U.S. v. Herrera-Gonzalez

• Decision Date: 26 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-2245.,06-2245.
• Citation: 474 F.3d 1105
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Horasio HERRERA-GONZALEZ, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

474 F.3d 1105

UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Horasio HERRERA-GONZALEZ, Appellee.

No. 06-2245.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 17, 2006.

Filed: January 26, 2007.

Lester Alan Paff, argued, U.S. Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Appellant.

Aaron D. Hamrock, argued, McCarthy & Hamrock, West Des Moines, IA, for Appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

The Government appeals the district court's decision to grant Horasio Herrera-Gonzalez's motion to suppress evidence seized after a search of his car during a traffic stop. Because we believe the traffic stop was lawful and, even if it was not, Herrera-Gonzalez's voluntary consent to the search purged any arguable taint of the stop, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

During the clear mid-morning of July 18, 2005, Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Scott Faiferlick had been traveling for some distance behind Herrera-Gonzalez's vehicle eastbound on Interstate 80, a four-lane interstate with two lanes each direction. Faiferlick observed the vehicle cross the fog line on the right side of the right lane for "about 10 to 15 seconds." Prior to this observation, Faiferlick had not observed any other violations or unusual driving. At the time Herrera-Gonzalez crossed the line, two tow trucks were 50 to 100 yards ahead, partly in the median and partly on the left shoulder of the highway. Nothing was blocking the right shoulder when he crossed the fog line. Prior to reaching the tow trucks, however, Herrera-Gonzalez moved back into the right lane of travel as he approached a short bridge that was just before the tow trucks. After crossing the bridge, Herrera-Gonzalez "hugged" the fog line until he passed the tow trucks, at which point he resumed travel in the center portion of the right lane. Herrera-Gonzalez testified that he crossed the fog line to avoid the tow trucks. Faiferlick testified that there was no need to cross the fog line to avoid the trucks and that he believed it was unsafe to cross the line. Based upon the fog-line crossing and his concern that the driver might be impaired or tired, Faiferlick stopped Herrera-Gonzalez for violating Iowa Code § 321.306, which requires that "[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety."

As Faiferlick pulled the vehicle over, he called the California license plates in to dispatch. The plates came back "not on file," which according to Faiferlick meant that there was no record for the plate or that it was an invalid plate. When Faiferlick approached the vehicle, he could see that Herrera-Gonzalez was not impaired, asleep or intoxicated. Herrera-Gonzalez told Faiferlick his name was Jose Rodriguez and produced a California driver's license bearing the name Jose Rodriguez, as well as the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. Faiferlick then asked Herrera-Gonzalez to accompany him to his patrol car, which he did. While Herrera-Gonzalez was in the patrol car, Faiferlick asked him where he was going, where he was coming from, and the nature of his employment. Faiferlick also tried but failed to verify Herrera-Gonzalez's driver's license and issued Herrera-Gonzalez a written warning for improper use of lanes. Herrera-Gonzalez offered to retrieve documents from a briefcase in his car that allegedly would verify his identity, but Faiferlick declined the offer. Shortly thereafter, Faiferlick asked if he could retrieve the documents and asked for consent to search the vehicle. Herrera-Gonzalez claimed he consented to have Faiferlick retrieve the verifying documents only, while Faiferlick contended that the consent was not limited in any way. Faiferlick had written consent forms in his vehicle, but did not provide one to Herrera-Gonzalez or inform him of his right to refuse consent.

The search revealed a hidden compartment behind the rear seat of the car that Faiferlick believed contained controlled substances. Upon finding the compartment, Faiferlick placed Herrera-Gonzalez in handcuffs, resumed his search, and through the use of a fiber-optic scope observed numerous packages inside the compartment. After observing the packages, Faiferlick returned to his patrol car, noticed that the videotape that he thought was recording the stop had ended, and placed a new tape in the recorder. Faiferlick testified that approximately 30 minutes elapsed between the time his tape stopped and the time he inserted the new tape. In an effort to remedy the lapse in videotaping, Faiferlick called Deputy Adam Infante so that a third party could witness him reading Herrera-Gonzalez the Miranda¹ rights. During the call, Herrera-Gonzalez confirmed that he had given consent to search the car. After law enforcement officers later found 14 kilograms of cocaine in the hidden compartment, Herrera-Gonzalez again confirmed in an interview with Infante that he had given Faiferlick consent to search his vehicle. Herrera-Gonzalez did not indicate in either of the subsequent affirmations that the consent had been limited in any way.

The district court concluded that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because Faiferlick did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe a traffic violation had occurred. The court found that there was "no factual basis for a conclusion that the Defendant's modest movement from his lane of travel could not be `made with safety'" and that the fog-line crossing could reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to give the tow truck workers more room. Moreover, the district court noted that Faiferlick did not pursue any line of questioning that would have investigated his alleged suspicion that Herrera-Gonzalez may have been tired or intoxicated. The court did not make factual findings as to whether Herrera-Gonzalez stayed in his lane "as nearly as practical" or whether he had "ascertained" prior to crossing the line that his move could be made safely.

With respect to the scope of Herrera-Gonzalez's consent, the district court found Faiferlick's testimony more credible than Herrera-Gonzalez's, concluding that he had not limited his consent.² The court went on to conclude, however, that the consent was not sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal stop because: (1) the temporal proximity between the stop and the consent was unclear, but was no more than 20 minutes and could have occurred within a few minutes after the first tape ran out (some 4 minutes after the stop began) or some 15 minutes later; (2) there were no intervening circumstances between the stop and the consent; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of Faiferlick's misconduct weighed in favor of Herrera-Gonzalez. As support for its official-misconduct conclusion, the district court noted the unreasonable basis for the stop and questioned Faiferlick's purpose in seeking consent to search where the only perceived violation was a fog-line crossing. According to the district court, these facts and Faiferlick's questions regarding Herrera-Gonzalez's travel itinerary and employment suggested a "quality of purposefulness" in Faiferlick's actions, particularly because nothing had transpired during the stop to suggest that a search for contraband or evidence of a crime was necessary. Ultimately, however, the court concluded that even absent flagrant official misconduct, the uncertainty of the temporal proximity and the lack of intervening circumstances rendered Herrera-Gonzalez's consent insufficient to purge the taint of the illegal stop. Consequently, the district court granted Herrera-Gonzalez's motion to suppress.

II. DISCUSSION

Having reviewed the suppression hearing transcript and the video recording of the traffic stop, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that the traffic stop was objectively unreasonable.

This court reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions about probable cause and reasonable suspicion de novo. United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir.2006). A traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment "if it is supported by either probable cause or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. Even if the officer was mistaken in concluding that a traffic violation occurred, the stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the mistake was an "objectively reasonable one." Id.; United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that "[t]he determinative question is not whether [the defendant] actually violated the Motor Vehicle Code . . . but whether an objectively reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was committing a code violation"). While officers have an obligation to understand the law, this court should not expect them to "interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney," Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (quoting United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir.1999)), and the determination of objective reasonableness "is not to be made with the vision of hindsight, but instead by looking to what the officer reasonably knew at the time." United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir.2005). Finally, the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the officer involved, and the subjective intentions of the officer making the stop are irrelevant in determining the validity of the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

Federal courts of appeals, including this one, have reached different conclusions on the objective reasonableness of traffic stops based on statutes very similar to § 321.306, depending on the particular circumstances of each case. Compare United States v. Herrera Martinez, ...