United States v. Mills

• Decision Date: 11 July 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 16-cr-20460
• Citation: 393 F.Supp.3d 650
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Edwin MILLS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

393 F.Supp.3d 650

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Edwin MILLS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 16-cr-20460

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed July 11, 2019

Louis Crisostomo, Aldous Brant Cook, Linda Aouate, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.

Gerald J. Gleeson, II, Miller Canfield Paddock & Stone, PLC, Troy, MI, Jean deSales Barrett, Ruhnke & Barrett, Montclair, NJ, Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, Michael A. Rataj, Sanford A. Schulman, Christopher W. Quinn, II, Detroit, MI, Jacqueline K. Walsh, Walsh & Larranaga, Seattle, WA, Marc R. Lakin, Birmingham, MI, Judith S. Gracey, The Gracey Law Firm, Keego Harbor, MI, Richard H. Morgan, Jr., Law Office of Richard H. Morgan Jr., Pontiac, MI, Avraham C. Moskowitz, Moskowitz, Book and Walsh, LLP, New York, NY, Stephen T. Rabaut, Clinton Township, MI, Michael O. Sheehan, Sheehan and Reeve, New Haven, CT, Sanford Plotkin, Sanford Plotkin, P.C., Ann Arbor, MI, Vincent J. Toussaint, Toussaint Law, James A. Waske, Southfield, MI, John M. McManus, McManus Law, Royal Oak, MI, for Defendants.

MARK A. GOLDSMITH, United States District Judge

OPINION & ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS EDWIN MILLS AND CARLO WILSON'S JOINT MOTIONS REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY (Dkt. 789) AND THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT (Dkts. 773, 787, 788, 790)

This criminal case involves multiple defendants, all of whom have been charged with violating the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Defendants Edwin Mills and Carlo Wilson have filed several joint motions, arguing that the federal death penalty in general is unconstitutional (Dkt. 789), and that the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 ("FDPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq., in particular is unconstitutional (Dkts. 773, 787, 788, 790). The Government filed responses in opposition to these five motions (Dkts. 798, 793, 799, 815, 800, respectively), to which Defendants replied (Dkts. 836, 833, 837, 839, 838, respectively).¹ For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Defendants' motions.

I. BACKGROUND

A federal grand jury returned a second superseding indictment on February 28, 2018, charging the eleven defendants in this case with various crimes, including violations of RICO. See generally 2d Superseding Indictment (Dkt. 292).² That indictment claims that Defendants were members and associates of a criminal enterprise—the "6 Mile Chedda Grove" street gang in Detroit—one of whose purposes was to "preserv[e] and protect[ ] the power, territory, reputation, and profits of the enterprise through murder, robberies, intimidation, violence, and threats of violence." Id. at 2, 6. The enterprise purportedly operated on the east side of Detroit within an area bordered roughly by East McNichols Road to the north, Kelly Road to the east, Houston-Whittier Street to the south, and Chalmers Street to the west. Id. at 2. The "Chedda Grove" part of the enterprise's name is partially derived from one of the main streets in this territory—Cedargrove Street. Id.

The indictment further alleges that the enterprise's profits derived primarily from the sale and distribution of controlled substances, including crack cocaine, heroin, and morphine. Id. at 5. The sale and distribution alleged were not limited to Michigan; gang members and associates purportedly sold and distributed controlled substances in Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and West Virginia. Id.

Defendants Edwin Mills and Carlo Wilson have each been charged with one count of racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); two counts of murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (Count Eight involves victim A.T.; Count Ten involves victim S.H.); two counts of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j) (Count Nine involves victim A.T.; Count Eleven involves victim S.H.); two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) (Count Twelve involves victim M.A.; Count Thirteen involves victim T.M.); and one count of using, carrying, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Fourteen, based on Counts Twelve and Thirteen). See generally 2d Superseding Indictment. On March 1, 2018, the Government filed its notice of intent to seek a sentence of death against both Mills and Wilson (Dkt. 293). Defendants' trial is set to begin on April 21, 2020. See 8/31/2018 Order at 3 (Dkt. 475).

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that the federal death penalty in general is unconstitutional in violation of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments (Dkt. 789). Defendants further argue that the FDPA is unconstitutional in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and the Tenth Amendments (Dkt. 773, 787, 788). Defendants also filed a joint motion to strike the statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors from the notice of intent to seek the death penalty based on the unconstitutionality of the FDPA (Dkt. 790).

Several legal standards guide the Court in addressing the merits of these motions. For example, because "it is settled that capital punishment is constitutional," Glossip v. Gross, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732, 192 L.Ed.2d 761 (2015), the Court presumes that the FDPA is constitutional, see United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) ), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035, 128 S.Ct. 2424, 171 L.Ed.2d 234 (2008) ; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity."). Defendants bear the heavy burden of proving that the FDPA is unconstitutional. Sampson, 486 F.3d at 20 (citing Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 198, 121 S.Ct. 1446, 149 L.Ed.2d 391 (2001) ). On the one hand, for Defendants to succeed on their facial challenges, they must show that "no set of circumstances exists under which the [FDPA] would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully."). On the other hand, in reviewing Defendants' as-applied challenges, the Court must examine only the particular parties and facts of the case before it, not merely whether the FDPA could be construed as unconstitutional is some hypothetical situation. See United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2001) ); accord Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 193 (6th Cir. 1997). Last, when the Supreme Court has directly decided an issue, this Court must "follow the case [that] directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions." Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989).

The Court will begin by addressing Defendants' motions regarding the constitutionality of the FDPA, and then turn its attention to the constitutionality of the federal death penalty in general.

A. Constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty Act

The FDPA defines the circumstances under which a defendant who commits certain federal crimes may be eligible for the death penalty. See Jones v. United States ("Louis Jones"), 527 U.S. 373, 376-379, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) ; United States v. Lawrence, 555 F.3d 254, 263-264 (6th Cir. 2009). Here, there is no dispute that Defendants' charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) are qualifying capital offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2). After a defendant is found guilty of a death-penalty eligible crime, a separate sentencing hearing follows "to determine the punishment to be imposed," 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b), during which the jury must make three determinations before a defendant can be sentenced to death.

First, the jury must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had one of the four requisite levels of intent to commit the death-eligible offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a). Second, if statutory intent is found, the jury must unanimously find that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of sixteen statutory aggravating factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), which are listed at § 3592(c)(1)-(16). Only after the jury makes these two findings is the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Louis Jones, 527 U.S. at 377, 119 S.Ct. 2090. Finally, if the jury makes the first two determinations, it must then consider the statutory aggravating factors, along with any non-statutory aggravating factors for which notice has been provided, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) ; Louis Jones, 527 U.S. at 378 n.2, 119 S.Ct. 2090 ("The term ‘nonstatutory aggravating factor’ is used to refer to any aggravating factor that is not specifically described in 18 U.S.C. § 3592."), and weigh them against any mitigating factors to determine if the death penalty is appropriate, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) ("the jury ... shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death"). Like statutory aggravating factors, the Government must establish the existence of non-statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defendant need only establish the existence of mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). And although only aggravating factors found to exist by a unanimous jury may be considered during the sentencing hearing, "the jury may consider a...