United States v. Harris

• Decision Date: 02 July 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:13cr17/MCR
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LONGIE T. HARRIS, JR., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,

v.LONGIE T. HARRIS, JR., Defendant.

Case No. 3:13cr17/MCR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PENSACOLA DIVISION

Dated: July 2, 2013

ORDER

The Defendant is charged in a one-count indictment with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). The matter is before the court on the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 20, 2013. Having carefully considered the testimony, evidence, and arguments of the parties, the court finds that the Defendant's motion should be granted.

BACKGROUND

While on patrol on the evening of September 3, 2012, Deputy Pawal Wieszadlo of the Escambia County Sheriff's Office observed a tan Dodge Caravan with a crack in the lens cover of the left rear taillight through which white light emitted.¹ After following the vehicle for approximately one block, Deputy Wieszadlo initiated a traffic stop.² When he approached the vehicle, Deputy Wieszadlo asked the Defendant for his driver's license.Rather than produce a driver's license, the Defendant handed Deputy Wieszadlo a Florida Identification Card. When Deputy Wieszadlo inquired further, the Defendant admitted he did not have a valid driver's license. Deputy Wieszadlo returned to his patrol car and ran a check on the Defendant, which revealed that the Defendant's license had been revoked. Deputy Wieszadlo thus asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle, and as he did, Deputy Wieszadlo observed a firearm on the left side of the driver's seat.³ After learning that the Defendant was a convicted felon, Deputy Wieszadlo placed him under arrest for driving with a suspended license and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The Defendant seeks to exclude evidence of the firearm and ammunition, as well as all statements he made during the course of his arrest,⁴ arguing that the seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the traffic stop was not supported by probable cause and therefore was invalid. For the reasons set forth below, the court agrees.

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). "To satisfy constitutional concerns, a traffic stop requires either probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." United States v. Parker, No. 12-14142, 2013 WL 1104098, at *1 (11th Cir. March 18, 2013). "A determination of probable cause rests on objective factors, and the officer's subjective motives in making the stop are irrelevant." United States v. Peguero, No. 11-13043, 2013 WL 1909036, at *1 (11th Cir. May 9, 2013) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813); United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 n.3 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that "a police officer's subjective motivations for conducting a stop have no bearing on the objective inquiry into whether the stop is reasonable under the FourthAmendment") (emphasis in original); United States v. Harrelson, 465 Fed. Appx. 866, 868 (11th Cir. 2012) ("To determine whether the officer had probable cause, we do not focus on the officer's subjective motives; rather, we focus on whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justified the stop."). "'[A] traffic stop based on an officer's incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.'" Peguero, 2013 WL 1909036, at *1 (quoting Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003)). "As the Supreme Court has explained, 'what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.'" United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)). "This rule provides law enforcement officers broad leeway to conduct searches and seizures regardless of whether their subjective intent corresponds to the legal justification for their actions," so long as the legal justification is objectively grounded. United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir. 1999). In other words, "[s]o long as a traffic law infraction that would have objectively justified the stop had taken place, the fact that the police officer may have made the stop for a reason other than the occurrence of the traffic infraction is irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment . . . ." Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 173 (5th Cir.1998). A mistake of law, however, can never provide probable cause for a traffic stop, see Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279, because the "'failure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively reasonable,'" United States v. Rosvall, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1276 (D. Utah 2009) (quoting United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original)).

Here, the Defendant was stopped because the vehicle he was driving had a cracked taillight lens cover that allowed for the emission of white light.⁵ He was cited for a violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.610, which makes it unlawful

for any person to drive . . . on any highway any vehicle . . . which is in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with such lamps and other equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter, or which is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter, or for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required under this chapter.

The statute further provides that if a law enforcement officer has "reasonable cause to believe that a vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair," he may "require the driver of the vehicle to stop and submit the vehicle to an inspection and such test with reference thereto as may be appropriate." Fla. Stat. § 316.610(1). In order to determine whether a stop was justified under § 316.610(1), courts should consider the Florida statutes "that delineate specific equipment requirements." Paul v. State, 991 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2008); see also Hilton v. State, 961 So. 2d 284, 290 (Fla. 2007) (holding that "for a stop to be constitutional under the 'not in proper adjustment or repair' section of 316.610(1), the equipment defect or damage must be in violation of the law"); Doctor v. State, 596 So. 2d 442, 446 (Fla.1992).

The Government relies on three statutes in support of its argument that Deputy Wieszadlo's stop of the Defendant was justified under Florida law and thus was reasonableunder the Fourth Amendment.⁶ First, the Government references Fla. Stat. § 316.224, which requires that

[a]ll lighting devices and reflectors mounted on the rear of any vehicle . . . display or reflect a red color, except the stop light or other signal device, which may be red, amber, or yellow, and except that the light illuminating the license plate shall be white and the light emitted by a backup lamp shall be white or amber.

According to the Government, a taillight that shines or reflects any color other than red violates Florida law.⁷ This position has no support in Florida law. Indeed, although Fla. Stat. § 316.224 requires that all rear-mounted lights display or reflect a red color, it does not require that the lens covers of such lights be free from cracks or that there be no emission of white light. See Paul, 991 So. 2d at 406. Moreover, the Government has not provided - nor has the court found - any Florida case standing for the proposition that a crack in the lens cover of a taillight allowing some white light to emit constitutes a statutory traffic violation. To the contrary, Florida courts have repeatedly found that white light emitting through a crack in a taillight lens cover does not render a vehicle noncompliant under Fla. Stat. § 316.224 and that such a defect constitutes a statutory violation only if no red light is emitted from the taillight. See Doctor, 596 So. 2d at 446-47 (holding that "a reasonable officer would have known that [Defendant's] vehicle was in compliance with the law since red taillights were visible on both ends of the vehicle" despite the emission of white light); Johnson v. State, 888 So. 2d 122, 124-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding thatappellant made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to challenge the legality of a stop initiated because of white light emitting through a cracked lens cover of a brake light); Frierson v. State, 851 So. 2d 293, 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (noting that a cracked lens cover, as opposed to a cracked taillight, is not "violative of the law"), quashed on other grounds, 926 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2006).

In Doctor, officers stopped the defendant's vehicle pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 316.610 because of a crack in the lens cover of the left rear taillight. Doctor, 596 So. 2d at 446. In deciding whether the stop was justified, the Florida Supreme Court considered Fla. Stat. § 316.610 in conjunction with other statutes that "delineate the specific equipment requirements for vehicles" and found only one statute applicable, that being Fla. Stat. § 316.221(1), which requires all vehicles to be equipped with at least two rear mounted taillights that emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of 1,000 feet to the rear. Id. According to the evidence in Doctor, the defendant's vehicle had two sets of rear lights, each of which was equipped with a signal light on the outside, a brake light, a reverse light, and a lens cover or reflector, one of which was cracked. One of the officers confirmed...