Goodspeed Airport Llc v. East Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm'n

• Decision Date: 10 February 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 10–516–cv.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
• Parties: GOODSPEED AIRPORT LLC, Plaintiff–Appellant,v.EAST HADDAM INLAND WETLANDS & WATERCOURSES COMMISSION, James Ventres, Defendants–Appellees,State of Connecticut, Amicus Curiae.*

634 F.3d 206

72 ERC 1161

GOODSPEED AIRPORT LLC, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.EAST HADDAM INLAND WETLANDS & WATERCOURSES COMMISSION, James Ventres, Defendants–Appellees,State of Connecticut, Amicus Curiae.*

Docket No. 10–516–cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 10, 2011.Decided: Feb. 10, 2011.

Dean M. Cordiano, Day Pitney LLP, Hartford, CT (René A. Ortega, John R. Bashaw, on the brief), for Plaintiff–Appellant.Kenneth J. McDonnell, Gould, Larson, Bennet, Wells & McDonnell, P.C., Essex, CT, for Defendants–Appellees.Mary K. Lenehan, Assistant Attorney General (for Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut), Hartford, CT, for Amicus Curiae.Before: POOLER, KATZMANN, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.WESLEY, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff–Appellant Goodspeed Airport LLC appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Kravitz, J.), entered after a bench trial, in favor of Defendants–Appellees East Haddam Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Commission and James Ventres. Goodspeed Airport sought declaratory and injunctive relief establishing and protecting its right to cut certain trees on its property, part of which is protected wetlands. Under Connecticut law and municipal regulations, a person must apply for permission to undertake activities affecting wetlands. We write to clarify what to date this Court has suggested only in dicta: that Congress has established its intent to occupy the entire field of air safety, thereby preempting state regulation of that field. However, the state and local laws and regulatory scheme at issue in the instant appeal do not sufficiently intrude upon the field of air safety to be preempted. Nor are they expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is Affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case, as well as the statutory and regulatory context, are discussed at length in the district court's thorough and well-reasoned opinion. Goodspeed Airport, LLC v. East Haddam Inland Wetland & Watercourses Comm'n (Goodspeed), 681 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.Conn.2010). We discuss only those aspects of the case necessary to an understanding of the issues presented on appeal.

Appellant Goodspeed Airport (the “Airport”) is a small, state-licensed, privately owned and operated commercial airport in East Haddam, Connecticut. Appellee James Ventres is the enforcement officer for Appellee East Haddam Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Commission (“IWWC”).

The IWWC is a municipal regulatory body established pursuant to the Connecticut Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act (“IWWA”). The IWWA declares that it is “the public policy of [Connecticut] to require municipal regulation of activities affecting the wetlands and watercourses within the territorial limits of the [state's] various municipalities or districts.” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 22a–42(a). The IWWC may issue cease and desist orders and bring actions to enforce the act's provisions. Persons within its jurisdiction are required to apply to the IWWC for permission before undertaking activities affecting protected land.

The Airport's property is partly composed of protected wetlands. This protected land contains trees and other vegetation which the Airport wishes to cut down. In January 2001, the IWWC issued the Airport a Cease and Desist Order (the “Order”) instructing it to refrain from “all regulated activity within seventy-five feet of inland/wetlands and watercourses (regulated areas) on your property[.]” The Order cited as its authority certain regulations of the Town of East Haddam, adopted and promulgated under Connecticut General Statute Section 22a. This Order was later withdrawn, but Appellees continue to assert that the Airport is obliged to obtain a permit before cutting the trees.

The Airport contends—and Appellees do not contest—that some of the trees it wishes to cut down fall within the definition of “obstructions to air navigation” under 14 C.F.R. Part 77 (“FAA Regulations”). The FAA Regulations establish standards for identifying these obstructions, defining an imaginary surface in the shape of a bowl around regulated runways. Id. § 77.23. Objects breaching this imaginary surface are declared to be obstructions.¹ Id.

The Airport argues that, since these trees qualify as obstructions, they are therefore hazards to air navigation under the FAA Regulations and the otherwise applicable state and local statutory and regulatory framework establishing the IWWC's permit process is preempted. Specifically, the Airport contends it should be allowed to take whatever steps are necessary to remove the trees without first applying for a permit, and that both IWWA and the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act (“CEPA,” codified at Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 22a–14 to 22a–20) are preempted as to any restriction they might otherwise impose on this activity.

The Airport offers two theories of preemption. First, it argues that the state and local statutes, regulations and actions pursuant to IWWA and CEPA are impermissible intrusions upon a field of regulation which Congress (via the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“Aviation Act”) and the FAA Regulations promulgated thereunder) has indicated its intent to entirely occupy. Second, the Airport argues for express preemption pursuant to language in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”).

The Airport sought a declaratory judgment establishing its right to cut down the trees without applying to the IWWC for a permit. It also sought to enjoin the defendants from bringing any action under state or local law to prohibit or otherwise regulate the removal of any trees constituting obstructions to air navigation.² After a bench trial, the district court ruled that neither theory of preemption was established. Specifically, the district court found that, while Congress in passing the Aviation Act intended to occupy the entire field of air safety, the state and local statutes, regulations and actions in question do not intrude into that field and are therefore not field-preempted. Further, the district court found no express preemption as a result of the ADA language. The Airport timely appealed from this judgment. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the district court on all points.

II. DISCUSSION³

Federal preemption of state law can be express or implied. See New York SMSA Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir.2010) (per curiam).⁴ To establish implied preemption, evidence of Congressional intent to displace state authority is required. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). There is a rebuttable presumption against the preemption of the states' exercise of their historic police power to regulate safety matters. See New York State Rest. Ass'n v. New York City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 123 (2009) (citing Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)).

The Airport argues that, once a tree becomes an “obstruction” to air navigation under the FAA Regulations, the local permit process becomes ipso facto inapplicable to the Airport's efforts to trim or remove that tree. However, it does not claim that the permit process is entirely preempted or invalidated by federal law, merely that it cannot operate so as to interfere with the removal of obstructions to air navigation.

Generally, facial challenges must demonstrate that there is no possible set of conditions under which the challenged state permit process could be constitutional. See, e.g., Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580, 107 S.Ct. 1419, 94 L.Ed.2d 577 (1987). However, this showing need not be made when a plaintiff claims that “what is preempted [ ] is the permitting process itself, not the length or outcome of that process in particular cases.” Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir.2005).

On their face, the IWWA, CEPA, and the local permit process established pursuant thereto do not address issues of air safety. Nor do they prohibit removal of the trees; they merely impose a permit requirement on their removal. A proper examination of the Airport's claim therefore requires us to consider whether federal law occupies the field of air safety, and if it does, whether the state laws and regulations intrude upon that field.

“The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.” 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1). The district court took this language, as well as the overall statutory and regulatory scheme initiated by the Aviation Act, as evidence of “a clear congressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation safety to the exclusion of state law.” Goodspeed, 681 F.Supp.2d at 201.

In Air Transport Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Cuomo (ATA), 520 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir.2008), this Court observed that several of our sister circuits, and several district courts within our own circuit, have concluded that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of air safety and thereby preempt state regulation of that field. ATA examined evidence of Congressional “intent to centralize air safety authority and the comprehensiveness of [ ] regulations pursuant to that authority,” under both the Aviation Act and the ADA. Id. However, as the district court was careful to observe, ATA stopped short of formally holding that Congress intended to occupy the field of air safety. See Goodspeed, 681 F.Supp.2d at 199. Today we join our sister circuits.⁵

But concluding that Congress intended to occupy the field of air safety does not end our task. As the district court recognized, the inquiry is twofold; we must determine not only Congressional intent to preempt, but also the scope of that preemption. “The key question is thus at what point the state regulation sufficiently interferes with federal regulation that it should be...