Valdes v. State

Decision Date30 January 2009
Docket NumberNo. SC07-2256.,SC07-2256.
Citation3 So.3d 1067
PartiesEli Enrique VALDES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Maria E. Lauredo, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Richard L. Polin, Bureau Chief, Joshua R. Heller, and Jill D. Kramer, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

The issue before us involves double jeopardy — specifically whether dual convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section 790.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2003), arising from the same criminal episode, violate double jeopardy. The Third District Court of Appeal in Valdes v. State, 970 So.2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), concluded that no double jeopardy violation occurred from the dual convictions and certified conflict with Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 931 So.2d 231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), which reached the opposite conclusion. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

We reach two related conclusions in this case. First, because we conclude that our prior double jeopardy jurisprudence announcing the "primary evil" standard has proven difficult to apply and has strayed from the plain language of the governing statute, we now adopt the approach set forth in Justice Cantero's special concurrence in State v. Paul, 934 So.2d 1167 (Fla.2006). Thus, we hold that section 775.021(4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2008), prohibits "separate punishments for crimes arising from the same criminal transaction only when the statute itself provides for an offense with multiple degrees." Paul, 934 So.2d at 1176 (Cantero, J., specially concurring). Second, by applying this simple test to this case we conclude that dual convictions under 790.15(2) and section 790.19 do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Accordingly, we approve the result in Valdes and disapprove Lopez-Vazquez.

FACTS

Valdes, who was driving his own vehicle, pulled up next to a vehicle being driven by Rocio Rodriguez, in which her sister, Natalie Gianella, and Rodriguez's minor daughter were passengers. Gianella, Rodriguez, and Valdes knew each other and had previous disputes. Valdes rolled down his window, as did Gianella, and the two began arguing. Valdes pulled out a gun, and Gianella began laughing at him. When the light turned green and the vehicle started to move, Valdes began shooting at the vehicle, firing four or five shots. Gianella was struck in the arm and foot. Valdes was charged with three counts of attempted second-degree murder with a firearm and one count each of discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section 790.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2003).1 The jury found Valdes guilty as charged on all counts and he was sentenced to concurrent thirty-year prison terms on each count.

On appeal to the Third District, Valdes argued in pertinent part that his dual convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person and shooting into an occupied vehicle violated double jeopardy. In evaluating whether Valdes's convictions fell under the subsection (4)(b)(2) exception to the Blockburger2 test as codified in section 775.021(4), that the offenses are degrees of the same offense, the Third District recognized that "[o]ffenses are considered degree variants of the same core offense where both crimes intend to punish the `same primary evil.'" Valdes, 970 So.2d at 419 (citing Paul, 934 So.2d at 1175). The court acknowledged the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Lopez-Vazquez, in which the Fifth District concluded that convictions under sections 790.15(2) and 790.19, arising from the same criminal episode, violate double jeopardy. Valdes, 970 So.2d at 419.

In the conflict case of Lopez-Vazquez, the Fifth District described these facts: "[A]n incident of road rage escalated into extreme acts of violence, culminating in the attempt by Vazquez to take the life of the victim. As Vazquez sat in his vehicle, he fired his weapon into the vehicle occupied by the victim, wounding the victim in the arm." 931 So.2d at 232. The Fifth District concluded that the offenses of discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person in violation of section 790.15(2) and shooting into an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19 shared the same core offense of battery. Id. at 235. The Third District disagreed not only with this conclusion but also with the Fifth District's conclusion that the primary evil punished by the two statutes in question "`is the endangerment of the safety of those who may be struck by the discharge from the firearm,' and that both of these offenses share the same evil." Valdes, 970 So.2d at 419 (citation omitted). These diametrically opposed decisions applying the same precedent give rise to the certified conflict in this case.3

ANALYSIS
Double Jeopardy Principles

The most familiar concept of the term "double jeopardy" is that the Constitution prohibits subjecting a person to multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal offense. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is found in both article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which contain double jeopardy clauses.4 Despite this constitutional protection, there is no constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction as long as the Legislature intends to authorize separate punishments. See Hayes v. State, 803 So.2d 695, 699 (Fla.2001) ("As the United States Supreme Court explained in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. at 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977), where multiple punishments are imposed at a single trial, `the role of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments arising from a single criminal act.'"); Borges v. State, 415 So.2d 1265, 1267 (Fla.1982) ("The Double Jeopardy Clause `presents no substantive limitation on the legislature's power to prescribe multiple punishments,' but rather, `seeks only to prevent courts either from allowing multiple prosecutions or from imposing multiple punishments for a single, legislatively defined offense.'") (quoting State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. 1981)). As we recognized in Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17 (Fla.2001):

The prevailing standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature "intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes." M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996); see State v. Anderson, 695 So.2d 309, 311 (Fla. 1997) ("Legislative intent is the polestar that guides our analysis in double jeopardy issues. ..."). Absent a clear statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, courts employ the Blockburger test, as codified in section 775.021, Florida Statutes (1997), to determine whether separate offenses exist. See Gaber v. State, 684 So.2d 189, 192 (Fla.1996) ("[A]bsent an explicit statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for two crimes, application of the Blockburger `same-elements' test pursuant to section 775.021(4) ... is the sole method of determining whether multiple punishments are double-jeopardy violations.") (footnote omitted).

Gordon, 780 So.2d at 19-20 (footnote omitted).

In this case there is no clear statement of legislative intent to authorize or to prohibit separate punishments for violations of sections 790.15(2) and 790.19.5 Both parties and both district courts of appeal agree with this simple conclusion. Because there is no clear legislative intent to be discerned, the next inquiry is whether separate punishments for the two convictions violate the Blockburger test, as codified in section 775.021(4). That section provides:

(4)(a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.

(b) The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent. Exceptions to this rule of construction are:

1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof.

2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.

3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.

§ 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2003).

It is undisputed that sections 790.15(2) and 790.19 each contain an element that the other does not. Shooting from a vehicle in violation of section 790.15(2) requires proof of two elements: (1) the defendant knowingly and willfully discharged a firearm from a vehicle; and (2) the discharge occurred within 1000 feet of any person. § 790.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). In contrast, section 790.19 requires proof of the following three elements: (1) the defendant shot a...

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