We must also examine the nature of the rights involved.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744-48, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 2698-700, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982), for a discussion of the development of the immunity doctrine. For officials whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit, the courts have recognized "absolute immunity." See Nixon (finding president entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on official acts); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (recognizing absolute immunity of judges in their judicial functions); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951) (same as to legislators). In most instances, however, public officials are only entitled to qualified immunity from suit. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The fact that qualified, rather than absolute, immunity is the norm reflects "an attempt to balance competing values: not only the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, but also 'the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.' " Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 102 S.Ct. at 2732 (citations omitted) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)).

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. "The central purpose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them 'from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.' " Elder v. Holloway, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806, 102 S.Ct. at 2732).

Consistent with this purpose, the qualified immunity of public officials involves "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86...