United States v. Jackson

Decision Date03 April 2023
Docket Number3:19-cr-00098-TMR-5
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JAMES RALPH JACKSON, III, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE (DOC. NO. 217)

THOMAS M. ROSE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case is before the Court on the Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. No. 217) (the “Motion”), filed by James Ralph Jackson, III (Jackson). Jackson is currently incarcerated at McDowell FCI [Federal Correctional Institution] in West Virginia. He asks the Court for compassionate release from his term of imprisonment. More specifically, he asks that this Court grant him “compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).” (Doc. No. 217 at PageID 844.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Jackson's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 30, 2019, the United States of America (the Government) filed an 11-count Indictment in this case, with two of the counts brought against Jackson and the remaining counts brought against four other individuals. (Doc. No. 7.) On or about November 14, 2019, pursuant to a plea agreement, Jackson pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment, which charged him with conspiracy to interfere with commerce by threats or violence (Hobbs Act), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)(1), and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Doc. No. 68.) The Statement of Facts attached to the Plea Agreement, signed by Jackson and his attorney, states:

Beginning on a date unknown, but at least by on or about August 21, 2016 and continuing until on or about January 13 2019 in the Southern District of Ohio, the defendant JAMES RALPH JACKSON, III together with at least one other person, both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, knowingly and intentionally agreed and conspired to unlawfully delay, obstruct and affect, interstate commerce, as that term is defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951, and the movement of articles and commodities in interstate commerce by committing armed robberies to wit: home invasions of Dayton, Ohio area drug dealers. As a party and member of this agreement, the defendant voluntarily joined this conspiracy knowing that its objective was to commit armed home invasions/robberies and carjackings of drug dealers in order to wrongfully take and steal from their illicit drug inventories and criminal proceeds generated from the illicit drug sales. The personal property sought by and obtained by the conspirators from their victims without their permission and consent included: various illicit controlled substances, U.S. currency, jewelry, clothing, shoes, firms [sic] and motor vehicles. The conspirators wrongfully obtained aforesaid personal property from the various victims through the wrongful use of actual and threatened force, violence and fear of injury both immediate and future. The defendant JAMES RALPH JACKSON, III intended to join this conspiracy together with at least one other person to achieve these objectives, thereby sharing a unity of purpose and intent to commit home invasions/armed robberies and carjackings. During the existence of the conspiracy, at least one of the conspirators performed at least one of the overt acts listed in the Indictment while in the Southern District of Ohio in order to further the conspiracy's objective. Representative overt acts completed by one or more of the conspirators included:
a. On or about January 13, 2019, the co-conspirators Dreshaun Alexander Thomas and Kieran Chandre Furness, drove a Dodge Ram pickup truck to a residence located at 4478 Gatewood Place, Trotwood, Ohio;
b. Upon arriving at said location, said co-conspirators, forced entry into said residence;
c. While inside said residence, said co-conspirators forcibly removed an individual made known to the Grand Jury as “J.B.” from the premises at gun point; and d. After removing “J.B.” from said residence, said co-conspirators proceeded to carjack “J.B.'s” 2018 Mazda CX-9.

(Doc. No. 68 at PageID 196.)

The Final Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) regarding Jackson provided additional information about the circumstances of the offense, and it identified approximately thirteen prior adult criminal convictions and numerous other minor convictions. (PSI ¶¶ 94-117.) Jackson's extensive criminal history, spanning nearly two decades, included convictions for receiving stolen property in 1999 (and again in 2001), reckless operation in 2001, burglary in 2002, two counts of disorderly conduct in 2003, vehicular assault in 2003, theft in 2007, four counts of identity fraud in 2012, aiding and abetting fraud in 2012, possession of marijuana in 2013, and fraud in 2016. (Id.) Additionally, the PSI stated that Jackson had previously violated probation and, more recently, committed an offense (fraud) while on supervision for which he was subsequently convicted. (Id. ¶¶ 96, 104-06.) However, the PSI also indicated that Jackson had successfully completed home confinement in the past and that he complied with community service requirements. (Id. ¶¶ 94-109.) Further, the PSI stated that Jackson accepted responsibility and showed remorse for his actions with respect to the offense he pleaded guilty to in this case. (Id. ¶ 43.)

At sentencing, the Court imposed a 60-month term of incarceration, three years of supervised release with special conditions, a $100 special assessment, and restitution in the amount of $18,717 (joint and several with his co-defendants). (Doc. No. 208.) Jackson is currently 42 years old and has an anticipated release date of September 9, 2025. (See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS INMATE LOCATOR, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited March 29, 2023).)

Jackson filed several documents in support of the Motion. (Doc. No. 217.) The Government filed a Response to the Motion (Doc. No. 218) (the “Response”), in which the Government opposes the relief sought in the Motion. No reply was filed in support of the Motion, and the time to do so has now passed (see 01/18/2023 Notation Order). The matter is ripe for review and decision.[1]

II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards

Section 3582(c)(1)(A), colloquially known as the “compassionate release” statute, grants authority, in certain limited circumstances, to modify a term of imprisonment after it has been imposed. It provides, in part:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that-in any case-the court .. may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).[2]

Therefore, a court may reduce a defendant's previously imposed term of imprisonment if it finds that three requirements are met: (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”; (2) the “reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) the § 3553(a) factors, to the extent that they are applicable, support the reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747, 749 (6th Cir. 2021). On the other hand, a court may deny a compassionate release motion when any of the three substantive requirements is lacking and need not address the others.[3] United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). Moreover, while a court may reduce the term of imprisonment if all three requirements are met, it “need not do so.” Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (stating that a court “may” reduce the term of imprisonment); United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020) (Congress's use of ‘may' in § 3582(c)(1)(A) dictates that the compassionate release decision is discretionary, not mandatory”).

Regarding the third requirement, § 3582(c)(1)(A) instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1108 (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). The factors set forth in Section 3553(a) consider such things as the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offense, the history of the defendant, the characteristics of the defendant, “and various penological goals, such as the need to promote respect for law and to protect the public,” as well as to reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2020); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Among the variety of items that courts specifically have considered in the context of motions for compassionate release are the type of offense(s) for which the defendant was convicted whether the defendant had prior criminal convictions (and, if so, how many and the seriousness of such crimes), whether the defendant had prior juvenile convictions, the defendant's background, whether the defendant previously complied with any presentence or post-incarceration conditions, the amount of the sentence that the defendant has served to date, whether the court varied downward from the...

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