Tweed-New Haven Airport v. Town of East Haven, Ct, Civil Action No. 3:08-cv-597 (JCH).

• Decision Date: 24 October 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:08-cv-597 (JCH).
• Citation: 582 F.Supp.2d 261
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: TWEED-NEW HAVEN AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF EAST HAVEN, CONNECTICUT et al., Defendants.

582 F.Supp.2d 261

TWEED-NEW HAVEN AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF EAST HAVEN, CONNECTICUT et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:08-cv-597 (JCH).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

October 24, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Doug Dubitsky, Hugh I. Manke, John Charles King, Richard William Pingel, Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, PC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Martin S. Echter, Patricia Cofrancesco, Law Office of Patricia Cofrancesco, E. Haven, CT, for Defendants.

BENCH TRIAL RULING

JANET C. HALL, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority ("Authority"), brings this action under the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution. Named as defendants are the Town of East Haven ("East Haven"), the Town's Inland Wetlands and Watercourse Commission, the Town's Planning and Zoning Commission, and the Town's Flood and Erosion Control Board (collectively "East Haven defendants"). The Authority seeks to prevent the East Haven defendants from continuing to use their local municipal powers to obstruct construction of a federally-mandated, federally-funded, and state- and federally-approved, aviation safety and air navigation project ("Runway Project"). The Authority claims that the East Haven defendants' municipal powers, as applied to the Runway Project, are preempted by federal and state law.

The Authority seeks an order from the court enjoining the East Haven defendants from taking any action, including seeking injunctive relief in Connecticut state court, that would have the effect of interfering with the Runway Project. The Authority also seeks a judgment that declares, inter alia, that the East Haven defendants' regulations are preempted by federal and state law and that the Authority may continue construction of its Runway Project.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Airport

Tweed-New Haven Airport (the "Airport") is situated on land located in both East Haven and the City of New Haven ("New Haven"). The Authority, which was established by Connecticut General Statutes §§ 15-120i et seq., manages the Airport. The Airport property, consisting of land situated in both East Haven and New Haven, is owned by New Haven, which leases it to the Authority. The Airport consists of numerous structures, including an airport terminal building and an air rescue and fire safety facility. It also has a main runway that essentially runs north/south (hereinafter "Runway").¹ The Airport is classified by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") as a primary commercial service airport because it provides regularly scheduled, passenger air service.

B. Runway Safety Areas

Because the Airport provides regularly scheduled passenger service, it is required to hold an operating certificate under FAA Regulation Part 139, which includes a requirement for Runway Safety Areas ("RSAs") acceptable to the FAA. RSAs are "a vital component of airport safety," because "[t]hey enhance the safety of air travelers by providing an area for aircraft which undershoot, overrun, or veer off the runway...." Stipulation of Uncontroverted Facts at ¶ 13 ("Stip."). They also "provide direct access for firefighting and rescue equipment and personnel during such incidents." Id. At the time the Complaint was filed, the Airport did not have standard RSAs at either end of the Runway and therefore did not comply with FAA Part 139 requirements. Stip. at ¶ 18.

1. Construction of the RSAs

With the help of the FAA, between 2000 and 2002, the Authority substantially updated the Airport's "Master Plan." Phase One of the updated Master Plan involved preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement regarding the RSAs. Phase Two of the Master Plan involves construction of the RSAs. Phase Two has two stages. Stage One will take place at the southern portion of the Runway, and Stage Two will take place at the northern end of the Runway.

Stage One calls for the construction of a 500 by 1,000 foot RSA at the southern end of the Runway. All of the construction work related to the southern portion of the runway will take place within the existing boundaries of the Airport and located entirely within New Haven. See Pl.'s Exh 13; Transcript of Bench Trial Proceedings (August 25, 2008)(hereinafter "Trial Tr.") at 11/3-24.² Stage One also includes wetlands and tidal wetlands mitigation. This mitigation includes the relocation of Morris Creek farther to the south, and certain cutting, dredging, filling, and other work related to activities in the wetlands. Stip. at ¶ 25. The purpose of the mitigation is to reclaim former tidal wetlands that are currently less than tidal wetlands due to lack of salinity. Trial Tr. at 16/3-9. The mitigation seeks to restore them to tidal wetlands. Id. While the mitigation will take place in East Haven, it will all take place within the existing boundaries of the Airport. Id. at 16/13-19.

Stage Two calls for the construction of a 500 by 1,000 foot long RSA at the north end of the Runway. The construction of the RSA on the north end of the Runway requires moving the part of Dodge Avenue that is within the Airport, 500 feet north of its current location. See Pl.'s Exh. 5, Figure 2-3.³ The construction of the north RSA is to take place entirely within the boundaries of the Airport. Trial Tr. at 22/17-20. In reaching this conclusion, the court credits the testimony of James Downar.⁴ Trial Tr. at 22/17-20. In addition, a review of Plaintiffs Exhibit 5, at figure 2-3, further evidences the Airport property boundary (green dashed line) and visually demonstrates that the relocation of Dodge Avenue occurs within the Airport property.⁵

Stage Two also requires channeling an existing brook, Tuttle Brook. To properly construct the RSA, so that it can support an aircraft in the emergency event that it continues past the end of the Runway, Tuttle Brook/Morris Creek must be relocated.⁶ Id. at 12/21-25; at 13/1-12. The marshy terrain cannot currently sustain an aircraft in case of an emergency. Id. at 12/21-23; at 21/1-5. Tuttle Brook/Morris Creek at the north end of the Runway runs north/south and diagonally bisects Dodge Avenue and continues down to the south portion of the Runway. See, e.g. Pl.'s Exh. 13. To the north of the Runway, Tuttle Brook is located in East Haven. See Pl.'s Exh. 19. All work relocating Tuttle Brook/Morris Creek will occur on Airport property. Trial Tr. at 11/21-24; at 16/13-19.

2. Approval Process

Ninety-five percent of the RSA construction costs are to be funded by a federal grant under the Airport and Airway Improvement Act. At the time of the filing of the Complaint, the FAA had already awarded the Authority $10,050,000 for construction of Stage One. The Authority requested $10,762,968 for fiscal year 2009 for the costs of completing Stage Two. On August 11, 2008, the Authority received funding for Stage Two of the Runway Project. See Pl.'s Exh. 96; Trial Tr. at 42/21-24.

The proposed RSAs have been thoroughly vetted by regulatory bodies over many years. The FAA published a draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in October 1999 and a final version in 2000. The project has been approved by the FAA, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, the Connecticut Department of Transportation, and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection.⁷

The Authority made a presentation before the East Haven Planning and Zoning Commission in an attempt to include the East Haven defendants in the planning and implementation of the Runway Project. The Commission unanimously voted to send to the Town Council an unfavorable referral on the Authority's application. The Authority subsequently requested review of the Commission's decision by the Town Council, which also unanimously rejected the Authority's application. Nevertheless, pursuant to the state and federal approvals, the Authority began constructing Stage One of the Runway Project.

C. The Instant Action

Asserting jurisdiction based on its regulatory authority over wetlands, on February 5, 2008, the East Haven Inland Wetland and Watercourse Commission issued a Cease and Desist Order, which ordered all work on the East Haven portion of the Runway Project to stop. On February 13, 2008, the Authority and the East Haven defendants agreed to a sixty-day moratorium on construction to provide time for the parties to attempt to resolve: their differences. Those attempts were unsuccessful, and the Authority filed the instant lawsuit.

The Authority filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order as well as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on April 21, 2008. The court denied the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 9) and for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 8) on May 21, 2008, but ordered the matter set down for an early trial. The court subsequently denied the East Haven defendants' Motion to Dismiss based on the Authority's failure to join the State of Connecticut as a party (Doc. No. 65). On August 25, 2008, the court held a bench trial where both parties presented evidence.⁸ Post-trial briefs were filed by the plaintiff on September 10, 2008 (Doc. No. 101), and by the defendants on September 24, 2008 (Doc. No. 106).

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Federal Preemption

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, article VI, clause 2, "invalidates state laws that `interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law.'" Air Transport Assoc. of America, Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir.2008)(citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)) ("ATA"). Federal preemption may be express or implied. See, e.g., ATA, 520 F.3d at 220-21; Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Management Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 94-95, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). Express preemption arises when "`a federal statute expressly directs that...