US v. Whitfield

• Citation: 689 F. Supp. 954
• Decision Date: 27 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. Cr. 3-88-7.,Cr. 3-88-7.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James Edward WHITFIELD, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

689 F. Supp. 954

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James Edward WHITFIELD, Defendant.

No. Cr. 3-88-7.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Third Division.

July 27, 1988.

Lynn A. Zentner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

George H. Smith, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.

ORDER UPHOLDING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW SENTENCING GUIDELINES

DEVITT, District Judge.

The basic question presented by this case, and by some 400 others across the nation, is whether the Congress may empower a commission, consisting in part of federal judges who are appointed and removable by the President, to establish binding and determinate sentencing standards for criminal cases.

The court believes the answer is yes, and that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and the guidelines promulgated under it, are valid; I predict the United States Supreme Court will so hold when the issue reaches it from this circuit in United States v. Johnson, 682 F.Supp. 1033 (W.D. Mo.1988) for which a writ of certiorari was granted on June 13, 1988.

The United States district court opinions are sharply divided on the question. The guidelines sentencing system has been upheld by 21 district courts and found unconstitutional by 29. The issues have been well stated and thoroughly discussed in reasoned opinions by the district judges. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the arguments, pro and con, or list the cases. They have been reported or summarized in West's Federal Supplement, in the brand new Federal Sentencing Reporter, a project of the Vera Institute of Justice, and in Federal Sentencing Update, distributed by the Federal Judicial Center.

The defendant in this case was convicted of bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The crime was allegedly committed on December 20, 1987. The new Federal Sentencing Guidelines are intended to apply to this case. Defendant moves to preclude their application as to him, claiming they violate the U.S. Constitution.

Defendant argues that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and the Guidelines, violate the principle of Separation of Powers because the Act:

1. Impermissibly assigns non-judicial responsibilities to the Sentencing Commission, which is within the judicial branch.

2. Impermissibly assigns to the President removal powers over members of the Sentencing Commission and thus extends executive control over the judicial branch.

3. Requires that federal judges serve on the Commission and thus impairs the function of the judicial branch.

For the reasons to be stated, we find none of these arguments persuasive and hold the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Guidelines to be constitutional.

In considering the constitutionality of a legislative act, the court is mindful that it is performing its "gravest and most delicate duty," Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2771, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) and that whenever possible, the courts must construe congressional enactments so as to save them from claimed constitutional infirmities. Driscoll v. Edison Light and Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 114-115, 59 S.Ct. 715, 720-720, 83 L.Ed. 1134 (1939).

In this case, defendant argues only that the Act violates the principle of separation of powers. "The underlying purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is to prevent the concentration of executive, legislative and judicial power within a single, and potentially tyrannical, branch of government." United States v. Sparks, 687 F.Supp. 1145, 1152 (E.D.Mich.1988). Rather than adhering to rigidly defined classes of duties for the coordinate branches, the United States Supreme Court has counseled that the proper focus of the doctrine and the relevant inquiry for our purposes here is:

the extent to which the Act prevents one branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential of disruption is present must we then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2790, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1976).

We consider each of defendant's claims seriatim.

A. Assignment of Non-Judicial Responsibilities to the Commission

Defendant argues that the Act imposes executive or legislative responsibilities upon the Commission and that due to the Commission's placement in the judicial branch, such an assignment violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The government agrees that the Commission as defined in the Act appears to perform an executive function but argues that the congressional designation of the Commission as being within the judicial branch is severable.

The court is persuaded by Judge Enright's reasoning in United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F.Supp. 1411 (S.D.Cal. 1988), and other cases which have similarly found, that the Commission is properly regarded as an independent commission within the judiciary which operates in aid of the judicial function and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Article III courts are authorized to promulgate rules regarding administration, operations and procedures and the congressional delegation of such rule-making authority to the judiciary is constitutional. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941) reh. denied, 312 U.S. 713 (1941). The Commission's mandate is to formulate a comprehensive framework for sentencing decisions for the purpose of reducing unwarranted disparity. This task is in aid of the judicial function of sentencing and the Commission is properly within the judicial branch. United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F.Supp. 1411 (S.D.Cal. 1988); United States v. Macias-Pedroza, No. Cr. 88-13 TUC RMB (D.Ariz. April 14, 1988); United States v. Alves, 688 F.Supp. 70 (D.Ma.1988).

B. Presidential Removal Authority

The defendant argues that the power lodged in the President to remove a Commission member for good cause violates separation of powers principles by granting the President removal authority over Article III judges, thereby expanding the power of the executive at the expense of the judiciary. The defendant relies on Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) in support of this argument.

But, the Presidential removal power properly cannot be considered control over judges on the Commission in their Article III capacities because the judges retain their position as Article III judges independently of their tenure as members of the Commission. Moreover, judges who serve on the Commission do not serve there in their judicial capacity, nor do they exercise responsibilities assigned exclusively to the judiciary by Article III. United States v. Amesquita-Padilla, 691 F.Supp. 277 (W.D. Wa.1988). Finally, the good cause standard set forth in the Act is sufficiently restrictive to prevent use of the removal power to achieve policy goals. Id. See also, United States v. Macias-Pedroza, No. Cr. 88-13 TUC RMB (D.Ariz. April 14, 1988); RuizVillanueva, 680 F.Supp. 1411 (S.D.Cal. 1988).

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