United States v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 08 November 2022
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL ELH-14-0403,CIVIL ELH-20-1798
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent, v. CORNELL LOUIS ROBINSON, Petitioner.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent, v. CORNELL LOUIS ROBINSON, Petitioner.

CRIMINAL No. ELH-14-0403

CIVIL No. ELH-20-1798

United States District Court, D. Maryland

November 8, 2022

MEMORANDUM

Ellen L. Hollander United States District Judge

Cornell Robinson, Petitioner, has filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF 143 (“Petition”). The motion was filed on Johnson's behalf by the Office of the Federal Public Defender (“FPD”), based on Rehaif v. United States, U.S., 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). However, the FPD has since withdrawn its representation of Petitioner. ECF 151 (Motion); ECF 152 (Order of 5/4/22). Nevertheless, Robinson has advised that he seeks to pursue his post-conviction petition. ECF 154. He asks this Court to vacate his conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF 143. The government opposes the Petition. ECF 156. Robinson has not responded.

No hearing is necessary to resolve the Petition. For the reasons that follow, I shall deny the Petition.

I. Background

Robinson and a codefendant were indicted on August 27, 2014. ECF 1. Of relevance here, Robinson was charged in a Superseding Indictment (ECF 19) with carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1) (Count One); Possession and Brandishing Firearms, in furtherance of a Crime of Violence, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Two); and Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Three).

On July 29, 2015, after a three-day jury trial before the Honorable J. Frederick Motz, the jury convicted Robinson of carjacking possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. ECF 101.

Sentencing was held on November 13, 2015. Judge Motz sentenced Robinson to 96 months of imprisonment for Count One; a consecutive term of 84 months for Count Two; and to 96 months of imprisonment for Count Three, concurrent with Counts One and Two. Thus, defendant received a total sentence of 180 months of incarceration. ECF 119. The Court also sentenced Robinson to five years of supervised release.

Robinson filed a timely appeal, but the appeal did not raise the issue pertinent to the Petition. ECF 121. The Fourth Circuit affirmed (ECF 133), and the mandate issued on May 17, 2017. ECF 134.

II. Legal Standard

Section 2255(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides relief to a prisoner in federal custody only on specific grounds: “(1) ‘that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,' (2) ‘that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such a sentence,' (3) ‘that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,' and (4) that the sentence ‘is otherwise subject to collateral attack.'” See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255); see United States v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420, 426 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Newbold, 791 F.3d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2010).

Under § 2255, the Petitioner must establish (1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid. Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2003).

And, “an error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428).

The scope of collateral attack under § 2255 is narrower than on appeal, and a “‘collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.'” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 519 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)). A failure to raise a claim on direct appeal constitutes a procedural default that bars presentation of the claim in a § 2255 motion, unless the petitioner can demonstrate “cause and actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he complains,” or “actual innocence.” Pettiford, 612 F.3d at 280 (citing United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1999)); see Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (“Habeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986); see also Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 354 (1994) (stating that “the writ is available only if the petitioner establishes ‘cause' for the waiver and shows ‘actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation.'”); Finch v. McKoy, 914 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2019) (discussing requirements for a claim of actual innocence); United States v. Linder, 552 F.3d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 2009).

In reviewing the Petition, the Court is mindful that a self-represented litigant is generally “held to a ‘less stringent standard' than is a lawyer, and the Court must liberally construe his claims, no matter how ‘inartfully' pled.” Morrison v. United States, RDB-12-3607, 2014 WL 979201, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 12, 2014) (internal citations omitted); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating that claims of self-represented litigants are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 634 (4th Cir. 2021) (same); Bala v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Conservation & Recreation, 532 Fed.Appx. 332, 334 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (same).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), the court must hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief ....” United States v. Mayhew, 995 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2021); see United States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2004). Ordinarily, a district court has discretion as to whether to hold a hearing, but “a hearing is required when a movant presents a colorable Sixth Amendment claim showing disputed facts beyond the record, or when a credibility determination is necessary to resolve the claim ....” Mayhew, 995 F.3d at 176-77. If the district court “denies relief without an evidentiary hearing,” the appellate court will “construe the facts in the movant's favor.” United States v. Akande, 956 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Turner, 841 Fed.Appx. 557, 559 (4th Cir. 2021) (same)

In my view, no hearing is necessary. As discussed below, no colorable claim has been presented in the Petition.

III. Discussion

A.

At the time of Robinson's conviction, the law did not require a defendant to know that his prior conviction was a felony conviction. See United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). After Robinson's conviction, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif, making clear that, in addition to proving that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, the government must also prove that the defendant “knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2200.

Accordingly, Robinson now claims that his conviction is invalid for three reasons: (1) the indictment did not allege the knowledge-of-status element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), as required under Rehaif; (2) the evidence presented by the government at trial did not prove Robinson knew of his prohibited status at the time he possessed the firearm; and (3) the Court violated the Sixth Amendment by failing to instruct the jury on the knowledge-of-status element of § 922(g). ECF 143.

Petitioner failed to raise on direct review the claim he asserts here. To sufficiently excuse a procedural default, a defendant must either show: (1) cause for the default and prejudice as a result; or (2) actual innocence of his conviction. United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 253 (4th Cir. 2012); see Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).

“[C]ause for a procedural default must turn on something external to the defense, such as the novelty of the claim or a denial of effective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1999). A procedural default cannot be excused because a defendant failed to recognize and raise a claim on direct appeal. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535 (1986). In order to determine whether a claim is novel enough to satisfy actual cause, courts ask not “whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel's task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was ‘available' at all.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 537.

As noted, the Supreme Court did not decide Rehaif until 2019. But, the government points out that the issue of whether a defendant must know that he is a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) was frequently litigated in the Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that a defendant need not know of his status as a prohibited person under § 922(g)); United States v. Santiesteban, 825 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Williams, 588 F.2d 92, 92-93 (4th Cir. 1978) (rejecting arguments similar to those raised in Rehaif).

Therefore, a Rehaif claim is not so novel as to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1084 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that petitioner's Rehaif claim was not “truly novel” so as to excuse procedural default).

Alternatively Robinson cannot show that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim, nor does he assert as much. See Murray v. Carrier, ...