Union Depot, Street Railway & Transfer Co. of Stillwater v. Brunswick
| Decision Date | 11 December 1883 |
| Citation | 17 N.W. 626,31 Minn. 297 |
| Parties | Union Depot, Street Railway & Transfer Company of Stillwater v. Margaret Brunswick and others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
The respondents, Margaret Brunswick and others, appealed to the district court for Washington county from an award made in condemnation proceedings instituted by the appellant company. The appeal was tried before McCluer, J., and a jury, and respondents had a verdict. This appeal is taken from an order refusing a new trial.
Marsh & Searles, for appellant.
Thompson & Manwaring, for respondents, cited Boom Co. v Patterson, 98 U.S. 403.
1. The appellant was organized to build and operate a railway from the north line of the city of Stillwater to the south line of the town of Baytown, in Washington county, the principal object of which was to connect by railway the different railroads now terminating in the city of Stillwater, viz those whose depot is in the lower or southern, and those whose depot is in the upper or northern, end of the city appellant's road being designed as a transfer road between them. The appellant had instituted proceedings to condemn, for the purposes of their road, the property of respondents. Upon the trial of an appeal from the award of the commissioners, the only matter in issue being the value of the property, the court, under the objection and exception of the railway company, allowed the following question to be asked of a witness on the part of the land-owners: "Is there any other route by which connections can be made between the lower depot and the upper depot, except across this land?" -- to which the answer was: We think this was error. This evidence did not fairly tend to show the market value of the property, or even its general fitness for railroad purposes. The manifest purpose of it was to show that the railway company had got to have it, and therefore to make their necessities, rather than the market value of the property, the measure of the landowners' compensation. The idea that a jury would naturally get from the admission of such evidence would be that the petitioner should be made to pay all they could afford to pay rather than do without the property, without reference to what it was fairly worth. In determining the actual value, everything, of course, which enhances its present worth should be taken into consideration; not, however, the fact that it is necessary or indispensable for the public use for which it is proposed to be taken.
Suppose the public were laying out a highway of great public importance and necessity, through a narrow ravine, would it be competent to show that this was the only practicable or possible route, so as to make the public pay for the land what they might be willing to pay under compulsion rather than do without the highway? Or suppose a railroad was intended to be built through some canyon or mountain pass, the soil of which was of little or no practical value, would it be competent to permit the owner to show that it furnished the only possible route for the road? We apprehend not. These are extreme cases, but not different in principle from the one under consideration. Stinson v. Chicago, St. P. & M. Ry. Co., 27 Minn. 284, 6 N.W. 784; Virginia & T. R. Co. v. Elliott, 5 Nev. 358, (296.) The error in admitting this evidence was afterwards emphasized by the court's refusing to instruct the jury that, in estimating the value of the property, they were not to consider the necessity of the petitioner.
2. On the trial much evidence was introduced as to the value of the property in consideration of its supposed fitness for various uses, such as that of a site for warehouses, or coal-yards, and the like, which would naturally depend somewhat on its railroad facilities. The court refused the request of the petitioner to instruct the jury: "In estimating the market value of this property, the jury cannot include any increase in value to the same that they may think will accrue to it from the construction of the contemplated railroad." We think the petitioner was fairly entitled to this instruction. It is true, the court did instruct the jury generally that they were to estimate the value of the property as of the time it was taken, but we think that, under the circumstances, the petitioner was entitled to a more specific instruction, to the effect that in estimating this value they were not to include any mere prospective or future increase of value, to result from the completion of the proposed improvement. Of course, any increase in value which the property had already experienced by reason of the commencement or public expectation of the improvement would properly be considered, because that had already affected its present market value. But the purpose of the request was to prevent the jury from taking into account any supposed future increase of value that might thereafter occur.
3. The property in question was situated upon the shore of the navigable waters of Lake St. Croix; hence, the case presents some important questions as to the extent and nature of the rights of the respondents as riparian owners. At common law, the king, as representative of the nation, held in trust for them all navigable waters, and the title to the soil under them. This was a sovereign or prerogative, and not a proprietary right. At the revolution the people of each state became sovereign, and in that capacity held all these navigable waters and the soil under them for their common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered to the general government. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Peters 367; Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. 423, 6 Wall. 423, 18 L.Ed. 756. New states, since admitted, have the same rights in these navigable waters as the original states. Upon the admission of a new state, this right of eminent domain in them, which was temporarily held by the United States, passes to the state. The patent from the United States of land on a navigable stream conveys to the patentee no title to the bed of the stream. This vests in the state as a sovereign right. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 3 HOW 212, 222, 11 L.Ed. 565; Mumford v. Wardell, supra.
In some states it is held (following the analogy of the common-law rule applicable to waters where the tide ebbs and flows) that a riparian owner on a navigable stream has the fee only to ordinary high water. Such seems to be the tenor of the decisions of the federal courts. But, as it is wholly a matter...
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