United States v. Temple

• Decision Date: 18 December 1956
• Docket Number: No. 53 C 1116.,53 C 1116.
• Citation: 147 F. Supp. 118
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Paul L. TEMPLE, Sullivan Box Factory, a copartnership, and Republic Box Company, a copartnership, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

147 F. Supp. 118

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Paul L. TEMPLE, Sullivan Box Factory, a copartnership, and Republic Box Company, a copartnership, Defendants.

No. 53 C 1116.

United States District Court N. D. Illinois.

December 18, 1956.

R. Tieken, U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Myer H. Gladstone, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

SULLIVAN, District Judge.

This action is one by the Government to recover damages for several transactions in which it claims it has been defrauded by defendant Paul Temple. On the basis of its complaint and one other document which will be discussed later, the Government has moved for a summary judgment in its favor.

The first affirmative defense asserted by the answer is that the complaint is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Consideration of this defense requires an examination of the various Counts of the complaint. Counts I and II set forth two occasions on which Temple allegedly obtained money from the Smaller War Plants Corporation as loans by making false representations, and ask double damages under the False Claims Act, Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 231. That section provides:

"Any person * * * who shall make * * * any claim upon or against the Government of the United States * * * knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent * * * shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of $2,000, and, in addition, double the amount of damages which the United States may have sustained by reason of the doing or committing such act * * * and such forfeiture and damages shall be sued for in the same suit."

The cause of action there given is limited by Title 31 U.S.C.A. § 235, which provides that "Every such suit shall be commenced within six years from the commission of the act, and not afterward".

That limitation would, in view of the times involved, bar the present action so far as Counts I and II are concerned, unless the time for filing was extended by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, Title 18 U.S.C. § 3287:

"When the United States is at war the running of any statute of limitations applicable to any offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner * * * shall be suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President * * *"

The question therefore is whether Section 231 designated an "offense involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States". The Supreme Court held in United States v. Grainger, 1953, 346 U.S. 235, 73 S.Ct. 1069, 97 L.Ed. 1575, that a violation of the companion criminal section of the False Claims Act, Title 18 U.S.C. § 287, was such an "offense" and that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act accordingly tolled the normal three-year Statute of Limitations. Whether this decision requires a similar conclusion in the present instance depends upon a comparison of the sections involved. Using exactly the same language, both are concerned with any person who "makes any claim against the United States, knowing such claim to be false"; the sole distinction is in the remedy provided.

That a civil and compensatory remedy is made available to the Government in addition to a criminal sanction does not in any way change the character of the act performed, or make it any less an "offense against the United States". United States v. Strange Bros. Hide Co., D.C.N.D.Iowa 1954, 123 F. Supp. 177. Nor is this conclusion a mere matter of semantics revolving around the word "offense". The False Claims Act was concerned with fraud of a pecuniary nature, committed against the government, Marzani v. United States, 1948, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 78, 168 F.2d 133, affirmed without opinion 335 U.S. 895, 69 S.Ct. 299, 93 L.Ed. 431 and 336 U.S. 922, 69 S.Ct. 653, 93 L.Ed. 1084; United States v. Cochran, 5 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 131 and United States v. Lurie, 7 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 11, 15. The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act was concerned in turn with the ease with which fraud could be concealed, and sought to grant the government in time of war a correspondingly longer time to discover it. Bridges v. United States, 1953, 346 U.S. 209, 73 S.Ct. 1055, 97 L.Ed. 1557. Surely Congress may be assumed to have been as anxious, or even more anxious, to preserve to the government its civil remedy as its criminal retribution.

This conclusion is supported by similar holdings under the analagous Surplus Property Act, United States v. Covollo, D.C.E.D.Pa.1955, 136 F.Supp. 107; United States v. Witherspoon, 6 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 858. And lower courts which have considered the question have unanimously held that the Wartime Suspension Act tolled the limitations section of the False Claims Act: United States v. Strange Bros. Hide Co., D.C.N.D. Iowa 1954, 123 F.Supp. 177; Dugan & McNamara, Inc., v. United States, 1955, 127 F.Supp. 801, 130 Ct.Cl. 603; United States v. Salvatore, D.C.E.D.Pa.1956, 140 F.Supp. 470. The Seventh Circuit has clearly indicated that, if squarely faced with the same problem, this would be its position, United States v. Lurie, 7 Cir., 1955, 222 F.2d 11, 15. Cf. United States ex rel. Nitkey v. Dawes, 7 Cir., 1945, 151 F.2d 639, certiorari denied 327 U.S. 788, 66 S.Ct. 808, 90 L.Ed. 1015.

Since Sec. 231 provides a remedy for an offense against the United States involving fraud, the time for its enforcement was tolled by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, and this action was timely filed as to Counts I and II.

Count III alleges the presentation to the Government of a fraudulent claim and seeks recovery under Title 41 U.S.C.A. § 119, which allows recovery by the United States for presenting to the government a false document for the purpose of obtaining money. This section is subject to no specific statutory limitation, and a recent Supreme Court decision, Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 1956, 350 U.S. 148, 76 S.Ct. 219, indicates that Title 28 U.S.C. § 2462 limiting the time for recovery of "penalties" would not apply, cf. United States v. Weaver, 5 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 796; United States v. Witherspoon, 6 Cir., 1954, 211 F.2d 858; and Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., v. United States, Ct.Cl., 145 F.Supp. 922. Counts IV and V (described below) are common law counts as to which there is no statute of limitations against the government. The defense of the statute of limitations as to these Counts must accordingly also be overruled.

The second...