United States v. St. Clair

• Citation: 293 F. Supp. 337
• Decision Date: 20 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 68-CR-77.,68-CR-77.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Peter John ST. CLAIR, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

293 F. Supp. 337

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Peter John ST. CLAIR, Defendant.

No. 68-CR-77.

United States District Court E. D. New York.

November 20, 1968.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph P. Hoey, U. S. Atty. for Eastern Dist. of New York, Brooklyn, N. Y., for plaintiff, Michael Rosen, Frank R. Natoli, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel.

Lubell & Lubell, New York City, for defendant, Jonathan W. Lubell, Stephen L. Fine, New York City, of counsel.

OPINION AND ORDER

WEINSTEIN, District Judge.

This criminal prosecution for refusal to submit to induction (50 U.S.C.App. § 462(a)) presents the narrow but spiny question of whether there is revealed in the defendant's Selective Service record any "basis in fact" for denying his request for classification as a conscientious objector. 50 U.S.C.App. § 460(b) (3); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-123, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946). Since our answer is no, the indictment must be dismissed.

In July, 1965, shortly after his eighteenth birthday, defendant registered with his Local Board, leaving blank the claim on the registration form to be filled in by a conscientious objector. As a college student he was classified 2-S. Informed that he had withdrawn from school "as of 12/1/66," on January 4, 1967 the Local Board reclassified defendant 1-A. By letter dated January 9 defendant requested a personal appearance, and on February 14 he forwarded to the Local Board SS Form No. 150, the "Special Form For Conscientious Objector."

A ten page handwritten explanation the defendant attached to his Form 150 stated that he is a pantheist, not a member of an organized religious group, and opposed to war by reason of his religious beliefs. He wrote in part:

"I consider myself a Pantheist. In my belief everything is God. All Physical substance and anything else that exists is God. * * * I believe that God is an impersonal force or being rather than a personal one and immanent rather than transcendent. God, in my belief, encompasses everything that exist sic and is therefore an existing being itself.

* * * * * *

My belief in this "Supreme Being" involves only the duty to live according to my own conscience. It is this duty to my conscience that prevents me from participating in war, and makes me willing to bear the consequences of a jail sentence if necessary. I believe that war is a crime against humanity and that I myself would be playing a major part in this crime if I were to participate in any war. I therefore must and will refuse to serve in any military organization, in obedience to this belief.

* * * * * *

I believe that the bases of my present pantheistic beliefs was sic in my questioning and later rejecting much of the theology which I was taught. My pantheistic views also stem in part from the scientific teaching I received during my Catholic education.

My moral belief in non participation in war comes in part from the opinions of certain teachers, mentioning names who taught me at St. Augustines sic high school * * * and Manhattan College. * * *

The violent force of one human being inflicting physical damage on another human being with the intent to injure, is in direct contridiction sic to this idea of love, and I consider it a gross evil. There are however some circumstances on the individual level in which I feel that the use of limited physical violence is necessary. There are occasions in which the force is used to aid rather than injure the victem sic, such as medical treatment upon a delerious sic patient, restraining a mental patient, or in subduing a criminal. In these cases I feel that the violence inflicted upon the victem sic is done so for his greater good. (cure of patients, rehabilitation of criminals) These acts and others like them, because their purpose is not to injure people but to help them, could be carried out in a spirit of love rather than hate.

* * * * * *

The Local Board notified defendant that a personal interview would be granted. It instructed him, in a mimeographed letter, that he could present "new evidence pertinent to your case * * * in writing" and might be accompanied by a companion but not by "an attorney or legal counsel." The defendant appeared alone and without submitting any additional documents. He was seen by a single member of the Board. The written summary of this personal appearance in the Local Board's records reads, so far as relevant, as follows:

"A thorough reading of all sheets attached to 150 reveals innumerable inconsistencies —hold until after preinduction physical for further study of entire file for local board determination."

Five days after defendant was found physically fit for military duty, the Local Board met and unanimously denied conscientious objector status. The Board's record of the meeting states only:

"Review of entire file by local board & in opinion of member conducting hearing there was a lack of sincerity & in the opinion of the local board the registrant did not maintain the necessary of sic burden of proof to warrant a 1O or 1AO classification."

Having received a letter from defendant notifying it that he appealed its ruling, the Board scheduled a meeting with "the Government Appeal Agent regarding" the appeal. The notes of this meeting —apparently those of the Appeal Agent—contain only a brief summary of the file and conclude: "Registrant respectfully asks that he be reclassified 1O." There is no indication in the record that the Agent gave defendant any advice.

Following this meeting defendant was sent another mimeographed letter explaining that the former method of investigation by the Department of Justice to develop the facts in the case had been abandoned, that the burden was upon defendant "to substantiate his claims" and that he could present additional written statements. This letter reads, in part, as follows:

"Any information that would tend to indicate that your claim for Conscientious Objection is sincere and meaningful and not based on political, philosophical or sociological views nor merely your own personal moral code, would be helpful, as well as information showing that you are opposed to war in any form, including one which is purely defensive in nature, and not merely opposed to a particular war or form of war.

The above suggested information may be submitted by way of a written statement by you or by some of your friends and associates who are familiar with your views.

Please understand that the burden is upon you to substantiate your claim."

The defendant submitted no further evidence. By a vote of 5-0 on December 22, 1967 the Appeal Board continued his 1-A classification.

After the appeal had been pending some months, defendant mailed a letter to the Department of Justice stating that he would refuse "to cooperate any further with the Selective Service System" because of his belief in "the sacredness of human life" and that he was, accordingly, "withdrawing" his request for conscientious objector status. This letter was apparently never considered by the Appeal Board. This Court can only consider facts before that Board in determining the validity of the classification decision. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 382, 75 S. Ct. 392, 396, 99 L.Ed. 428 (1955). Since the letter of withdrawal did not enter into the decision to deny conscientious objector status, it is not now relevant.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLASSIFICATION

The power to review classification decisions is one of the most restricted known to our law. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-123, 66 S.Ct. 423, 427, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946) ("only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which the Appeal Board gave the registrant"); Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir.1957) ("the range of review is the narrowest known to the law"). It "is not for the courts to sit as super draft boards, substituting their judgments on the weight of the evidence for those of the designated agencies. * * * The classification can be overturned only if it has `no basis in fact.'" Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 380-381, 75 S.Ct. 392, 395 (1955).

In a criminal prosecution the District Court reviews the decision of the highest body within the Selective Service System that decided the issue— here, the Appeal Board. DeRemer v. United States, 340 F.2d 712, 715, 719 (8th Cir.1965); United States v. Wymer, 284 F.Supp. 100 (S.D.Iowa 1968). The Appeal Board makes a de novo determination. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.25. It may refuse to allow the decision of a local board while basing its decision upon the record before the Local Board. Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54 Calif.L.Rev. 2123, 2158-59 (1966); Note, Changes in the Draft: The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 4 Colum. J. L. & Social Problems 120, 132 (1967). If the "information" in the record is "not sufficient" the Appeal Board "shall return the file to the local board with a request for additional information or action." 32 C.F.R. § 1626. 23. The Local Board then, as always, has power to make a more precise record or to gather additional information by subpoenaing witnesses. 32 C.F.R. § 1621.15.

In the case before us the Appeal Board had only the record of the Local Board. While we can assume somewhat more knowledge on the part of the higher body, skill cannot substitute for a record if administrative expertise is not to become "`a monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion.'" Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167, 83 S.Ct. 239, 245, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 393 U.S. 87, 92, 89 S.Ct. 280, 21 L.Ed.2d 219 (1968). In the absence of an assignment of reasons for the Appeal Board's decision, any judicial review of the question of whether there is a "basis in fact" for its decision must proceed from a consideration of the only evidentiary material upon...