U.S. v. Deninno
Decision Date | 24 December 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 96-6113,96-6113 |
Citation | 103 F.3d 82 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bonard Ray DENINNO, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Bonard Ray Deninno, pro se.
Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, M. Jay Farber, Assistant United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Bonard Ray Deninno appeals from an order denying his motion for return of forfeited property. The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma adopted the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Doyle W. Argo which found the administrative forfeitures of defendant's property procedurally valid. Although we find the record insufficient to hold the administrative forfeitures procedurally valid, we dismiss Mr. Deninno's Rule 41(e) motion because it fails to offer any legal basis for the return of the forfeited property. 1
Mr. Deninno was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on four drug counts related to manufacturing, possessing, and distributing methamphetamine. His conviction resulted from the execution of a federal search warrant at a motel room where Mr. Deninno was present. During the search federal agents seized laboratory equipment, controlled substances, $16,150.00 in United States currency, a .357 caliber Colt revolver, and a 10 millimeter magazine. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) administratively forfeited this property. Subsequent to his conviction and unsuccessful appeal thereof, Mr. Deninno filed a motion in the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) for the return of the laboratory equipment, valued at $1,250.00, and the $16,150.00 in United States currency. Mr. Deninno also sought in his motion the return of a vehicle that had been seized and judicially forfeited by the state of Oklahoma.
We review the district court's denial of Mr. Deninno's motion for the return of property under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) for an abuse of discretion. See Frazee v. IRS, 947 F.2d 448, 449 (10th Cir.1991).
Mr. Deninno seeks the return of the seized items under Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e). Rule 41(e) provides in part:
(e) Motion for Return of Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property.
Whether to assume jurisdiction over a Rule 41(e) motion is governed by equitable principles. Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d 999, 1003 (10th Cir.1988). Id. (citations omitted).
We have held that where the property sought to be returned has been administratively forfeited, the Court should not exercise Rule 41(e) jurisdiction if the movant has failed to challenge the forfeiture through the appropriate administrative and judicial procedures. See Frazee, 947 F.2d at 450 (citing In re Harper, 835 F.2d 1273, 1274 (8th Cir.1988)); Linarez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 208, 213 (7th Cir.1993); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1608 ( ). However, federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is available for the limited purpose of considering collateral due process attacks; that is, deciding whether the forfeiture offended due process rights. See United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 511 (1st Cir.1995) (per curiam) (); United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir.1993) (); Marshall Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 893 F.2d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1990) ( ); Willis v. United States, 787 F.2d 1089, 1093 (7th Cir.1986) ( ). If an administrative forfeiture does not have any procedural defects, other challenges to the forfeiture, which could have been addressed under the statutory and regulatory procedures, must be considered waived. See Giraldo, 45 F.3d at 511; Woodall, 12 F.3d at 795; Linarez, 2 F.3d at 213. Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Deninno's Rule 41(e) motion comes after his criminal proceedings have ended does not defeat the district court's jurisdiction. See Woodall, 12 F.3d at 794 n. 1 ( ); Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392, 1397 (2d Cir.1992) (); United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (9th Cir.1987) ( ).
Here, due process requires "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), cited in Giraldo, 45 F.3d at 511. Although Mr. Deninno admits that "[he] was served notice of the forfeitures," see Rec. vol 1, doc 167, at 2, he avers that the government failed to allow him access to writing materials and postage. If indeed Mr. Deninno was given notice while being deprived of writing materials and postage, such notice was not "reasonably calculated ... to ... afford [him] an opportunity to present [his] objections," see Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657. The government fails to offer any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, that Mr. Deninno had access to writing materials and a stamp other than the assertion that "it is inconceivable that these items would not be made available to him." Rec. vol. 1, doc. 170, at 5. It is unlikely, but not inconceivable. Thus, we must turn to the merits of Mr. Deninno's motion. 2
Based upon the record, we conclude that because Mr. Deninno's Rule 41(e) motion does not offer any plausible legal theories upon which to challenge the forfeitures, it must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). See LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1118 (10th Cir.1991) ( ). Mr. Deninno contends that the forfeiture violated his constitutional rights, specifically: (1) his Fifth Amendment right to due process; (2) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (3) his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) his Fifth Amendment right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. Each of the allegations of the motion are precluded by clear precedent.
Facially, both federal and Oklahoma state administrative forfeiture laws satisfy the requirements of due process. Both give notice to possible claimants and provide a procedure by which claimants may contest the pending forfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607-1609; 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.75-1316.78; 63 Okla. Stat. § 2-506. Mr. Deninno's claim that these procedures do not provide due process is without merit. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 676-80, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2088-90, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974).
Although Mr. Deninno has questioned the adequacy of the notice he received prior to the forfeiture of his property, these alleged procedural faults are irrelevant because Mr. Deninno fails to allege that they prejudiced him. See United States v. Nelson, 54 F.3d 1540, 1545 (10th Cir.1995) (). Mr. Deninno was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession of a listed precursor chemical in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d)(1), and maintaining a place for the manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). All of the property at issue in this case was seized from a hotel where Mr. Deninno was carrying out these crimes. Section 881(a) of Title 21 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture ...
(2) All ... equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing ... any controlled substance ... (6) All moneys ... furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance ... and all moneys ... used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter....
21 U.S.C. § 881(a). Section 2-503 of title 63 of the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated provides, in relevant part:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture:
4. All conveyances, including ... vehicles ... which are used to transport or conceal, for the purpose of distribution ..., or in any manner facilitate the transportation for the...
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