Vachon v. State

• Decision Date: 23 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-583,93-583
• Citation: 514 N.W.2d 442
• Parties: Maurice VACHON and Kathie Vachon, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 442

514 N.W.2d 442

Maurice VACHON and Kathie Vachon, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 93-583.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 23, 1994.

As Amended April 14, 1994.

Randall J. Shanks, Gallner & Gallner, P.C., Council Bluffs, and David D. Nisley, Modesto, CA, for appellants.

Richard M. Tucker and John E. Beasley, Phelan, Tucker, Boyle, Mullen, Bright & Walker, Iowa City, and Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., and Robert D. Wilson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Considered by CARTER, P.J., and NEUMAN, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

I. Introduction

Maurice and Kathie Vachon ("Vachons") appeal from the entry of summary judgment against them with regard to their medical malpractice suit against the State of Iowa. The Johnson County District Court entered summary judgment against the Vachons on the ground that their claims against the State are time barred. The Vachons appeal to this court, claiming a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the application of the discovery rule to their claims against the State. The State cross-appeals claiming the district court erred in holding the discovery rule applied to claims governed by the Iowa State Tort Claims Act. Iowa Code ch. 25A (1991) (now codified at Iowa Code ch. 669 (1993)). A further dispute occurs regarding the applicable statute of limitations in this case. The Vachons claim Iowa Code section 614.1(9) governs. The State contends Iowa Code section 669.13 controls.

II. Standard of Review

Our review in this case is for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. This appeal stems from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the State. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc., 408 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa 1987). The burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is with the moving party. Id. Every legitimate inference that can reasonably be made from the evidence should be afforded the nonmoving party. Id. A fact question exists if reasonable minds could differ as to how a factual issue should be resolved. Id.

III. Factual Background

The factual background of this case is succinctly discussed in our prior decision of Vachon v. Broadlawns Medical Foundation, 490 N.W.2d 820, 821-22 (Iowa 1992) ("Vachon I "). We need only discuss here the undisputed facts of particular relevance to this appeal.

On October 9, 1987 a car struck Maurice Vachon while he walked on a gravel road near Des Moines. He was taken to Broadlawns Hospital for treatment. That same day, Broadlawns transported Vachon by ambulance to the University of Iowa hospital. Doctors at the University of Iowa diagnosed "compartment syndrome" in Vachon's right leg. Vachon received treatment for compartment syndrome for several days. On October 16, 1987 doctors amputated Vachon's right leg slightly below the knee.

On May 25, 1988 the Vachons retained legal counsel. On March 20, 1989 an attorney for the Vachons requested the release of Vachon's medical records from the University of Iowa Hospital. These records were mailed to the Vachons' attorneys on March 27, 1989.

On August 25, 1989 the Vachons sued Broadlawns Hospital, the two doctors who treated him there, and the State, under the theory of respondeat superior, for medical malpractice and loss of consortium. The Vachons' suit alleged negligence on the part of the Broadlawns doctors in failing to diagnose, care, and properly treat the compartment syndrome. On November 21, 1990 a jury entered a verdict in favor of the Vachon I defendants. We affirmed that verdict on September 23, 1992. Id. at 820.

On May 7, 1990 the Vachons' attorney received a letter from Dr. Charles Sisk stating the following:

It is noteworthy that a diagnosis of compartmental syndrome was missed by the emergency room physician at the University of Iowa who apparently was a third-year orthopedic resident and that no diagnosis was suspicioned or confirmed until the patient arrived in the operating room.

On July 8, 1991 the Vachons filed suit against the State alleging essentially the same cause of action they pursued in Vachon I. On May 26, 1992 the Vachons applied to the district court for approval of the retainer agreement with respect to this lawsuit.

The State filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming the Vachons' lawsuit was time barred under Iowa Code section 669.13. After a hearing on the matter, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State.

The district court held the discovery rule applied to suits brought under the State Tort Claims Act. Further, the district court held the plaintiffs knew all the facts necessary to put them on notice of the existence of potential malpractice claims against the State more than two years before they filed those claims. Thus, as a matter of law the district court held the Vachons' claims against the State were time barred under Iowa Code section 669.13.

IV. Applicability of the State Tort Claims Act

Iowa Code section 669.13 provides that "[e]very claim and suit permitted under this chapter shall be forever barred, unless within two years after such claim accrued, the claim is made in writing to the state appeal board under this chapter." Iowa Code § 669.13. The State Tort Claims Act permits parties to bring claims for monetary damages "on account of personal injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the State...." Id. § 669.2(3)(a).

The Vachons claim Iowa Code section 614.1(9) is the proper statute of limitations to apply in this case. The Vachons give no explanation in their briefs as to why they believe section 614.1(9) should apply rather than section 669.13. The State argues that by virtue of the fact that this is a claim for negligence against the State, the State Tort Claims Act and its statute of limitations applies.

The language of section 669.13 is clear. There is no dispute the Vachons filed a negligence claim against the State for personal injuries caused by a State employee. The Vachons themselves filed their claim against the State with the State Appeals Board pursuant to Iowa Code section 669.3. We hold the State Tort Claims Act statute of limitations section 669.13 applies in this case.

V. Applicability of Discovery Rule to Section 669.13.

Under the "discovery rule," a cause of action based on negligence does not accrue until a plaintiff discovers the injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it. Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 463, 150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967). We held the discovery rule applies to cases filed under the State Tort Claims Act in Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 273 (Iowa 1990).

In holding the discovery rule applied, we focused on the word "accrued." Id. at 270. Where a statute of limitations uses the term "accrued" with regard to when the statute begins to run, the discovery rule applies. Id. (citing Sparks, 408 N.W.2d at 351; Franzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985); Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 1981); Orr v. Lewis Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 N.W.2d 256, 262 (Iowa 1980); Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154, 155-56 (Iowa 1975); Baines v. Blenderman, 223 N.W.2d 199, 201-03 (Iowa 1974); Chrischilles, 260 Iowa at 463, 150 N.W.2d at 100).

We also noted the decisions of the United States Supreme Court applying the discovery rule to similar statutes. Callahan, 464 N.W.2d at 270-71; see Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 1024, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 1292 (1949); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123-24, 100 S.Ct. 352, 360, 62 L.Ed.2d 259, 270-71 (1979). Under both the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff's claim "accrues." See 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1941); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1966). Because the FTCA is similar to our State Tort Claims Act, we gave considerable weight to the United States Supreme Court cases interpreting those acts in Callahan, 464 N.W.2d at 271. We agreed with the United States Supreme Court that to attach such harsh consequences to "blameless ignorance" would defeat the remedial purposes of the governmental tort claim statutes. Id. at 271; Urie, 337 U.S. at 169, 69 S.Ct. at 1024, 93 L.Ed. at 1292.

For all of the above discussed reasons, the Vachons argue the discovery rule ought to apply in this case. The State, on the other hand, contends the discovery rule should not apply. The State believes Callahan should be overruled. It asserts chapter 669 is a statutorily created waiver of blanket governmental immunity in tort. As such, the State reasons the act's provisions should be strictly construed. It argues that if the legislature desired the embodiment of a discovery rule in the State Tort Claims Act, it could easily so provide.

For the reasons reiterated above from our decision in Callahan, we believe the discovery rule applies to claims brought under chapter 669. See Callahan, 464 N.W.2d at 270-71, 273. In addition, we note that since the Callahan decision our legislature possessed ample opportunity to amend section 669.13 to expressly disallow the application of the discovery rule. We regard its failure to do so as tacit approval of our decision in Callahan. See Smith v. Iowa Liquor Control Comm'n, 169 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 (1969).

Moreover, the latent nature of injuries common in medical malpractice cases sparked the waive of legislative enactments adopting the discovery rule. See generally W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 30, at 165-68 (5th ed. 1984). We discussed the necessity of applying the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases in Baines v. Blenderman, 223 N.W.2d at 201-03. "A rule which would invariably charge a patient with knowledge of malpractice at the time the injury was first perceived would 'punish the patient who relies upon his doctor's...