Turner v. State, No. 12-03-00254-CR (TX 12/15/2004)
| Decision Date | 15 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-03-00254-CR,12-03-00254-CR |
| Parties | RONALD WAYNE TURNER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Appeal from the 3rd Judicial District Court of Houston County, Texas.
Panel consisted of WORTHEN, C.J., GRIFFITH, J. and DeVASTO, J.
Ronald Wayne Turner appeals his conviction of murder, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Appellant raises two issues on appeal. We affirm.
Appellant and the victim, Shawna Martinez, lived with Appellant's parents, Curtis and Linda Turner. On the morning of October 9, 2002, Appellant called to Linda Turner for help stating that he could not wake up Martinez. Linda Turner went to Appellant's room where Appellant was attempting to revive Martinez, whose body was covered with bruises. Linda Turner subsequently called 9-1-1. When the police arrived, Linda Turner gave them permission to search the premises, which they did. Later that day, Linda Turner and Appellant went to the Grapeland Police Department and each gave written statements.
On October 12, 2002, Appellant was arrested in Elkhart, Texas on a misdemeanor warrant by Texas Ranger William R. Flores, who was handling the investigation of the matter. Appellant was read his Miranda1 warnings. Thereafter, Appellant waived his rights and agreed to submit to interrogation. Following his four-hour interrogation, during which multiple breaks were taken, Appellant gave a written statement. In his written statement, Appellant admitted to placing his hands on Martinez's mouth and throat briefly to keep her quiet while the two were arguing, but denied killing her. After making the written statement, Appellant was permitted to call Linda Turner. During the ensuing phone conversation, Flores overheard Appellant tell Linda Turner that he had caused Martinez's death by choking her. Appellant's October 12 written statement as well as his oral statement to Linda Turner were admitted into evidence over Appellant's objection.
Following the close of evidence and argument of counsel, a charge conference was conducted. Appellant objected to the charge as follows:
I would request that the Charge with respect to murder under Paragraph 2 read as follows: A person acts intentionally or with intent with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. That is the charge that I would ask that the Court give with respect to the offense of murder and I would object to the Court instructing the jury additionally on that matter with respect to the nature of his conduct.
The trial court overruled Appellant's objection. Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged. After a hearing on punishment, the trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for life. This appeal followed.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in its charge to the jury because it failed to limit its definitions of "intentionally" and "knowingly" to the result of Appellant's conduct. The court's charge to the jury read, in pertinent part, as follows:
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
Murder is a "result of conduct" offense. See Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). As such, it is error for a trial judge to not limit the definitions of the culpable mental states as they relate to the conduct elements involved in the particular offense. See Cook, 884 S.W.2d at 491. In other words, a jury charge that defines "intentionally" or "knowingly" as it relates to the nature of conduct as well as the result of conduct is incorrect. See Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 639.
While the State concedes that the trial court erred in its aforementioned instructions to the jury, it contends that such error was not harmful. Not every error in a charge requires reversal. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). We must conduct a harm analysis to determine if the error caused actual harm to the defendant requiring reversal of the conviction. Id.; see also Hughes v. State, 897 S.W.2d 285, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). In assessing harm from the inclusion of improper elements in the definitions of culpable mental states, we may consider the degree, if any, to which the culpable mental states were limited by the application portions of the jury charge. See Hughes, 897 S.W.2d at 296.
When we review a charge for alleged error, we must examine the charge as a whole, considering the workable relationship between the abstract parts of the charge and the application part, which applies the abstract law to the facts of the case. See Caldwell v. State, 971 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd). The abstract paragraphs of the charge instruct the jury regarding the meaning of concepts and terms as used in the application paragraphs of the charge. Id. The application paragraph authorizes a conviction. See id.
Where the application paragraph correctly instructs the jury, an error in the abstract instruction is not egregious. See Medina, 7 S.W.3d at 640. In a scenario where the definitions of intentionally and knowingly respectively set forth multiple, alternative types of conduct, it becomes apparent which conduct element applies to which offense when such terms are viewed in their factual context. See, e.g., Hughes, 897 S.W.2d at 296.
In the case at hand, the application paragraph, with respect to murder, stated as follows:
Now if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 9th day of October, 2002, in Houston County, Texas, the defendant RONALD WAYNE TURNER, intentionally or knowingly caused the death of an individual, Shawna Martinez, by strangling the said Shawna Martinez with his hands or by the use of an unknown object then you will find the defendant guilty of Murder as charged in the indictment.
As the application paragraph correctly instructed the jury that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant "intentionally or knowingly caused" the death of Shawna Martinez before it could find Appellant guilty of murder, we hold that the fact that the abstract definition of intentionally and knowingly was erroneous did not harm Appellant. See, e.g., Barcenes v. State, 940 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. ref'd).2 Appellant's first issue is overruled.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements Appellant made following his arrest on October 12, 2002, which was illegal because it was not made pursuant to a lawful arrest warrant. The State initially argues that Appellant has failed to preserve error on his first issue because his objection to the trial court was not specific enough to apprise the court of his complaint. We disagree.
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, Appellant argued as follows:
I did have one additional objection that I think will be cured but I think I need to make for the record, that is that there's no evidence that he was in custody as a result of a lawful warrant.
....
I don't think there's any testimony that — I just want to be clear on this, there's no testimony that there was a lawful warrant that placed him in custody.
Furthermore, in his motion to suppress, Appellant argued that
[t]he alleged statements, both oral and written, were the product of an unlawful arrest, illegal detention, and an unlawful search and seizure in direct violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consitution and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (op. on reh'g). Furthermore, a complaint on appeal must comport with the trial objection in order to sufficiently preserve error. See Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
In the case at hand, Appellant argues that his October 12 statements, both oral and written, were the product of an illegal warrantless arrest. We hold that when Appellant's objection to the trial court is considered in the context of a hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress, and in conjunction with Appellant's written motion, it is satisfactory in accordance with Rule 33.1(a).
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. See Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App.1996); Curry v. State, 965 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision is at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App.1990) (op. on reh'g).
In reviewing the trial court's ruling, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Hernandez v. State, ...
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