USA v. CITGO PETROLEUM Corp.
| Decision Date | 28 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. C-06-563 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CITGO PETROLEUM CORPORATION CITGO REFINING AND CHEMICALS COMPANY, L.P. PHILIP D. VRAZEL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Pending before the Court is CITGO's Motion to Set Aside Verdict, For a New Trial and For Entry of a Judgment of Acquittal on Counts Four and Five (Dkt. No. 472). Having considered the motion, response, reply, record, and relevant law, the Court is of the opinion that CITGO's motion should be DENIED.
On August 9, 2006, the Government filed its original ten count indictment against CITGO Petroleum Corporation and CITGO Refining and Chemicals Company, L.P. (collectively "CITGO"), and Philip D. Vrazel. On May 9, 2007, the Government filed its superseding indictment. CITGO was tried on Counts One, Two, Four, and Five of the superseding indictment by a jury in Corpus Christi, Texas. Counts One and Two charged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d), 18 U.S.C. § 2, and 40 C.F.R. § 61.342(e)(2)(i). Counts Four and Five charged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(e), and 40 C.F.R. § 60.692-4. The jury ultimately returned a verdict of not guilty on Counts One and Two and guilty on Counts Four and Five.
CITGO presently argues that "several manifest errors of law resulted in CITGO's conviction" for knowingly operating two oil-water separators, namely Tanks 116 and 117, without required emission control equipment. (Dkt. No. 472 at 1.) Specifically, CITGO maintains that: (1) the jury charge was clearly erroneous; (2) a conviction would violate CITGO's constitutional rights; (3) the evidence used to convict CITGO was erroneously admitted; and (4) the totality of the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court will address CITGO's arguments in turn.
"'A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict.'" United States v. Lucio, 428 F.3d 519, 522 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1998)). A jury's verdict should be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence established the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Charles, 469 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318—19 (1979)). In conducting this inquiry, the Court examines the evidence as a whole and construes it in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the verdict. United States v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 770—71 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Floyd, 343 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003)).
"The standard does not require that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 616 (5th Cir. 1991)). "If the evidence, however, gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, [the Court] must reverse the conviction, as under these circumstances 'a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.'" United States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original)).
"[A court's Rule 29] review of the sufficiency of the evidence does not include a review of the weight of the evidence or of the credibility of the witnesses." Ragsdale, 426 F.3d at 771 (quoting Floyd, 343 F.3d at 370) (internal quotation marks omitted). Loe, 262 F.3d at 432 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
A district court may grant a new trial "if the interest of justice so requires." FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a). "A motion for a new trial is addressed to the discretion of the court, which should be exercised with caution, and the power to grant a new trial . . . should be invoked only in exceptional cases . . . ." United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 493 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The power to grant a new trial "should be exercised infrequently by district courts, unless warranted by 'exceptional' circumstances." United States v. Tarango, 396 F.3d 666, 672 (5th Cir. 2005). The trial judge may grant a new trial only if he finds that the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand. See id.; United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 466 (5th Cir. 2004). If the Court "finds that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred at trial, . . . this is classified as such an 'exceptional case' as to warrant granting a new trial in the interests of justice." Sipe, 388 F.3d at 493 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The trial judge may weigh the evidence and assess credibility of witnesses in reviewing a motion for a new trial. United States v. Arnold, 416 F.3d 349, 360 (5th Cir. 2005).
CITGO presently argues that the Court's jury charge was erroneous because: (1) under the plain language of 40 C.F.R. § 60.691, the "EPA specifically defined the term 'oil-water separator' to include only units with specific types of equipment, namely 'the forebay and other separator basins, skimmers, weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers,' which are not found in equalization tanks." (Dkt. No. 472 at 4—5); and (2) the EPA specifically exempted equalization tanks from the definition of "oil-water separator" after public notice and comment. CITGO further asserts that this reading must be adopted because otherwise certain terms composing the definition of "oil-water separator," to wit "which also includes," would be superfluous.
The definition of "oil-water separator" in 40 C.F.R. § 60.691 provides:
"Oil-water separator" means wastewater treatment equipment used to separate oil from water consisting of a separation tank, which also includes the forebay and other separator basins, skimmers, weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers. Slop oil facilities, including tanks, are included in this term along with storage vessels and auxiliary equipment located between individual drain systems and the oil-water separator. This term does not include storage vessels or auxiliary equipment which do not come in contact with or store oily wastewater.
40 C.F.R. § 60.691. The Court instructed the jury as follows:
An oil-water separator means wastewater treatment equipment used to separate oil from water consisting of a separation tank, which also includes the forebay and other separator basins, skimmers, weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers. Slop oil facilities, including tanks, are included in this term along with storage vessels and auxiliary equipment located between the individual drain systems and the oil-water separator. This term does not include storage vessels or auxiliary equipment that does not come in contact with or store oily wastewater.
The definition of oil-water separator does not require that a separation tank have any or all of the ancillary equipment mentioned such as forebays, skimmers, weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers for the separation tank to meet the regulatory definition of an oil-water separator. An oil-water separator is defined by how it is used.
When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, a court must begin with the plain language used by the drafters. United States v. Uvalle-Patricio, 478 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Williams, 400 F.3d 277, 281 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted)). "[E]ach part or section of a statute should be construed in connection with every other part or section to produce a harmonious whole." Id. (quoting Williams, 400 F.3d at 281 n.2 (internal citation omitted)); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (). Furthermore, a statute should be construed in a manner that does not render any single provision superfluous. E.g., Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 876 (1991)). Plain language, moreover, should not be construed to produce an absurd result. United States v. A Female Juvenile, 103 F.3d 14, 16—17 (5th Cir. 1996). These rules of statutory interpretation apply with equal force to the interpretation of promulgated agency regulations. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 221 Ct. Cl. 771, 734 (1979) (citing Rucker v. Wabash R.R. Co., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969)).
After examining the plain language of 40 C.F.R. § 60.691, the Court is not persuaded by CITGO's argument. Nothing in the language of the definition of "oil-water separator" explicitly mandates that "the forebay and other separator basins, skimmers, weirs, grit chambers, and sludge hoppers" exist in conjunction with a separation tank in order for the units to be collectively classified as an "oil-water separator." Rather, the plain language of the definition only indicates that these ancillary items are to be included in the definition of "oil-water separator" if they exist.
This reading is consistent with the context of the definition. Indeed, each of the ancillary items modified by the phrase "which also includes" are properly described as...
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