US v. Sparks

• Decision Date: 07 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 88-CR-20019-BC.,88-CR-20019-BC.
• Citation: 687 F. Supp. 1145
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Larry Roger SPARKS, Carlena Lawrence, Reginald Lawrence, Anthony Blocker, Eartha Diane Gaines, Bonnie Sparks, Elmer Charles Johnson, Eric Sparks, Diane Blacksher, Joseph Lawrence, Julian Lawrence, Bernard Peoples, Brenda Lawrence, Catrena Lawrence, Alex Taylor, Michael Lawrence, and Steve Lawrence, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

687 F. Supp. 1145

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Larry Roger SPARKS, Carlena Lawrence, Reginald Lawrence, Anthony Blocker, Eartha Diane Gaines, Bonnie Sparks, Elmer Charles Johnson, Eric Sparks, Diane Blacksher, Joseph Lawrence, Julian Lawrence, Bernard Peoples, Brenda Lawrence, Catrena Lawrence, Alex Taylor, Michael Lawrence, and Steve Lawrence, Defendants.

No. 88-CR-20019-BC.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, N.D.

June 7, 1988.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael J. Hluchaniuk, Asst. U.S. Atty., Bay City, Mich., for plaintiff.

Robert E. Bourne, Midland, Mich., for Carlena Lawrence.

Jerome E. Burns, Saginaw, Mich., for Reginald Lawrence.

Stevens J. Jacobs, Brady & Jacobs, P.C., Bay City, Mich., for Eartha D. Gaines.

Henry J. Sefcovic, Bay City, Mich., for Elmer C. Johnson.

Joseph Sheeran, Bay City, Mich., for Diane Blacksher.

David G. Myers, Caro, Mich., for Bernard Peoples.

Harry Gill, Bay City, Mich., for Catrena Lawrence.

Thomas Plachta, Mount Pleasant, Mich., for Michael Lawrence.

Robert J. Rhead, Midland, Mich., for Julian Lawrence.

Robert J. Dunn, Bay City, Mich., for Anthony Blocker.

Philip Sturtz, Saginaw, Mich., for Bonnie Sparks.

Benjamin L. Crossley, Saginaw, Mich., for Eric Sparks.

George C. Bush, Saginaw, Mich., for Joseph Lawrence.

Mark A. Kolka, Bay City, Mich., for Brenda Lawrence.

Richard King, Flint, Mich., for Alex Taylor.

Richard L. Lee, Jr., Midland, Mich., for Steve Lawrence.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHURCHILL, District Judge.

In this criminal case, three of the 17 defendants¹ charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 raise constitutional and statutory challenges to the sentencing guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("Sentencing Reform Act"), Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, 2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998). Finding no merit in the defendants' statutory arguments and resolving the constitutional challenges in a manner that permits the sentencing guidelines to remain in force, the Court must deny the defendants' motions to preclude application of the sentencing guidelines.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND ARTICLE III CONSIDERATIONS

All of the defendants who have filed motions attacking the guidelines are subject to a plea cut-off date of June 21, 1988. Faced with a degree of uncertainty concerning the applicability of the sentencing guidelines, the defendants wish to know whether they will be sentenced under the guidelines before they enter into any type of plea agreement. Logically, then, the Court ought to provide a ruling on the validity of the sentencing guidelines. Counterbalanced with the pragmatic motivation for ruling on the guidelines, however, is the constitutionally mandated case or controversy requirement. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The case or controversy requirement encompasses the concepts of standing and ripeness, both of which are prerequisites to judicial review. In the case before the Court, the defendants can demonstrate both standing and ripeness at this juncture; accordingly, Article III presents no barrier to resolution of the defendants' motions.

A. Standing

Constitutional standing analysis requires a party to allege "some actual or threatened injury" before raising issues relating to the merits of a case. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607-08, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). "`Abstract' or `conjectural' or `hypothetical'" injury is insufficient for the purpose of establishing standing. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Applying this standard, the Court finds that the defendants in the case at bar can demonstrate adequate "threatened injury" to support standing. As the district court reasoned in United States v. Chambless, 680 F.Supp. 793 (E.D.La.1988), criminal defendants subject to sentencing under the guidelines can show an "impending injury," which is sufficient to confer standing upon defendants seeking to attack the guidelines. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). Likewise, any defendant who enters into a plea agreement necessarily is subject to sentencing under the guidelines; a defendant contemplating a plea offer therefore faces more than an "abstract" or "hypothetical" injury. Cf Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3324. Thus, the Court concludes that standing affords no impediment to disposition of the defendants' motions.

B. Ripeness

In a manner similar to standing, the concept of ripeness is intended "to prevent the courts ... from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Abbott Laboratories v. Garnder, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). Ripeness, which focuses on "avoidance of premature adjudication," id., requires consideration of two factors. First, the Court must address the "fitness of the issues for judicial decision." See id. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1515. Second, the Court must evaluate "the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Id.

As Judge Enright observed in United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F.Supp. 1411 (S.D.Cal.1988), the defendants' challenges involve "purely legal issues which do not require further factual development." Id. at 1415. Accordingly, the issues raised by the defendants in the case at bar are entirely fit "for judicial decision." With respect to the "hardship" factor, there can be no doubt that defendants contemplating plea agreements require a decision as to the validity of the guidelines if they are to make an intelligent and informed choice to plead guilty and thus forego their right to a jury trial. In sum, defendants' motions raise questions that undoubtedly are ripe for judicial consideration.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

The sentencing guidelines, which became effective on November 1, 1987, constitute a bipartisan² effort to "provide certainty and fairness" in the sentencing process and to alleviate "unwarranted sentencing disparities" among similarly situated defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). The guidelines are the product of the United States Sentencing Commission, which was created and empowered by Congress "as an independent commission of the judicial branch of the United States." Id. § 991(a). Because the defendants have interposed challenges to the nature, composition and product of the Commission, the Court will briefly review the substance of operative congressional directives despite the well-documented abundance of explanatory judicial discourse on this subject. See, e.g., 43 Crim.L.Rep. at 2122-27.

The Commission in question is comprised of a single chairperson, six additional voting members, and one nonvoting member. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). Upon the recommendation of the Judicial Conference, see S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 159, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3342, "at least three of the members of the Commission shall be federal judges." 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). Despite the statutory requirement concerning inclusion of federal judges, however, members of the Commission do not technically act in their capacity as judges while sitting on the Commission. See S.Rep. at 160, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3343. All members of the Commission, including the chairperson, are appointed by the President with the "advice and consent of the Senate," 28 U.S.C. § 991(a), and are "subject to removal from the Commission by the President only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown." Id.

The purposes of the Commission are quite simple in theory — to "establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system" subject to extensive congressional directives and to "develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing" as described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) & (2). In furtherance of the Commission's stated function of promulgating sentencing guidelines, see id. § 994(a), Congress also provided the Commission with the power to "monitor the performance of probation officers with regard to sentencing recommendations," id. § 995(a)(9), to "issue instructions to probation officers concerning the application of Commission guidelines and policy statements," id. § 995(a)(10), and to "devise and conduct periodic training programs of instruction in sentencing techniques for judicial and probation personnel and other persons connected with the sentencing process." Id. § 995(a)(18). Additionally, the Commission is charged with the responsibility of considering "any petition filed by a defendant requesting modification of the guidelines utilized in the sentencing of such defendant." See id. § 994(s). Section 994 further authorizes the Commission to recommend changes to the existing guidelines, although any proposed amendments must be reported to Congress before such amendments can become effective. Id. § 994(p). Proposed amendments can be "disapproved or modified," however, only "by Act of Congress." Id.

After the Sentencing Reform Act became effective, the Commission comprised of three federal judges and four other voting members developed the sentencing guidelines at issue in the case at bar. Defendants raise challenges to several aspects of the Act that created the Commission. First, defendants contend that section 994(a) provides for an impermissible delegation of Congress' lawmaking power to the Commission. Second, defendants argue that section 994(p)'s reporting and congressional action provision amounts to an unlawful legislative veto. Next, defendants turn to the Commission itself and urge the Court to declare that the placement of the Commission in the judicial branch...