U.S. v. Henderson
| Decision Date | 04 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:06-cr-039.,2:06-cr-039. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Thomas A. HENDERSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
David DeVillers, Kevin W. Kelley, United States Attorneys, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.
David Clark Stebbins, Diane M. Menashe, Diane M. Menashe Co LPA-2, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.
This matter is before this Court on numerous death penalty related motions filed by Defendant Thomas A. Henderson ("Defendant"). This Court conducted an oral hearing on these motions on March 9, 2007, and, based on those arguments and those set forth in memoranda submitted to this Court, rules as set forth below.
Defendant has been indicted for two counts of capital murder with accompanying weapons charges. Specifically, Defendant is charged with two counts of murder in retaliation for providing information to law enforcement and/or serving as a witness in a federal prosecution, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B), and two counts of committing these crimes with a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The Government has given notice that it is been authorized by the Attorney General to seek the death penalty for Defendant and intends to do so. Defendant has filed several motions relating to the death penalty, discovery, and trial procedures, and the Government has responded.1
Defendant asks this Court to order the United States Marshals in charge of transporting him to and from Court to permit him to change from his jail uniform into civilian clothes before appearing in any court proceedings, including pre-trial appearances. The Government does not object to Defendant's request. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. Defendant has the burden of obtaining such civilian clothing and providing it in a timely manner to the U.S. Marshals' Service, in advance of all court appearances.
Defendant asks this Court to permit him to appear at all proceedings without restraints and to keep the jurors from viewing him in restraints. The Government does not object to any reasonable attempts to shield the jurors from viewing Defendant in restraints.
The gravity of Defendant's alleged crimes, in addition to this Court's understanding of Defendant's past convictions, militates in favor of restraints, so as to prevent any future violence or possibility of escape. Defendant's suggested security alternative — additional security personnel — lacks practicality and safety. Courthouse security will already be substantially burdened by this trial's length (four to six weeks) and by a potentially large number of trial observers. Furthermore, restraints provide a degree of assured safety not available through other means.
To ensure that Defendant is not unduly prejudiced by this Court's need to secure the courtroom, however, every effort will be made to minimize the jury's awareness of the restraints. Defendant will be required to wear leg and belt restraints only, which will not be obvious to the jury.2 Moreover, Defendant will be escorted into the courtroom before the jury members take their seats, and he will leave the courtroom after the jury has departed, thus, eliminating the jury's opportunity to see the restraints. Additionally, leg and belt restraints, as opposed to handcuffs, will allow Defendant to participate actively in his case as he will be free to take notes or bring something to his counsels' attention.
Thus, in light of Defendant's alleged crimes and because of this Court's need to protect the security of the courtroom, Defendant will wear leg and stun belt restraints, which will be shielded by a skirt around the table, during both the trial phase and the sentencing phase, if the latter is necessary. At all other times — for instance when Defendant is traveling to and from the courthouse — normal security measures will be utilized, including handcuffs. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Appear at All Proceedings Without Restraints is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Defendant moves this Court for an order prohibiting the Government from admitting any evidence relating to his prior criminal convictions or prior alleged criminal conduct for which Defendant is not indicted in the instant case. Specifically, Defendant asks this Court to prohibit reference to any of the following topics during trial:3
(1) Defendant's prior conviction for bank robbery on or about April 27, 1973 in the Southern District of Ohio;
(2) Defendant's prior conviction of manslaughter on or about 1982 in Franklin County, Ohio;
(3) Defendant's prior conviction for drug distribution on or about April 29, 2002 in the Southern District of Ohio;
(4) Defendant's prior conviction of making a false statement in the acquisition of a firearm on or about April 29, 2002 in the Southern District of Ohio;
(5) Defendant's prior conviction for twelve counts of money laundering on or about April 29, 2002 in the Southern District of Ohio;
(6) Defendant's alleged participation in the intentional killing of Edward Boyd on or about June 26, 1981 in Franklin County, Ohio; and
(7) Defendant's alleged intentional killing of Ronald Beauford on or about May 30, 1981 in Franklin County, Ohio;
(8) Defendant's alleged intentional killing of Robert Catchings on or about May 30, 1981 in Franklin County, Ohio;
(9) Defendant's alleged participation in bank robberies other than the 1981 robbery of the Macon Bank & Trust Company in Macon, Georgia; and
(10) Defendant's alleged acts of intimidating, threatening or trying to influence the testimony of potential government witnesses in this case.
In the alternative, Defendant requests that this Court conduct a pre-trial evidentiary hearing and require the Government to prove that any evidence of criminal convictions or alleged criminal conduct outside of the instant case offered by the Government satisfies one of the limited exceptions for admission under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, if this Court permits the Government to introduce such evidence, Defendant requests proper limiting instructions.
The Government contends that some of the "other acts" evidence listed by Defendant will be appropriate for introduction during the trial phase. The Government asserts that it "does not anticipate" introducing evidence of the following during its case in chief in the trial phase:4
(1) Defendant's prior conviction for bank robbery on or about April 27, 1973 in the Southern District of Ohio;
(2) Defendant's prior conviction of manslaughter on or about 1982 in. Franklin County, Ohio;
(3) Defendant's prior conviction for drug distribution on or about April 29, 2002 in the Southern District of Ohio;
(5) Defendant's prior conviction for twelve counts of money laundering on or about April 29, 2002 in the Southern District of Ohio;
(8) Defendant's alleged intentional killing of Robert Catchings on or about May 30, 1981 in Franklin County, Ohio; and
(9) Defendant's alleged participation in bank robberies other than the 1981 robbery of the Macon Bank & Trust Company in Macon, Georgia.
With respect to items (3), Defendant's prior conviction for drug distribution, and (5), Defendant's prior conviction of twelve counts of money laundering, however, the Government will offer numerous audiotapes of conversations conducted by Defendant while he has been in prison for such charges. The Government asserts that it will have to explain to the jury how law enforcement obtained these taped conversations, and will work with Defendant's counsel before trial to minimize any unreasonable negative impact this evidence may present.
The Government submits that the following items do not represent "other bad acts" evidence prohibited by Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but rather are integral to the offense conduct for which Defendant has been charged in this case:
(4) Defendant's prior conviction of making a false statement in the acquisition of a firearm on or about April 29, 2002 in the Southern District of Ohio;
(6) Defendant's alleged participation in the intentional killing of Edward Boyd on or about June 26, 1981 in Franklin County, Ohio; and
(10) Defendant's alleged acts of intimidating, threatening or trying to influence the testimony of potential government witnesses in this case.
With respect to Defendant's conviction for making a false statement in the purchase of a firearm, the Government intends to introduce evidence that would indicate that this firearm was the murder weapon. In addition, the Government asserts that Defendant's ability to purchase a firearm while utilizing a false identification card also is relevant to the instant case.
The Government also argues that Defendant's alleged participation on the intentional killing of Edward Boyd is directly related to the charged offenses. The Government explains that Boyd was also a potential witness for the 1981 Macon Georgia bank robbery for which Defendant was convicted, and which is the focus of the current indictment. Evidence of Boyd's alleged killing, the Government argues, further supports the motive alleged for the murders charged in this case.
Regarding Defendant's alleged threats and efforts to influence the testimony of potential government witnesses in this case, the Government states that such spoliation of evidence, including threatening a witness, tends to establish consciousness of guilt without inferring to the character of Defendant, and therefore is relevant and admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 402.
Finally, the Government contends that...
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...also governs 'the admissibility of non-statutory aggravating factors.' Bradley, 880 F.Supp. at 285."); United States v. Henderson, 485 F. Supp. 2d 831, 868 (S.D. Ohio 2007) ("[T]his Court is aware that the FDPA requires that any information proffered at the penalty phase 'may be excluded if......
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...admissibility of non-statutory aggravating factors.’ U.S. v. Bradley, 880 F.Supp. 271, 285 (M.D.Pa.1994).”); United States v. Henderson, 485 F.Supp.2d 831, 868 (S.D.Ohio 2007) (“[T]his Court is aware that the FDPA requires that any information proffered at the penalty phase ‘may be excluded......
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