Valdez v. City and County of Denver
Decision Date | 06 July 1989 |
Docket Number | 86-2771,Nos. 86-2719,s. 86-2719 |
Citation | 878 F.2d 1285 |
Parties | Robert VALDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a municipal corporation, J.D. MacFarlane, Manager of Safety and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the City and County of Denver, and Captain Herrera, Defendants-Appellants, and Joyce Neville, Director of the Department of Health & Hospitals, City and County of Denver, Seymour Sundell, Staff Medicine Coordinator, Denver General Hospital, and J. Smith, Defendants-Cross-Appellees, and John Does 1-3, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Peter H. Ney, Littleton, Colo., for plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant.
Theodore S. Halaby (Robert M. Liechty with him on the brief) of Halaby & McCrea, Denver, Colo., for defendants-appellants and defendants-cross-appellees.
Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
In this case, we hold that an official charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by that order.
Plaintiff-appellee, Robert Valdez (Valdez), instituted this action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against the City and County of Denver, and various law enforcement officials and medical personnel employed by the municipality. The record reveals that on March 1, 1985, Valdez was present as a spectator in state traffic court. When Denver County Court Judge Larry Lopez-Alexander said something to a defendant with which Valdez disagreed, Valdez exclaimed "bullshit," and the two proceeded to exchange words. Judge Lopez-Alexander subsequently held Valdez in contempt and ordered him to await sentencing outside the courtroom. Captain Herrera and three unidentified deputies from the sheriff's department promptly arrested Valdez. Later that day, Judge Lopez-Alexander issued a mittimus directing the municipality to retain custody of Valdez. From March 1 through 14, Valdez was incarcerated pursuant to Judge Lopez-Alexander's order in the Denver County Jail under the administrative supervision of J.D. MacFarlane. Valdez was originally scheduled to appear on the latter date before Judge Lopez-Alexander for sentencing on the contempt citation, but because of complications in the case, the judge postponed his appearance date until March 27. Prior to that date, however, Valdez was released from custody upon a writ of habeas corpus issued from the state district court.
In his complaint, Valdez alleges, inter alia, false arrest and imprisonment in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments against defendants-appellants, Captain Herrera and J.D. MacFarlane respectively. Upon completing discovery, Herrera and MacFarlane moved for summary judgment asserting their entitlement to absolute "quasi-judicial" immunity, or in the alternative qualified immunity. The district court rejected both grounds and denied the motion. Both officers appeal. 1 Our jurisdiction to review the denial of an absolute immunity claim arises under the "collateral order" doctrine. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). The denial of a qualified immunity claim is reviewable as a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Our review is de novo. Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 629 (10th Cir.1988). 2
The Supreme Court has endorsed a "functional" approach to questions concerning the application of common-law tort immunities to individuals in Sec. 1983 actions: "[I]mmunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 544, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (emphasis in original). The extent of government officials' immunity depends upon the likely effect their exposure to liability will have on the operation of effective government in a particular context, balanced against the potential for a deprivation of individual rights in that context. E.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 2028, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973); Chavez v. Singer, 698 F.2d 420, 422 (10th Cir.1983). 3
Courts have long recognized that a litigant dissatisfied with the outcome of judicial proceedings will oftentimes accuse his "adversaries" of constitutional infirmities. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 348, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). Because " 'controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree' ... the common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons--governmental or otherwise--who were integral parts of the judicial process." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1115, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized not only the absolute civil immunity of judges for conduct within their judicial domain, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217-18, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), but also the "quasi-judicial" civil immunity of prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 994-95, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), grand jurors, id. at 423 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. at 991, witnesses, Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345-46, 103 S.Ct. at 1120-21, and agency officials, Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-13, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-14, for acts intertwined with the judicial process. 4
Recognizing that the power to execute judicial decrees is no less an important and integral part of the judicial process than the roles of those officials previously afforded absolute immunity, we held in T & W Inv. Co., Inc. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 801, 802-03 (10th Cir.1978), that a receiver named as a defendant in a corporation's civil rights action was a court officer who shared the judge's immunity to the extent he carried out the orders of his appointing judge. Our sister circuits addressing the question likewise agree with virtual unanimity that court officers sworn to execute court orders are shielded by absolute immunity in the performance of their duty. E.g., Coverdell v. Department of Social and Health Serv., 834 F.2d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir.1987) ( ); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238-39 (7th Cir.1986) ( ); Property Management & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599, 602-04 (11th Cir.1985) ( ); Tymiak v. Omodt, 676 F.2d 306, 308 (8th Cir.1982) ( ); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir.1981) ( ); Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir.1980) ( ); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 & n. 6 (3d Cir.1975) ( ); Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir.1973) ( ); Bradford Audio Corp. v. Pious, 392 F.2d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir.1968) ( ).
Enforcing a court order or judgment is intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding. Henry, 808 F.2d at 1239. If losing parties were free to challenge the will of the court by threatening its officers with harassing litigation, the officers might neglect the execution of their sworn duties. As the Ninth Circuit aptly reasoned: "The fearless and unhesitating execution of court orders is essential if the court's authority and ability to function are to remain uncompromised." Coverdell, 834 F.2d at 765. Absolute immunity for officials assigned to carry out a judge's orders is necessary to insure that such officials can perform their function without the need to secure permanent legal counsel. A lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process.
Despite Valdez' contrary assertion, a qualified immunity for officials following court orders will not protect the judicial process by permitting the dismissal of insubstantial claims prior to trial. Even with the adoption of the objective qualified immunity standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736-38, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the applicability of the defense turns on the fact-specific question of whether reasonable officers could have believed their conduct to be proper in light of the "clearly established" law. Factual disputes would require discovery if not a trial. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 3042 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Moreover, in most instances what is "clearly established" would be subject to differing views. See Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656-57 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1220, 99 L.Ed.2d 421 (1988). Interlocutory appeals would inevitably follow. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "even the processing of a complaint that is dismissed before trial consumes a considerable amount of time and resources." Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 343, 103 S.Ct. at 1119. The expense of litigation which officials like the defendants Herrera and MacFarlane would incur, the diversion of their attention from more socially...
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