University of Texas-Pan American v. Valdez
Decision Date | 28 October 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 13-92-022-CV,TEXAS-PAN,13-92-022-CV |
Citation | 869 S.W.2d 446 |
Parties | 88 Ed. Law Rep. 1272 The UNIVERSITY OFAMERICAN, Appellant, v. Mario Alberto VALDEZ, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
David Allan Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Morales, Atty. Gen., Mary F. Keller, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Delmar L. Cain, Asst. Atty. Gen., Will Pryor, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellant.
Jesus Ramirez, Jose R. Guerrero, Montalvo & Ramirez, McAllen, for appellee.
Before SEERDEN, C.J., and KENNEDY, and FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA, Jr., JJ.
Mario Valdez sued the University of Texas-Pan American ("the University") under the Texas Tort Claims Act to recover damages for personal injuries he sustained during a baseball game at the University baseball field. A jury found that Mr. Valdez's injuries were caused 60% by the negligence of the University and 40% by his own negligence. The trial court rendered judgment in Mr. Valdez's favor for $129,000 plus prejudgment interest and all costs of court. The University appeals asserting that Mr. Valdez's claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, that Mr. Valdez failed to obtain jury findings necessary to support a judgment in his favor, and that the University owed no legal duty to Mr. Valdez. We reverse and render.
While enrolled as a student at the University, Mr. Valdez sustained head injuries playing left field as a member of the school's baseball team during an intercollegiate game held at a field owned and controlled by the University. In attempting to catch a long fly ball, Mr. Valdez ran into an outfield fence, and struck his head against it. Mr. Valdez consequently suffered impairment to the right side of his visual field. Mr. Valdez sued the University, under the Texas Tort Claims Act, pleading negligent use of the field, dangerous condition, and premise defect. The University both specially excepted and answered asserting its immunity as an affirmative defense to the suit. During trial, the University continued to assert its immunity by a motion for instructed verdict, by objections to the charge, and by tendering substantially correct jury questions. Over the objections of the University, the case was submitted to the jury on the sole theory that the University was negligent in using the field without a warning track. While the jury found the University negligent in its use of the field, it answered favorably to the University on two submitted questions which were material to the immunity defense. The jury found that Mr. Valdez did not pay to use the baseball field, and found "from a preponderance of the evidence that the baseball field and outfield fence in question were constructed prior to January 1, 1970." Both parties moved for judgment based on some of the jury's answers. The trial court rendered judgment for Mr. Valdez.
Because it is dispositive, we will direct our review to the appellant's second point of error. The University complains that the trial court erred in entering judgment for Mr. Valdez, and erred in failing to grant the University's special exceptions, motion for instructed verdict, and motion for judgment. The University contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, asserting that Mr. Valdez's claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The University's complaints, having been timely presented to the trial court in the above motions, are properly before us for review. TEX.R.APP.P. 52(a).
In reviewing an assertion that, contrary to the judgment, an affirmative defense has been established as a "matter of law", this Court normally utilizes a standard which involves a two-tiered analysis of the evidence. Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). However, in this case, the University actually procured jury findings favorable to its defense. These were disregarded by the trial court. Because Mr. Valdez has not challenged the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury findings, our review is limited to an inquiry into the propriety of the court's determination that the findings could be disregarded. The court may disregard a jury finding supported by evidence when the issue is immaterial. TEX.R.CIV.P. 301; Eubanks v. Winn, 420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex.1967).
The State of Texas, even if it has committed tortious acts, is immune from suit unless it gives its consent to be sued. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 453 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1970). As an agency of the State, the University enjoys the protection afforded by this sovereign immunity, except in instances where immunity has been expressly waived by statute. See Delaney v. University of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 58-59 (Tex.1992).
The essence of the University's position is that under the present facts the Texas Tort Claims Act affords Mr. Valdez a single cause of action for a "premise defect." That claim, asserts the University, is barred because the giving rise to a premise defect claim is the actual construction of the premises, and the jury found that the construction of the ballfield with the outfield fence was completed prior to January 1, 1970. This would serve to place Mr. Valdez's suit in circumstances where the statute expressly retains immunity for the State. The University contends that Mr. Valdez has asserted no other valid theory of recovery. We agree.
The State of Texas has consented to suit in only limited instances which are enumerated in the Texas Tort Claims Act. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. ch. 101 (Vernon 1986 & Vernon Supp.1993). The provisions applicable to this case provide waiver of immunity for:
personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.
Id. at § 101.021(2). However, this waiver is limited by the provision that:
(a) If a claim arises from a premise defect, the governmental unit owes to the claimant only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on private property, unless the claimant pays for the use of the premises.
(b) The limitation of duty in this section does not apply to the duty to warn of special defects such as excavations or obstructions on highways, roads, or streets or to the duty to warn of the absence, condition or malfunction of traffic signs, signals, or warning devices as is required by Section 101.060.
Id. at § 101.022. Additionally, the Tort Claims Act provides that it "does not apply to a claim based on an act or omission that occurred before January 1, 1970." Id. at § 101.061.
The threshold question presented here is whether Mr. Valdez's claim presents a cause of action for a premise defect, and if so, what constitutes the of the University for purposes of determining the date of occurrence.
While the act does not define "premise defect", this Court has previously applied a common, ordinary meaning to the term. Billstrom v. Memorial Medical Ctr., 598 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
The word 'premises' is commonly defined as 'a building or part of a building with its grounds or other appurtenances'.... 'Land and its appurtenances'.... The word 'defect' is commonly defined as a 'shortcoming, imperfection' or 'want of something necessary for completeness'.
Id. See also Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Henson, 843 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) ( ). Mr. Valdez's claim alleges an unsafe (imperfect) condition of the baseball field (land) and its rigid, unyielding fence (appurtenance to land). Regardless of the labels Mr. Valdez attaches to his claim, we hold that his cause of action is one alleging that a condition on real property constitutes a premise defect.
Other appellate courts that have considered this issue have held that where liability arises from a premise defect under section 101.022(a) on real property owned by the State, the is the actual building of the structure. When construction is complete prior to January 1, 1970, and where there have been no structural changes since that date, the State enjoys sovereign immunity. Chapman v. City of Houston, 839 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) ( ); Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Crossland, 781 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1989, writ denied) ( ); Shives v. State, 743 S.W.2d 714, 716-17 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1987, writ denied) ( ); Burnett v. Texas Highway Dep't, 694 S.W.2d 210, 211-12 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ...
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