U.S. v. Montgomery, 82-1836

• Citation: 714 F.2d 201
• Decision Date: 04 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1836,82-1836
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Wayne C. MONTGOMERY, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

Page 201

714 F.2d 201

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Wayne C. MONTGOMERY, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 82-1836.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Argued May 3, 1983.

Decided Aug. 4, 1983.

Wendie I. Gershengorn, Boston, Mass., for defendant, appellant.

James F.X. Dinneen, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., with whom William F. Weld, U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., was on brief, for appellee.

Before COFFIN and BOWNES, Circuit Judges, and BONSAL, ^* Senior District Judge.

COFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant/appellant Wayne Montgomery was convicted in a jury trial of possession of a shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and possession of three firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. Appendix § 1202. On appeal he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress certain post-arrest statements made to an arresting law enforcement agent. We must decide whether those statements resulted from custodial interrogation in violation of appellant's rights to remain silent and to consult with an attorney before making any statements.

In December of 1981, pursuant to a search warrant, local police accompanied by agents of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("the ATF") searched a residence in Weymouth, Massachusetts, and recovered several firearms including three with whose possession appellant was ultimately charged. Appellant, who was present in the house at the time of the search, was arrested at that time by local police on charges not relevant to this appeal.

About seven months later appellant was arrested in Milford, Massachusetts by ATF agents pursuant to a warrant alleging that he had violated the federal firearms laws. After informing appellant of his Miranda rights, ATF agents transported him to Boston. There he was shown an ATF form entitled "Waiver of Right to Remain Silent and of Right to Advice of Counsel". Appellant initialled each statement in the "Statement of Rights" portion of the form, which explained his rights to remain silent and to have the advice and representation of counsel. He refused to sign the portion of the form waiving those rights until he had spoken with an attorney. Agents then proceeded to photograph and fingerprint appellant.

According to ATF agent Sherman, appellant initiated the following conversation after being fingerprinted:

Montgomery: Am I being charged with each gun?

Agent Sherman: You will probably be charged with two counts.

Montgomery: Did all of the guns fire?

Agent Sherman: Yes. Why do you want to know?

Montgomery: The sawed-off was in pieces.

Agent Sherman: That is right, but it only took a minute to put together.

Montgomery: Ya, but it was missing a spring.

Agent Sherman: Well the State Police test fired the gun and it worked. Did you have any problem firing the gun?

Montgomery: I could not get it to work.

Appellant, again according to agent Sherman's statement, then indicated that he did not want to talk any more about the firearms, and their conversation closed.

Agent Sherman's memorandum recounting the conversation was prepared during pre-trial discovery and given to defense counsel. Appellant moved to suppress his statements reported in the memorandum on the basis that they were made in the absence of counsel and after he had specifically refused to sign a waiver of his constitutional rights without the advice of counsel. That motion was denied, on the basis of the above factual background, which was stipulated, and agent Sherman's testimony, essentially summarizing the above facts, was admitted at trial. The jury, during the course of its deliberations, requested that it be allowed to rehear that testimony, and its request was granted.

1. Custodial Interrogation

The Fifth Amendment does not bar the admission of volunteered statements. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We therefore must first decide whether appellant's statements resulted from custodial interrogation.

Though appellant initiated the conversation, agent Sherman extended the conversation with express questions of his own. Appellant made incriminating statements only after agent Sherman had interjected questions. The Supreme Court has held that "the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent ... [i.e.,] any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect". Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (emphasis added). Since the questioning here was express, we have no occasion to go farther. This was custodial interrogation. We are thus required to address the issue of waiver.

2. Waiver

Even though appellant's statements resulted from custodial interrogation without presence of counsel, they were nonetheless properly admitted if appellant waived his rights to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney. "The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Such waiver need not be expressly stated or written.

"An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).

But a heavy burden is on the government to demonstrate waiver. "The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden is great; but at least in some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated." Id.

The government argues here that because appellant initiated the conversation with agent Sherman he waived his Fifth Amendment rights even as to questions posed by the agent. It points to the fact that appellant terminated as well as initiated the conversation as evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, answering questions only at his own selection.

In arguing that appellant's waiver of his rights can be inferred from his initiation of the conversation, the government relies on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). But any such implication in Edwards has been clearly dispelled by Oregon v. Bradshaw, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), which was decided after oral argument in this case. The Court explained its holding in Edwards:

"We did not there [in Edwards ] hold that the 'initiation' of a conversation by a defendant such as respondent would amount to a waiver of a previously invoked right to counsel; we held that after the right to counsel had been asserted by an accused, further interrogation of the accused should not take place 'unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.' 451 U.S. at 485 .

* * *

But even if a conversation taking place after the accused has 'expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,' is initiated by the accused, where reinterrogation follows, the burden remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation....

Thus, the Oregon Court of Appeals was wrong in thinking that an 'initiation' of a conversation or discussion by an accused not only satisfied the Edwards rule, but ex proprio vigore sufficed to show a waiver of the previously asserted right to counsel. The inquiries are separate, and clarity of application is not gained by melding them together." Id. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2834.

It is therefore clear that the mere fact that a suspect, after requesting counsel, "reopened the dialogue" does not end the inquiry as to waiver. The "totality of the circumstances" must still be considered in determining "whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent". The burden, as always, is on the government and is a heavy one. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628; North Carolina v. Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at 372-73, 99 S.Ct. at 1756-57.

In the case at bar, according to agent Sherman's statement, after appellant read and initialled the form informing him of his rights and had requested counsel, he was photographed and fingerprinted. The conversation, above set forth, followed. We conclude that the lapse of time between appellant's request and the conversation was not an extended period, probably less than an hour. The question asked by appellant, "Am I being charged with each gun?" was a natural, if not inevitable, query which would occur to one in his situation, who had been present seven months earlier when several guns had been seized. The answer ("You will probably be charged with two counts") was unresponsive; it obviously referred to the two qualitatively different offenses described in the indictment and conveyed no information as to the number of guns with which appellant was being charged. Either because of this nonresponsiveness or because appellant knew enough about the law to know that violation of the firearms law involved the possession of a firearm that was operable, he asked his second question ("Did all of the guns fire?").

This was the critical point at which the presence or absence of appellant's waiver of his right to counsel must be determined. It seems to us that both questions dealt with the nature of the charges against him, particularly with the quantity of guns he was being charged with possessing. There was no affirmative statement...