U.S. v. Owens

• Decision Date: 12 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 3:99CR290 (EBB).,3:99CR290 (EBB).
• Citation: 142 F.Supp.2d 255
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Orville OWENS, a.k.a. "Ratty"; and Earl Josephs, a.k.a. "Quame&#34

142 F.Supp.2d 255

UNITED STATES of America v. Orville OWENS, a.k.a. "Ratty"; and Earl Josephs, a.k.a. "Quame"

No. 3:99CR290 (EBB).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

April 12, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David A. Ring, U.S. Attorney's Office, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.

Sarah A. Chambers, Paul F. Thomas, Federal Public Defender's Office, New Haven, CT, William H. Paetzold, Moriarty & Paetzold, Glastonbury, CT, for Defendants.

Ruling on Defendants' Motions to Suppress and Motion to Sever

BURNS, Senior District Judge.

Defendant Earl Josephs moves, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b), to suppress all oral and written statements made by him to law enforcement officers on November 15, 1999 because they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. [Doc. No. 32] Similarly, Defendant Orville Owens moves to suppress all oral and written statements made by him to law enforcement officers on December 16, 1999 at the Hartford Correctional Center, and all statements made by him to law enforcement officers and to the grand jury on December 21, 1999 at the United States Courthouse in Hartford. [Doc. No. 27] Finally, Defendant Josephs moves, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, to sever his case from co-defendant Owens based on prejudicial joinder and a possible Bruton problem. [Doc. No. 34] For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motions to suppress are DENIED, and Defendant Josephs' motion to sever is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2000, a grand jury returned a four-count superceding indictment charging Defendants with Affecting Commerce by Robbery and Violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The Government also alleges in Counts 1 and 2 that Defendants murdered Lizette Hamilton in the course of the robbery.

On June 10, 1998, Ms. Hamilton was killed in her apartment at 30 Morris Street, Hartford, Connecticut. Ms. Hamilton was found bound with packaging tape at the hands, feet, and neck, with multiple stab wounds to the neck, heart, and navel. Police later discovered that Ms. Hamilton's sister was storing twenty-nine pounds of marijuana in the apartment, and that Ms. Hamilton was allegedly killed as part of a robbery of the drugs.

According to Josephs, he and Owens were driving over to visit Ms. Hamilton so that Josephs could have sex with her. When they reached the apartment, Hamilton invited them in and said she was hungry, and Josephs left to get her a soda from the corner store. When he returned fifteen minutes later, Josephs said he found the apartment door open, and Ms. Hamilton bound and bleeding on the bed. According to Owens, however, Josephs asked him to help rob Ms. Hamilton of the marijuana stored in her apartment. Upon arriving at the apartment, Owens held Ms. Hamilton at gunpoint and asked her for the marijuana. Ms. Hamilton gave them one pound, at which point Josephs taped Ms. Hamilton's arms, legs, and mouth and proceeded to stab her to death, while, according to Owens, he "begged" Josephs not to kill her.

Both Owens and Josephs move to suppress various statements made by them both pre and post-arrest. Josephs moves to suppress his statement made to law enforcement officers on November 15, 1999 on the grounds that he was illegally detained, his statement was not made voluntarily, and the interrogation should have ceased when he requested an attorney. The Government contends that it had sufficient probable cause to arrest Josephs, that his statement was taken only after Josephs was properly mirandized, and that the interrogation was free of coercion. Owens moves to suppress his statements made on December 16, 1999 on the ground that he was improperly mirandized, and moves to suppress his statements made to a grand jury on December 21, 1999 on the ground that, after invoking his right to counsel, he was coerced into testifying. The Government maintains that on both occasions, Owens was advised of his rights, and knowingly and voluntarily waived them before making the statements. A suppression hearing was held on August 29-30, 2000, and the final post-hearing briefs were filed on December 6, 2000.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Probable Cause

When the constitutional validity of an arrest is challenged, the court must determine whether the facts available to the officers at the time of arrest supported probable cause. In general, probable cause to arrest "exists where `the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)); Marshall v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir.1996). This standard allows some room for mistakes, provided those mistakes are "those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302.

In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's attempt to impose the requirement that an officer's judgment regarding the facts in a giver instance not only be responsible, but correct. Instead, the Rodriguez Court held that "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971)). In any given case, the question of whether the standard has been met must be determined by reference to the "totality of the circumstances," Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-33, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), on the basis of what information the arresting officer possessed at the time of the arrest.

B. Custodial Interrogation

Because custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, when a defendant is in police custody, he must be advised of his Miranda rights, (namely his right to remain silent, his right to an attorney, and the fact that anything he says can be used against him), before interrogation commences. See Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1991).¹ "Miranda warnings are intended principally to safeguard the suspect's privilege against self incrimination." United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir.1996). Once the warnings are administered, the defendant may "knowingly and intelligently" waive such rights and answer questions, but unless and until such warnings are given and waived, no statements obtained as a result of interrogation are admissible. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Miranda warnings and a waiver of rights are prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant under interrogation while in the custody of the police. See id. at 476, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

If an interrogation proceeds without an attorney present, and a statement is taken, "a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). The Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the suspect waived his Miranda rights. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Anderson, 929 F.2d at 99.

Whether a defendant is advised of his Miranda rights speaks to the issue of voluntariness. In addition to being preceded by an advisement of rights, any statement subsequently made by a defendant must be voluntary for it to be admissible. The "ultimate issue of `voluntariness' is a legal question requiring independent federal determination." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). The test for voluntariness of a confession is whether "the confession was `extracted by any sort of threats or violence, (or) obtained by any direct or implied promises, however, slight, (or) by the exertion of any improper influence.'" Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S.Ct. 202, 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)). "A confession is not voluntary when obtained under circumstances that overbear the defendant's will at the time it was given." Anderson, 929 F.2d at 99; see also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167-68, 107 S.Ct. 515. When making a determination of voluntariness, a court must consider the "totality of all the surrounding circumstances," including the defendant's "background and experience, the conditions of his interrogation and the conduct of the law enforcement officers." Ruggles, 70 F.3d at 264-65; see also Butler, 441 U.S. at 374, 99 S.Ct. 1755; Anderson, 929 F.2d at 99-100.

C. Severance

Severance is controlled by Fed. R.Crim.P. 14, which addresses whether the joinder of two or more defendants is prejudicial. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 447, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (citing Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 515-16, 80 S.Ct. 945, 4 L.Ed.2d 921 (1960)). Severance motions are committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1130 (2d Cir.1989). Rule 14 provides:

If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or...