Uribe v. Houston General Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 04-92-00382-CV,04-92-00382-CV
• Citation: 849 S.W.2d 447
• Parties: Mario URIBE, Appellant, v. HOUSTON GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 447

849 S.W.2d 447

Mario URIBE, Appellant, v. HOUSTON GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 04-92-00382-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas San Antonio.

Feb. 26, 1993.

Phil Hardberger, Hardberger & Rodriguez, Inc., Larry Zinn, San Antonio, for appellant.

John Milano, Jr., Thornton, Summers, Biechlin, Dunham & Brown, Inc., San Antonio, for appellee.

Before PEEPLES, BIERY and GARCIA, JJ.

OPINION

BIERY, Justice.

This is an appeal of a summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant, Houston General Insurance Company [Houston General] and against the plaintiff, Mario Uribe, on the plaintiff's claims of violations of TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 21.21, §§ 4, 16 (Vernon Supp.1993); State Bd. of Ins., 28 TEX.ADMIN.CODE §§ 21.3(a), 21.4 (West October 10, 1988) (Unfair Competition and Unfair Practices of Insurers, and Misrepresentation of Policies); TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(g) (Vernon 1981); State Bd. of Ins., 28 TEX.ADMIN.CODE § 21.203 (West October 10, 1988) (Unfair Claims Settlement Practices); TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 1987); and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. ¹ The trial judge granted a general summary judgment on all of Mr. Uribe's causes of actions. In one point of error, Mr. Uribe contends the general summary judgment as to all six causes of action was erroneously granted. We reverse and remand.

The standard for appellate review of a summary judgment for a defendant is whether the summary judgment proof establishes, as a matter of law, that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to one or more of the essential elements of each of the plaintiff's causes of action. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970). The movant has the burden to show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985); TEX.R.CIV.P. 166(a), (c).

A defendant may not be granted summary judgment on a cause of action not addressed in the summary judgment proceeding. Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983). Motions for summary judgment "stand or fall on the grounds specifically set forth in the motion(s)." Ortiz v. Spann, 671 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (opinion on rehearing) (emphasis added). As stated by the Texas Supreme Court:

It is axiomatic that one may not be granted judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not addressed in a summary judgment proceeding. In City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979), we wrote, "The movant ... must establish his entitlement to a summary judgment on the issues expressly presented to the trial court by conclusively proving all essential elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law."

Chessher, 658 S.W.2d at 564 (alteration in original). If a summary judgment is erroneously rendered when under the record of the summary judgment proceeding one or more causes of action were not addressed in the movant's motion for summary judgment, we must reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for determination of the untried issues. See Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 703-04 (Tex.1984); Chessher, 658 S.W.2d at 564; Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453, 454-55 (Tex.1982). ² This is because the trial court should have rendered a partial and interlocutory summary judgment, not a final judgment disposing of all issues and parties in the case. Teer, 664 S.W.2d at 705; Chessher, 658 S.W.2d at 564. The merits of the appeal are not reached because, in the absence of an order of severance, a partial or interlocutory summary judgment is appealable only "when and not before the same is merged in a final judgment disposing of the whole case." Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 324 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1959); see also Teer, 664 S.W.2d at 704-05.

For example, in Teer, 664 S.W.2d at 702, landowners brought an action against the City of Bellaire, Wayne Duddlesten and H-R-D-37, Ltd. seeking declaration of the invalidity of certain city zoning ordinances. Two of the defendants, Duddlesten and H-R-D-37, Ltd., moved for a summary judgment. The trial court entered a final summary judgment in favor of all the defendants, even though the City was not a party to the summary judgment proceedings. In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals declared the City's ordinances valid. Teer v. Duddlesten, 641 S.W.2d 569, 573-76 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1982). The supreme court reversed the judgment of the lower courts and remanded the entire cause to the trial court without addressing the merits of the landowners' appeal--the validity of the zoning ordinances. Teer, 664 S.W.2d at 705. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Robertson suggested:

In remanding this cause we will needlessly waste the time and effort of the parties and courts involved in this litigation. The merits of this cause, brought forward by Plaintiffs' appeal of their declaratory judgment action, are properly before the court and should be passed on.

Id. (Robertson, J., dissenting). However, in declining to review the merits of the appeal as to the parties properly before the court, the majority stressed the importance of obtaining a proper summary judgment:

The judgment in the summary judgment proceeding erroneously included City of Bellaire. The correct judgment was one that did not adjudicate plaintiffs' rights against City. It should have been an interlocutory or partial summary judgment. We reverse the judgments of the courts below and remand the cause to the trial court for a trial of the action against City of Bellaire.

Id. at 705. (emphasis added)

Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 658 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.1983) is also instructive. Plaintiff instituted suit against the telephone utility to recover damages for alleged breach of employment contract, wrongful discharge, fraud and misrepresentation. Id. at 564. The defendant moved for summary judgment solely on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim; the trial court rendered a final summary judgment in its favor. The supreme court reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court:

Because Southwestern Bell moved for summary judgment on only one of Chessher's four causes of action, the court of appeals' affirmation of this judgment was improper as to the other causes of action alleged by Chessher. Griffin v. Rowden, 654 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. 1983); Puga v. Donna Fruit Co., Inc. 634 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1982); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co. v. City of Dallas, 623 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1981). Pursuant to TEX.R.CIV.P. 483, the application for writ of error is granted, ... the judgments of the courts below are reversed ...

Id. at 564 (emphasis added). As in Teer, the supreme court did not review the merits of the plaintiff's appeal. Therefore, a motion for summary judgment which challenges less than all causes of action pled and an erroneous final general summary judgment which has been entered by the trial court requires reversal and remand of the entire cause to the trial court without considering the merits of the appeal. See Johnson v. Rollen, 818 S.W.2d 180, 182 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); Whiddon v. Metni, 650 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). ³

This case began as a worker's compensation claim filed by appellant Uribe claiming compensation for personal injuries sustained at work on January 23, 1990. By March 1990, appellee Houston General refused to pay any weekly compensation or medical benefits to appellant. On May 9, 1990, the Texas Compensation Commission awarded Uribe $32,079.77 in benefits from Houston General and ordered Houston General to pay all related medical bills. On May 30, 1990, with the advice of his attorneys, Uribe entered into a compromise settlement agreement (CSA) with Houston General to settle his claim for $30,000 and related medical expenses. As required by the statute in effect at that time, the form contained the following language:

The Board finds the liability of the carrier or the extent of the injures is uncertain indefinite or incapable of being satisfactorily established.... It is ordered that the compromise agreement be and same is hereby approved.

TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (Vernon 1967). ⁴ After Houston General paid appellant the $30,000 pursuant to the CSA, Uribe filed suit alleging violations of the Texas Insurance Code, the Texas Administrative Code and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Mr. Uribe also alleged Houston General violated its common law duty of good faith and fair dealing by mishandling and wrongfully denying his claim.

Regarding Houston General's motion for summary judgment, the record reveals the motion is based on the argument the summary judgment proof establishes, as a matter of law, there is no genuine issue of fact about one or more of the essential elements of appellant's common law cause of action: Houston General contends the "finding of uncertainty" language printed on the CSA constitutes a bar to any subsequent cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The motion, however, does not speak to the remaining statutory causes of action raised by appellant's pleadings. Under this record, the trial court could only address the breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing cause of action specifically presented in the motion for summary judgment. Additionally, because the summary judgment order was general, we cannot determine from the record whether the additional causes of action were considered. Because of the requirement that all causes be specifically addressed in the movant's motion for summary judgment, a final summary judgment was improper. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

PEEPLES, Justice, concurring....