Utley v. City of St. Petersburg

• Decision Date: 20 September 1933
• Citation: 111 Fla. 844,149 So. 806
• Parties: UTLEY et al. v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

149 So. 806

111 Fla. 844

UTLEY et al. v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

September 20, 1933

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1933.

Suit by Matilda J. Utley, joined by D. T. Utley, her husband, against the City of St. Petersburg. From a decree in favor of defendant, complainants appeal.

Affirmed.

See also, 144 So. 58. Appeal from Circuit Court, Pinellas County; T Frank Hobson, judge.

COUNSEL

L. D Martin, of St. Petersburg, for appellants.

Erle B. Askew and Carroll R. Runyon, both of St. Petersburg, for appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Appellants filed amended and supplemental bill of complaint for the purpose of obtaining a decree canceling certain paving certificates as cloud on the title of plaintiff to certain lands, and for injunctive relief.

The complainants claim to the right of having the relief prayed decreed was grounded upon the contention that chapter 9914 Special Acts of the Legislature of 1923, under which the paving certificates were issued, was void because of the several provisions thereof of being in conflict with certain provisions of being in conflict with certain provisions of

General and special demurrers were sustained and the amended and supplemental bill dismissed, from which decree appellants appealed.

It appears to us that all questions presented here have been heretofore settled by this court adversely to the contention of the appellants, and that no good purpose can be served by again restating principles of law applicable which have heretofore been clearly stated and adhered to by this court.

Chapter 14392, Special Acts of 1929, by its terms validated all special assessments levied and imposed by the city of St. Petersburg, and all certificates of indebtedness issued by the city of St. Petersburg prior to that act becoming effective, as did also chapter 15511, Special Acts of the Legislature of 1931. The assessment here complained of was levied and the certificates of indebtedness were issued prior to the enactment of either of those acts. Therefore, unless the Legislature was without authority to levy the assessment and to authorize the issuance of the certificates, the validating acts cured any defects which might have existed in connection with the issuance of the certificates. See Anderson v. City of Ocala, 83 Fla. 344, 91 So. 182; also Walters v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 177, 101 So. 227.

The sufficiency of the title to the act may be sustained on authority of the opinions and judgments in the cases of Schiller v. State, 49 Fla. 25, 38 So. 706; State ex rel. Davis v. Rose, 97 Fla. 710, 122 So. 225; McSween et al. v. State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 97 Fla. 749, 122 So. 239, 125 So. 704, 65 A. L. R. 508.

The contention that the act violates section 20 of article 3 of the Constitution has been decided adversely to the appellants' contention in the case of Milton et al. v. City of Marianna, 105 Fla. ----, 144 So. 400.

The contention that the act did not provide for due process of law has been adversely determined by this court in the case of Anderson v. City of Ocala, supra, and in many other cases, the most recent of which is that of City of Coral Gables, a Municipal Corporation, v. Certain Lands, etc., 149 So. 36, in which opinion was filed May 10, 1933.

The contention that the assessment here under consideration and the issuance of the certificates constitutes the taking of property without due process of law was determined adversely to appellants' contention in the case of City of Fort Myers v. State, 95 Fla. 704, 117 So. 97, and again in Abell v. Town of Boynton, 95 Fla. 984, 117 So. 507.

The contention that the act is...