Williams v. United States

• Decision Date: 11 November 2022
• Docket Number: 7:22-CV-46-D,7:20-CR-55-D-l
• Parties: BRADLEY WILLIAMS, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina

BRADLEY WILLIAMS,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

Nos. 7:22-CV-46-D, 7:20-CR-55-D-l

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Southern Division

November 11, 2022

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III United States District Judge

On March 21,2022, Bradley Williams (“Williams” or “petitioner”) moved pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his 84-month sentence [D.E. 41]. On April 1,2022, Williams moved for compassionate release [D.E. 45]. On April 20,2022, Williams moved for leave to expand the record [D.E. 47]. On May 2,2022, the government moved to dismiss [D.E. 49] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 50]. On May 24,2022, Williams moved to stay the motion to dismiss pending the ruling on his motion to expand the record [D.E. 52]. On June 14,2022, the government responded in opposition to Williams's motion to stay [D.E. 53]. On July 5, 2022, Williams replied [D.E. 54]. On August 4,2022, Williams moved for leave to amend his section 2255 motion [D.E. 55] and filed an amended section 2255 motion [D.E. 56]. On August 18,2022, the government responded in opposition [D.E. 57]. As explained below, the court grants Williams's motion for leave to expand the record, denies as futile Williams's motion for leave to amend, denies Williams's motion to stay, grants the government's motion to dismiss, dismisses Williams's section 2255 motion, and denies Williams's motion for compassionate release.

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I.

On December 10, 2022, without a written plea agreement and after a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, Williams pleaded guilty to distributing a quantity of marijuana (counts one and two), possession with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine and a quantity of marijuana (count three), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (count four). See Rule 11 Tr. [D.E. 46] 2-30; Presentence Investigative Report (“PSR”) [D.E. 33]. On March 15,2021, the court held Williams's sentencing hearing, adopted the facts as stated in the PSR, overruled William's objection, and found Williams's total offense level to be 15, his criminal history category to be in, and his advisory guideline range to be 24 to 30 months' imprisonment on counts one, two, and three and 5 years' consecutive imprisonment on count four. See [D.E. 37]; [D.E. 38] 1; Sent. Tr. [D.E. 58] 2-9. After thoroughly considering all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced Williams to 24 months' concurrent imprisonment on counts one, two, and three and 60 months' consecutive imprisonment on count four, for a total of 84 months' imprisonment. See Sent Tr. at 15-20. Williams did not appeal.

II.

In Williams's section 2255 motion, Williams argues that (1) his counsel was ineffective by advising him to plead guilty to criminal offenses that arose from conduct that he thought would be resolved in state court; (2) his counsel was ineffective by failing to advise him of the nature of the offenses to which he pleaded guilty; and (3) his plea was not knowing because he did not understand the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty. See [D.E. 41]. Williams also seeks leave to amend his section 2255 motion to raise a challenge to his conviction under Kuan v. United States, 142 S.Ct. 2370 (2022). See [D.E. 56].

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for ‘failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” tests a complaint's legal and factual sufficiency.

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See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp, v, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-63, 570 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187,190 (4th Cir. 2010), affd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298,302 (4th Cir. 2008); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,93-94 (2007) (per curiam). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court need not accept a complaint's legal conclusions. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Similarly, a court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-79. Moreover, a court may take judicial notice of public records without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.. Fed.R.Evid. 201(d); Tellabs, Inc, v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a section 2255 motion, the court is not limited to the motion itself. The court may consider “the files and records of the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223,225 (1st Cir. 1993). Likewise, a court may rely on its own familiarity with the case. See, e.g.. Blackledge v. Allison. 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1977); United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d 354, 359-60 (4th Cir. 2013).

A.

Williams seeks leave to amend his section 2255 motion to add a claim under Ruan. See [D.E. 56] 9-13. According to Williams, in Ruan the Court altered the scienter requirement for 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1) to require the government to prove that a defendant knowingly and intentionally violated the statute. See id. at 9.

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after service, or, if it is a pleading requiring a response, within 21 days after service of the response or service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading only with the written consent of the opposing party or by leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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15(a)(2). Although “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires,” the court need not grant a plaintiff leave to amend when “the amendment would be futile.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,242 (4th Cir. 1999).

Section 2255(f) contains a one-year statute of limitations. Section 2255(f) provides that the one-year clock is triggered by one of four conditions, whichever occurs last:

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by die Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)-(4); see Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295,299-300 (2005).

The court entered judgment on March 19,2021. See [D.E. 37]. Williams did not appeal, and Williams's conviction became final at the latest on April 2,2021. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139,142 (4th Cir. 2001); cf. Hannigan v. United States, 131 F.Supp.3d 480, 484 n.l (E.D. N.C. 2015), appeal dismissed, 638 Fed.Appx. 234 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished). Thus, Williams had until April 2,2022, to file a timely section 2255 motion, and his original section 2255 motion was timely.

Williams filed his motion for leave to amend on August4,2022 [D.E. 55]. Williams's Ruan claim is untimely unless he can show that his claim relates back to his original pleading. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650, 659-64 (2005); Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220,241 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Pittman, 209 F.3d 314,318 (4th Cir. 2000); Brizuela v. Clarke, 112 F.Supp.3d 366, 380-81 (E.D. Va. 2015),

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appeal dismissed, 633 Fed.Appx. 178 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished); Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c).

Relation back is allowed when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B). Williams has not met this standard. See, e.g., Mayle, 545 U.S. at 659-64. In his first section 2255 motion, Williams alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. See [D.E. 41]. Williams's proposed new claim does not relate back to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and alleges a separate claim under Ruan. Compare Id. with [D.E. 55]. Therefore, Williams's Ruan claim is untimely.

Alternatively, Williams procedurally defaulted his Ruan claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Thus, the general rule of procedural default bars Williams from presenting this claim under section 2255. See, e.g., Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,621 (1998); United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248,253 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 144 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, Williams has not plausibly alleged “actual innocence” or “cause and prejudice” resulting from the alleged error about which he now complains. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622-24; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,170 (1982); United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 280-85 (4th Cir. 2010); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 144; United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-95 (4th Cir. 1999).

Alternatively, Williams has not demonstrated that Ruan applies retroactively. See In re Blanc, No. 22-12527-F, 2022 LEXIS 24640, *1-5 (11th Cir. Aug. 31,2022) (unpublished); Brizuela v. United States, No. 1:22CV2, 2022 WL 4369977, *5-6 (N.D. W.Va. Sept. 21, 2022) I (unpublished). Moreover, and in any event, Williams's Ruan claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Williams misinterprets the holding in Ruan. In Ruan, the Court did not

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introduce a new scienter standard for all prosecutions under 21 U.S.C. § 841. See Ruan-142 S.Ct. at 2382. Instead, the change in scienter...