Ni v. Slocum

Decision Date30 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. A128721.,A128721.
Citation127 Cal.Rptr.3d 620,196 Cal.App.4th 1636,11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8306,2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9936
PartiesMichael NI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Warren SLOCUM, as Chief Elections Officer, etc., Defendant and Respondent.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

DLA Piper, LLP, Steven G. Churchwell, Stanley J. Panikowski and David Dell, San Francisco, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

BuckleySandler, LLP and Donna L. Wilson, Santa Monica, for Electronic Signature and Records Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Evans & Page and Corey A. Evans, San Francisco, for Citizens in Charge, The Humane Society of the United States and National Taxpayers Union as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Antonio Gonzalez for Southwest Voter Registration Education Project as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Joe Trippi as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Gautam Dutta for Asian American Action Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michael P. Murphy, County Counsel, Brenda B. Carlson, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and David A. Silberman, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Douglas J. Woods, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, Constance L. LeLouis, Assistant Attorney General, and Hiren Patel, Deputy Attorney General, for Secretary of State Debra Bowen as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

MARGULIES, J.

To qualify an initiative measure for the election ballot, its proponents must submit to county elections officials a petition endorsed by a statutorily specified number of eligible voters. Initiative petition endorsement is ordinarily a pen-and-paper affair. Proponents of a recent initiative to legalize marijuana, however, submitted to respondent Warren Slocum, the Chief Elections Officer of San Mateo County (the County), a digital memory device containing an electronic image of an initiative petition. The petition contained a single signature, that of Michael Ni (hereafter petitioner), which he had inscribed on the electronic image of the petition by tracing it on the screen of his smartphone. Using the same signature, petitioner had also executed the required declaration by the circulator of the petition, attesting to the genuineness of his signature. The County rejected petitioner's electronic signature, explaining he had not “ personally affixed” it to the petition, as required by Elections Code section 100.

Petitioner unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate requiring the County to accept his electronic signature. We agree with the County that use of an electronic signature to endorse an initiative petition is not contemplated by the Elections Code and affirm the trial court's denial of the writ. 1

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a registered voter residing in San Mateo County. In February 2010, he filed a verified petition for a writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, seeking an order compelling the County to accept his electronic signature on an initiative petition and declaring electronic signatures to be a valid means of endorsing such petitions. The petition and complaint alleged that the proponents of Initiative No. 1377, an initiative to legalize marijuana use in California (hereafter the marijuana initiative), had agreed to work with Verafirma, Inc. (Verafirma), a developer of electronic signature software, to test the use of such signatures in the endorsement of initiative petitions. During the signature drive to place the marijuana initiative on the ballot, petitioner reviewed a copy of the initiative petition on the Internet and endorsed the online petition by using Verafirma's software to “sign[ ] it on an iPhone screen.” A copy of the petition bearing petitioner's signature was submitted to County election officials in electronic form, but the County refused to accept the electronic signature.

In support of the petition and complaint, petitioner submitted a declaration from a cofounder of Verafirma, Michael Marubio, explaining the company's method for creating an electronic signature. Using the company's software, a voter can view a copy of an initiative petition on a personal computer screen, use the screen of a “mobile touchscreen device” to trace the required signature and printed name and address, and cause an image of those tracings to appear on an electronic copy of the petition. According to Marubio, Verafirma's software uses ‘signature dynamics' technology, an electronic signature technology approved for use in California (see Gov.Code, § 16.5), and it complies with existing California statutory and regulatory requirements for electronic signatures used in connection with commerce and other governmental activities. A signature created using Verafirma's software is unique, capable of verification, under the sole control of the signer, and protected against manipulation.

In opposition, the County submitted a declaration from an elections official stating that on February 9, 2010, the San Mateo County Elections Office (County Elections Office) received a memorandum from the California Secretary of State warning elections officials that one or more counties were likely to receive “electronic devices” containing initiative petitions with electronic signatures. The memorandum stated that, after reviewing the issue, the Secretary had concluded electronic signatures do not satisfy the statutory requirement that a voter “personally affix” his or her signature, printed name, and address to an initiative petition.

Shortly thereafter, the County Elections Office received from the marijuana initiative proponents, along with ordinary signed paper copies of the petition, a portable digital memory device, known as a “thumb drive.” The thumb drive held an image of the marijuana initiative petition. In the space provided for voter endorsement on the petition were the signature Michael Ni and petitioner's handwritten name and street address. Petitioner's city of residence and zip code were also included, written in typeface rather than by hand. Petitioner had also executed the required circulator's declaration, stating that he witnessed his signature and that it was genuine. After careful examination, it appeared to the County that the same signature and printed name and address had been used for endorsing the petition and executing the circulator's declaration.

In a certification sent to the Secretary of State, the County Elections Office deemed petitioner's signature invalid because it was submitted electronically. The County apparently did not attempt to determine whether petitioner's signature otherwise satisfied statutory requirements. If it had done so, the official explained, elections officials would have visually compared the signature and address on the petition with the signature and address on petitioner's voter registration affidavit, which was maintained in electronic form in the County Elections Office.

The trial court denied the petition in a detailed written decision. The court concluded the thumb drive submitted to the County did not comply with statutory requirements for submission of an initiative petition, which the court construed to require the submission of a paper petition. In addition, the court concluded the use of an electronic signature was impermissible because it did not allow elections officials to determine whether the voter personally affixed his or her signature to the petition, as required by statute.

II. DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends the County was required to accept his electronic signature and address information as compliant with the statutory requirements for endorsement of an initiative petition under the Elections Code.2

In interpreting statutory provisions, our task ‘is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.’ ( Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 804, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 248, 139 P.3d 1196.) [I]t is well settled that we must look first to the words of the statute, “because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” ( Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1389, 1394, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 377, 241 P.3d 870.) In examining a statute's words, we “giv[e] them their ‘usual and ordinary meanings' and constru[e] them in context.” ( People v. Allegheny Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 704, 708–709, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 689, 161 P.3d 198.)

If the statutory language is unambiguous, our inquiry ends. ( Pineda v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1394, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 377, 241 P.3d 870.) On the other hand, [i]f the language is susceptible of multiple interpretations, ‘the court looks “to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” [Citation.] After considering these extrinsic aids, we “must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute....” ( Lopez v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1055, 1063, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 530, 239 P.3d 1228.) Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. ( Bruns v. E–Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 724, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 248 P.3d 1185.)

A. The Statutory Background

The California Constitution provides that an initiative measure must be placed on the ballot if the proponents present a petition signed by a sufficient number of voters—5 percent, for a statutory provision, or 8 percent, for a constitutional amendment, of the total votes cast for gubernatorial candidates in the last election. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subds. (b), (c); see Strauss v. Horton (2009) 46 Cal.4th 364, 386, 393, fn. 2,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
25 cases
  • City of San Diego v. Shapiro
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 1 Agosto 2014
    ...66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 321, supra [considering, but rejecting this interpretation of art. XIII A, § 4 ]; cf. Ni v. Slocum (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1636, 1654, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 [noting the distinction in former Political Code, § 1083a between "qualified electors" and "registered qualified ele......
  • Meyer v. Jacobsen
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 17 Mayo 2022
    ...turned on the absence of this statutory requirement. See Benjamin , 786 S.E.2d at 211 (distinguishing Ni v. Slocum , 196 Cal.App.4th 1636, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620 (2011) ). Under Montana law, by contrast, the Administrator is required to "check the names of all signers to verify they are regi......
  • City of San Diego v. Shapiro
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 1 Agosto 2014
    ...(See 66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 321, supra [considering, but rejecting this interpretation of art. XIII A, § 4]; cf. Ni v. Slocum (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1636, 1654, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 [noting the distinction in former Political Code section 1083a between “qualified electors” and “registered qual......
  • Meyer v. Jacobsen
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • 17 Mayo 2022
    ... ... commission to verify the signers. Benjamin , 786 ... S.E.2d at 211. Indeed, the Benjamin decision ... specifically turned on the absence of this statutory ... requirement. See Benjamin , 786 S.E.2d at 211 ... (distinguishing Ni v. Slocum , 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 ... (Cal.App. 1st Dist. 2011)). Under Montana law, by contrast, ... the Administrator is required to "check the names of all ... signers to verify they are registered electors of the ... county" and certify the signatures to the Secretary ... Section 13-27-303, MCA ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT