United States v. Mercado-Flores
| Decision Date | 08 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 14–466 (GAG). |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jorge MERCADO–FLORES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Julia Meconiates, United States Attorneys' Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Johnny Rivera–Gonzalez, San Juan, PR, Luis R. Lugo–Emanuelli, Lugo Emanuelli Law Office, Fajardo, PR, for Defendant.
On July 17, 2013, a federal grand jury rendered a one-count indictment that charged Defendant Jorge Mercado–Flores with the transportation of a fourteen-year-old female minor within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). (See Case No. 13–408(GAG) at Docket No. 16.) After extensive plea negotiations, Defendant and the Government entered into a plea agreement whereby Defendant agreed to plead guilty by way of an information to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2421, the transportation of an individual, as opposed to a minor, with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. (See Case No. 14–466(GAG) at Docket No. 6.) Both parties agreed that the mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment of section 2423(a) was excessive given the particular facts of this case. On July 31, 2014, the court held a change of plea hearing, whereby Defendant filed a waiver of indictment and pled guilty by way of information to 18 U.S.C. § 2421 in criminal case 14–466(GAG). (See Docket Nos. 1, 2, 6, and 7.)
Thereafter, on May 11, 2015, the court sentenced Defendant to fifty-seven months imprisonment, based on a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421, but reserved judgment on the following jurisdictional matter. (See id. at Docket No. 39.) The court questioned whether section 2421 applies to an offense wholly within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico because unlike section 2423(a), which applies to acts wholly within "any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States," section 2421applies only to acts wholly within any "Territory, or Possession of the United States." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (transportation generally) with 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (transportation of minors). Accordingly, the court ordered the Government to address this paramount issue of statutory interpretation. The Government timely filed its brief, arguing that section 2421 does indeed apply to Puerto Rico because despite its commonwealth status, it remains a territory of the United States. (Docket No. 43.)
Upon reviewing the Government's arguments, interpreting the applicable statutes along with the history of the unique relationship between the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and adhering to binding judicial precedent, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2421, which makes it a federal crime to transport any individual with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity "in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States," does not apply to a purely intrastate criminal act committed within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Accordingly, the court vacated the Judgment at Docket No. 44.
Thereafter, the Government filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's Opinion and Order that vacated Judgment at Docket No. 46, which is now presently before the court. (See Docket No. 55.) The Government argues that contrary to the court's conclusion, it is not well-settled law that Puerto Rico is no longer a mere territory and that an examination of the purpose of section 2421 reveals that Congress intended to treat Puerto Rico as a territory for purposes of the statute. (Id. )
Upon considering the Government's submission and the pertinent law, the court DENIES the Government's Motion for Reconsideration at Docket No. 55.
A motion for reconsideration cannot be used as a vehicle to re-litigate matters already litigated and decided by the court. Villanueva–Mendez v. Vazquez, 360 F.Supp.2d 320, 322 (D.P.R.2005). It is also a long-standing rule that motions for reconsideration cannot be used to bring forth new arguments. See Nat'l Metal Finishing Co., Inc. v. BarclaysAm./ Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir.1990) (). These motions are entertained by courts if they seek to correct manifest errors of law or fact, present newly discovered evidence, or when there is an intervening change in law. See Rivera Surillo & Co. v. Falconer Glass. Indus. Inc., 37 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1994).
Accordingly, for a motion for reconsideration to be granted, the court recognizes only three possible grounds: "(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available, and (3) the need to correct a clear error of law." See Torres v. Gonzalez, 980 F.Supp.2d 143, 147 (D.P.R.2013). "In practice, because of the narrow purposes for which they are intended, Rule 59(e) motions typically are denied." 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.) (2012); Rivera v. Meléndez, 291 F.R.D. 21, 23 (D.P.R.2013) ().
The court finds that it need not correct any manifest error of law nor that re- litigation of the same issues already analyzed in its Opinion and Order at Docket No. 46 is warranted. That being said, the court will briefly address the Government's arguments in order.
The court flatly disagrees with the Government's contention that it is not well-settled law that Puerto Rico is no longer a mere unincorporated territory of the United States for purposes of statutory interpretation. Without repeating the thorough discussion in its Opinion and Order, the court reiterates that following 1952, the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have consistently recognized the significant change in the degree of autonomy exercised by Puerto Rico in light of the many Congressional actions that transformed the island from a mere territory to that of the unique status of a commonwealth. (See Docket No. 46 at 4–11.) In response to this legislative history and in line with the established principle that the question of "[w]hether and how a federal statute applies to Puerto Rico is a question of Congressional intent," Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuño, 670 F.3d 310, 320 (1st Cir.2012), the Supreme Court and courts within the First Circuit have repeatedly held that Puerto Rico constitutes a State for purposes of statutory interpretation and that statutes governing actions wholly within any territory of the United States do not apply to Puerto Rico. See, e.g., Calero–Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 670–76, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (); Córdova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 41 (1st Cir.1981) (); Trigo Bros. Packing Corp. v. Davis, 159 F.Supp. 841, 842–43 (D.P.R.1958), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Davis v. Trigo Bros. Packing Corp., 266 F.2d 174 (1st Cir.1959) (); United States v. Figueroa Rios, 140 F.Supp. 376 (D.P.R.1956) ().
Although the Government argues that the First Circuit's holding in Córdova can only be applied narrowly to cover section three of the Sherman Act, the court finds the analysis and reasoning to be directly applicable to the statute at bar. After recognizing that "Puerto Rico's status changed from that of a mere territory to the unique status of Commonwealth," the court explained that "[t]he significance of this change from the point of view of the Sherman Act arises out of the fact that, as a general matter, the Sherman Act ceases to apply to purely local affairs once territories become states ...." Córdova, 649 F.2d at 41–42. Therefore, the court stated that there is no discernible reason why the Sherman Act should apply to Puerto Rico differently, given the Congressional intent to grant the island state-like autonomy. Id. at 42. Accordingly, the court held that it is fair to assume that the framers of the Sherman Act would have intended that Puerto Rico be treated as a State under the Act had they known about the commonwealth status of the island. Id.
Similar to how the Sherman Act does not apply to purely local affairs of the States, the federal government does not generally impede upon the core police powers of the States that grants them authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 901, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). Therefore, as a general matter, there is an "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [a federal act] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct....
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