United States v. Madison

• Decision Date: 10 October 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 6:17-cr-15-Orl-37KRS
• Citation: 337 F.Supp.3d 1186
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Jarvis Wayne MADISON
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

337 F.Supp.3d 1186

UNITED STATES of America

v.Jarvis Wayne MADISON

Case No. 6:17-cr-15-Orl-37KRS

United States District Court, M.D. Florida.

Signed October 10, 2018

Andrew C. Searle, US Attorney's Office, Orlando, FL, for United States of America

D. Todd Doss, Larry B. Henderson, Federal Public Defender's Office, Orlando, FL, for Jarvis Wayne Madison

ORDER

ROY B. DALTON JR., United States District Judge

Now before the Court are the parties' pre-trial motions in this federal capital case for which the Court determined no hearing is required.¹ Upon thorough consideration, the Court makes the following rulings.

BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2018, the grand jury returned a three-count second superseding indictment charging Defendant Jarvis Wayne Madison with: (1) kidnapping that resulted in a death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) ("Kidnapping Offense "); (2) interstate domestic violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261(a)(1) and (b)(1) ; and (3) interstate stalking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(1) and 2261(b)(1). (Doc. 211.) The Government then filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty as to the Kidnapping Offense. (Doc. 230 ("Notice ").) This Notice identified the factors the Government contends warrant the imposition of the death penalty under the provisions of the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 – 3598 ("FDPA "). (Id. )

Beyond being eighteen or older at the time of the offense, the Government proposed as statutory threshold factors that Defendant: (1) intentionally killed the victim; (2) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of the victim; (3) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken and intending that lethal force would be used in connection with a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, and the victim died as a direct result of that act; and (4) intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of violence, knowing that the act created a grave risk of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense, such that participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for human life and the victim died as a direct result of such action. (Id. at 2–3 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591(a)(2)(A)–(D) ).)

For statutory aggravating factors, the Government proposed one: the death of the victim or injury resulting in the death of the victim occurred during the commission or attempted commission of, or during the immediate flight from the commission of, the kidnapping. (Id. at 3 (citing § 3592(c)(1) ).) Last, the Government proposed two non-statutory aggravating factors: victim impact and pattern of domestic abuse. (Id. at 4 (citing § 3593(a)(2) ) ); see also § 3592(c) ("The jury ... may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists.").

Following this, the parties filed various pre-trial motions that have now been fully briefed. The Court takes each in turn, but starts with an overview of the FDPA.

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Death Penalty Act

To be eligible for the death penalty under the FDPA, a defendant must first be found guilty of a death penalty eligible crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3591. A kidnapping charge under § 1201 that results in "the death of any person" counts. See § 1201 ("[I]f the death of any person results, [the Defendant] shall be punished by death or life imprisonment."). Thus, if a defendant is found guilty of kidnapping with a resulting death, a separate sentencing hearing follows "to determine the punishment to be imposed." § 3593(b). Before a jury may consider death, it must make specific findings beyond a reasonable doubt: First, a threshold inquiry into the defendant's mental state under § 3592(a)(2); and if statutory intent is found, at least one of the statutory aggravating factors in § 3592(c). Only after the jury makes these findings is the defendant death penalty eligible.

If eligibility is met, the jury "shall consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death." § 3593(e). To that end, the FDPA allows the presentation of information "as to any matter relevant to the sentence ... regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury." § 3593(c). The Government maintains the burden of establishing aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defendant has the burden of establishing mitigating factors by a preponderance of the information. Id. "Based upon this consideration, the jury by unanimous vote ... shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence." § 3593(e). If "it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified," the defendant "shall be sentenced to death." § 3591(a).

With that backdrop, the Court turns first to Defendant's motions.

II. Defense Motions

A. Motion to Declare 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) Unconstitutional and to Strike Death Penalty Notice

First, the Court tackles Defendant's motion to declare the federal kidnapping statute unconstitutional and strike the Notice. (Doc. 290.) The Government opposes. (Doc. 304.)

1. Factual background²

Married in 2013, Defendant and the victim, R.M., were estranged at the time of the offenses charged in the Indictment. (Doc. 304, p. 4.) On November 15, 2016, R.M. reported a domestic violence incident to the Indiana state police. (Id. ) During the incident Defendant confined R.M. inside his car, at gunpoint, and verbally threatened to kill her. (Id. ; see also Doc. 1, ¶ 6) When R.M. first attempted to escape, Defendant fired a single round shot at R.M, narrowly missing her. (Doc. 304, p. 4; see also Doc. 1, ¶ 6.) On her second escape attempt, R.M. succeeded, taking refuge in a Wal-Mart where a store employee called 911. (Doc. 304, p. 4.)

An Indiana State Police Trooper responded to the 911 call and made an official report concerning the incident. (Id ; see also Doc. 1, ¶ 7.) By the time law enforcement arrived, Defendant fled the scene. (Doc. 304, p. 4.) Following the incident, R.M. left Indiana with her aunt, traveling to Ormond Beach, Florida where she resided with her aunt until her disappearance on November 27, 2016. (Id. )

According to the Government, beginning on November 15, 2016, after R.M. fled to Florida, Defendant began travelling southbound. (Id. at 4–5.) On November 27, 2016, he arrived in Volusia County where he first surveilled the house of R.M.'s aunt. (Id. at 6; see also Doc. 1, ¶ 9.) That same day, R.M. went jogging and Defendant, disguised, approached R.M. (Doc. 304, p. 6.) At some point between November 27, 2016, and December 2, 2016, Defendant shot R.M. multiple times while she was a passenger in his car. (Id. ) Following R.M.'s disappearance, her aunt reported her missing to law enforcement. (Id. at 7.) On December 2, 2016, law enforcement located and arrested Defendant in Louisville, Kentucky where he ultimately admitted to shooting R.M. three times while inside his car but claimed she voluntarily went with him from Florida. (Id. ; see also Doc. 1, ¶ 12.) Defendant then agreed to assist law enforcement in locating R.M.'s remains, and that evening he led agents to the site of R.M.'s burial where they located R.M.'s partially buried body. (Doc. 304, p. 8; Doc. 1, ¶¶ 12, 17.)

2. Analysis

Section 1201(a) criminalizes kidnappings when a defendant "unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person ... when the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Defendant brings both a facial and as-applied challenge, contending that § 1201(a) is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments and overbroad under the First Amendment.³ (Doc. 290, p. 1.)

The Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee is violated "by taking away someone's life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement." Johnson v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2556, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) ; see also Maynard v. Cartwright , 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). Even if a criminal statute can be read to cover some conduct, it still may be void for vagueness. See Johnson , 135 S.Ct. at 2560–61 ("[A]lthough statements in some of [the U.S. Supreme Court's] opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, [its] holdings contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp."). Instead, whether a law is void for vagueness depends on "whether the law is so incoherent that it either ‘denies fair notice to defendants’ or ‘invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.’ " United States v. Caldwell , 655 F. App'x 730, 732 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Johnson , 135 S.Ct. at 2557 ).⁴

Even if a law is not unconstitutionally vague it may be impermissibly overbroad. Agan v. Vaughn , 119 F.3d 1538, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997). The distinct concept of overbreadth "is part of first amendment doctrine." Hallandale Prof'l Fire Fighters Local 2238 v. City of Hallandale , 922 F.2d 756, 760 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1991). A statute may be invalidated as overbroad "if ‘a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.’ " United States v. Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010), superseded by statute on other grounds (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party , 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6, 128 S.Ct. 1184...