United States v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 01 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-2531.,71-2531.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William Lloyd BAILEY, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

458 F.2d 408 (1972)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. William Lloyd BAILEY, Appellant.

No. 71-2531.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

March 21, 1972.

Rehearing and Rehearing Denied June 1, 1972.

Philip Fahringer (argued) of O'Dowd, Fahringer & Diamos, Tucson, Ariz., for appellant.

James Wilkes, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), William C. Smitherman, U. S. Atty., Tucson, Ariz., for appellee.

Before DUNIWAY, HUFSTEDLER and KILKENNY, Circuit Judges.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 1, 1972.

HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge:

Bailey appeals from his conviction for bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) and (e). The pivotal issue on appeal is the validity of two search warrants, pursuant to which incriminating evidence was seized.

Bailey and his codefendant Cochran robbed a branch office of Western Savings and Loan Bank in Globe, Arizona, on April 2, 1971. They took $8490 in travelers checks and $3056 in cash. In the course of the robbery, Bailey captured and held as hostages the manager of the bank and his family. About six weeks after the robbery, on May 12, 1971, Bailey and Cochran were arrested more than 100 miles from Globe in Tucson, Arizona. At the time of his arrest, Bailey was driving a 1970 Pontiac Grand Prix automobile bearing Colorado license plates. He was accompanied by an unidentified person. Cochran was arrested in a house in Tucson later the same day at which time she told one of the FBI agents that she had borrowed the Pontiac from a friend of hers in Denver about a month after the Globe robbery.

Search warrants were issued the day after the arrests had been made. One warrant was issued to search the Pontiac, and the other was issued to search the house in which Cochran was arrested. Both warrants were issued upon the affidavits of Lewis Fain, a Special Agent of the FBI. The affidavits are set forth in full in the margin.¹

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In substance, each affidavit amply described Bailey and Cochran, the circumstances of the robbery and abductions, and the articles that were the objects of the search. However, neither affidavit stated any facts to support the affiant's conclusions that he had reason to believe that the automobile and the house, respectively, contained the objects of the searches, other than the facts that Bailey had been arrested in the automobile and that Cochran had been arrested in the house. The search of the Pontiac, pursuant to the warrant, yielded some of the stolen travelers' checks.² The search of the house yielded clothing worn during the robbery.

Bailey's motion to suppress that evidence on the ground that the search warrants were invalid was denied. We hold that the denial of the motion was erroneous because neither affidavit met the constitutional standards of Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 and Spinelli v. United States (1969) 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637.

Aguilar requires that a magistrate's determination of probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant must be supported by an affidavit that discloses the underlying circumstances from which the affiant has concluded that his information is reliable and that it must contain a statement of the underlying circumstances "to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the validity" of the affiant's conclusion that the things to be seized are where he says they are. (393 U.S. at 413, 89 S.Ct. at 587.)

In applying Aguilar in Durham v. United States (9th Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 190, 193, we said that:

"The facts submitted to the Commissioner must be sufficient to justify a conclusion by him that the property which is the object of the search is probably on the person or premises to be searched at the time the warrant is issued. The most convincing proof that the property was in the possession of the person or upon the premises at some remote time in the past will not justify a present invasion of privacy. . . ." (Emphasis added.)

The only fact set forth in the affidavit to support the affiant's conclusion that the described articles might be in the Pontiac was that Bailey was apprehended in the vehicle six weeks after the robbery. There is no indication that the car had been used in the robbery, that Bailey owned it, or that he had even been seen in it before his arrest. Under these circumstances, there was no foundation for any inference that the automobile contained the fruit of the search.³

The affidavit in support of the search of the house is no better than the affidavit for the automobile warrant. The affidavit simply discloses that Bailey had been seen at the house and that Cochran was arrested there. No facts are recited from which it could be inferred that Bailey and Cochran were other than casual social guests at the residence. At the trial, there was evidence that Bailey and Cochran had leased the house, but that fact was not before the issuing magistrate.

"All data necessary to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be contained within the four corners of a written affidavit given under oath. . . ." United States v. Anderson (9th Cir. 1971) 453 F.2d 174, 175.

See also Giordenello v. United States (1958) 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503. In short, there is nothing but conjecture to sustain the conclusion that the house contained the objects of the search. As we observed in United States v. Lucarz (9th Cir. 1970) 430 F.2d 1051, 1055:

"Simply from the existence of probable cause to believe a suspect guilty, it does not follow in all cases that there is also probable cause to search his residence. If that were so, there would be no reason to distinguish search warrants from arrest warrants, and cases like Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed. 2d 685 (1969), . . . would make little sense."

The Government argues that the searches can be upheld even though the warrants are invalid on the theory that the searches were incident to the arrests. They weren't. The search of the automobile was accomplished at both a time and a place substantially removed from the arrest. Also, the search of the house substantially exceeded the scope permissible by Chimel, supra.

The Government also argues that the search of the automobile could be sustained under the doctrine of Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419. The facts do not bring the case within the Chambers ambit. There was no probable cause to believe the vehicle contained the fruit of the crime. There were no exigent circumstances justifying the search. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564.)

The evidence produced from the illegal search was highly incriminating. We cannot say that "beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the error complained of did not contribute" to the conviction. Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

KILKENNY, Circuit Judge (dissenting):

If either of the searches was valid, the judgment should be affirmed on the theory that the error complained of did not, beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to the conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). Both searches, in my opinion, were valid and should be upheld.

THE AUTOMOBILE SEARCH

The affidavit makes it crystal clear that appellant was the bank robber or at least one of the participants in the robbery. It identifies the checks and currency which were stolen from the bank, the clothing worn by the robbers and the pistol used at the time of the robbery. The affidavit clearly establishes that the bank robber was "apprehended"¹ in a 1970 Pontiac vehicle and that the affiant had reason to believe that the vehicle might contain the fruits of the robbery and the personal property above mentioned. From the foregoing, the Magistrate could reasonably infer: (1) that the bank robber would be in possession of some of the fruits of the robbery; (2) that he would have some of the fruits with him in the automobile; (3) that the robber either before or during the apprehension would conceal some of the fruits in the automobile; and (4) that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant.

The fact that the apprehension occurred some one hundred miles from the scene of the robbery and over one month later is beside the point. In these circumstances, reason still dictates that the robber would probably have some of the fruits either on his person or in the vehicle he then occupied. The affidavit makes it clear that the fruits of the robbery were still missing. Where would be a better place to look than in the area in which the robber is apprehended?

We have recently said that in determining the sufficiency of a search warrant, the Magistrate must look to the nexus between the items which are the subject of the search, the place to be searched and the type of crime committed. The nature of the items and the extent of the suspect's opportunity for concealment, normal inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide the stolen property, and related matters must be considered in determining whether or not the search warrant is sufficient. United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970).

The only real difference, if any, between the facts outlined in the instant affidavit and those before the court in Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1964), is that in Porter the affidavit alleged that he was the owner of the automobile. Here, the affidavit charges that appellant was apprehended in the automobile. To me this is a distinction without a significant difference. Since it does not appear in the affidavit, we must assume that the Magistrate did not know that the robber was the driver. However, he did know that the...