U.S. v. Springs, 92-2289

• Decision Date: 12 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-2289,92-2289
• Citation: 988 F.2d 746
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sidney SPRINGS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 746

988 F.2d 746

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sidney SPRINGS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92-2289.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 25, 1993.

Decided March 16, 1993.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 12, 1993.

Adam Bourgeois (argued), Chicago, IL, for petitioner-appellee.

Laurie J. Barsella, Asst. U.S. Atty., Patrick B. Murray, Lance C. Malina, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), Crim. Div., Barry R. Elden, Asst. U.S. Atty., Crim. Receiving, Appellate Div., Chicago, IL, for respondent-appellant.

Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Sidney Springs, a member of Chicago's Fire Department, offered $12,500 for a police officer's aid in stealing six kilograms of cocaine from a fellow purveyor of illegal drugs. The officer pretended to accept the bribe but alerted federal officials, who thwarted the plan. Springs pleaded guilty to three felony charges, including extortion and attempting to possess the six kilograms of cocaine. The Sentencing Guidelines prescribe a range of 135-168 months for Springs' offenses; in February 1989 the district court imposed a sentence of 135 months' imprisonment. His lawyer asked the district judge to give a sentence lower than 135 months, to which the judge replied: "[T]here isn't anything in this case, anything that suggests any legal reason that I could go outside the Guidelines." Springs did not appeal.

While serving his sentence, Springs offered some information about persons who had not been involved in the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. Although this information did not lead to any prosecutions or convictions, the prosecutor filed a motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35, authorizing the district judge to reward the information with a lower sentence. In February 1990 the judge shaved 15 months off the sentence, leaving Springs with 120 months' imprisonment.

One year later the same judge vacated Springs' sentence altogether, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The judge explained:

At the time of [Springs'] plea the guidelines were new, and this court ... believed it had very little discretion to depart from them. Subsequent case law has demonstrated that a district court has more discretion to make a departure than this court had realized at the time it had sentenced [Springs]. Because of this mistaken belief at this critical time, this court will grant the defendant's petition and vacate his sentence and allow him to be resentenced.

The court released Springs from prison, on condition that he remain at home. More than a year passed. Eventually, in April 1992, the court resentenced Springs to 52 months' imprisonment. Back in 1988 the prosecutor had offered, and Springs had rejected, a plea bargain under which his sentence would be 72 months, in exchange for help, including testimony at trial, in convicting other members of the drug ring with which Springs was affiliated. Although Springs never gave any such assistance, the district court started with the prosecutor's offer and made a series of deductions. The judge did not mention the Guidelines during resentencing. The United States contends that the court lacked authority to vacate the sentence and that at all events the new sentence, determined without reference to the Guidelines, is invalid.

Springs was sentenced 16 months after the Guidelines went into effect, almost five years after the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act. If Springs believed that in February 1989 Judge Duff misunderstood the extent of his discretion, he could have presented this argument to us on appeal. United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 590-91 (7th Cir.1991) (in banc). He did not. Unsurprisingly, the United States contends that Springs' acquiescence forfeits any entitlement to collateral relief. E.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947); Johnson v. United States, 838 F.2d 201 (7th Cir.1988). The prosecutor made the same point in urging the district judge to deny the petition. The district judge inexplicably ignored the subject.

There is a further, and deeper, problem. Section 2255 does not authorize judges to revise all decisions that they have come to rue. Its domain is more limited:

A prisoner in custody ... [may obtain relief] upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack....

Was the sentence "imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States"? Springs does not so contend, and there is no basis for such a conclusion. Was the court "without jurisdiction to impose such sentence"? Hardly. Was the sentence "in excess of the maximum authorized by law"? Not remotely. Is the sentence "otherwise subject to collateral attack"? This language does not grant district judges a visitorial power. "[U]nless the claim alleges a lack of jurisdiction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack ... [is] far more limited.... The Court has held that an error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted 'a fundamental defect which inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.' " United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2240, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979), quoting from Hill, 368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471. See also, e.g., Reed v. Clark, 984 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.1993).

A sentence within the Guidelines--which Springs concedes he received--cannot be a "complete miscarriage of justice." Although a district judge's misunderstanding of the options for sentencing is regrettable, misapprehending the scope of one's discretion is some distance from a "fundamental defect". Addonizio illustrates the point. During the years before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, when most prisoners were eligible for parole after serving one-third of their sentences, many district judges believed that parole was automatic unless the prisoner misbehaved in custody. Judges routinely sentenced defendants to three times the term they wanted them to serve. Often they, and the defendants, were taken aback. In 1973 the Parole Commission published a set of guidelines articulating its policies. These guidelines revealed that the Commission based its decisions on the offenders' conduct rather than the district judges' sentences, so that, for example, persons convicted of selling the same quantity of drugs and having the same criminal history would (to the extent the sentences actually imposed allowed) spend the same time in prison. This meant release at the one-third point for prisoners who had received long sentences, service of the full term by those who had received short sentences. And the Commission revealed that for some kinds of crime it regularly required offenders to serve most or all of their terms. One of these categories was corrupt behavior by a public official.

Hugh Addonizio, a Member of Congress convicted of extorting payments from persons seeking official favors, was sentenced in 1970 to 10 years' imprisonment. The Parole Commission ordered Addonizio held to the expiration of his term. Expressing shock, the district judge invoked § 2255 and reduced Addonizio's sentence to time served. This reduction was necessary, the judge explained, to prevent Addonizio's incarceration from greatly exceeding what the judge had contemplated. The Supreme Court held, however, that § 2255 confers no such power on district judges. Addonizio's conviction and sentence were lawful; § 2255 does not permit judges to revise sentences that reflect misunderstandings. "[T]here is no basis for enlarging the grounds for collateral attack to include claims based not on any objectively ascertainable error but on the frustration of the subjective intent of the sentencing judge." 442 U.S. at 187, 99 S.Ct. at 2241.

Addonizio controls this case. If a post-sentencing change that dramatically affects the time to be served does not authorize resentencing under § 2255, then post-sentencing appellate opinions that suggest to the district judge that he possesses additional discretion in sentencing do not authorize resort to § 2255. The parole guidelines stunned many...