Valencia v. De Luca
| Decision Date | 26 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13 CV 930 JAP/WPL,13 CV 930 JAP/WPL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
| Parties | JOSE VALENCIA, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER HEINZ DE LUCA, OFFICER SEAN STRAHON, OFFICER CASEY SALAZAR, OFFICER MARK LEWANDOWSKI, OFFICER ALAN MASCARENAS, Individually and in their official capacities and as employees of the Santa Fe Police Department, and the CITY OF SANTA FE, Defendants. |
On December 19, 2013, Defendants, the City of Santa Fe (the City), Officers Heinz De Luca (Officer De Luca), Sean Strahon (Sergeant Strahon), Casey Salazar (Officer Salazar), Mark Lewandowski (Officer Lewandowski), and Alan Mascarenas (Officer Mascarenas) filed a motion for summary judgment. See DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (Doc. No. 31) (Motion). The individual officers will be referred to as Defendant Officers. Defendant Officers ask the Court to grant qualified immunity and dismiss all claims brought against them by Plaintiff Jose Valencia (Plaintiff). Plaintiff opposes the Motion and claims that Officer De Luca had no reasonable basis to initiate the traffic stop of Plaintiff's vehicle, that the investigative detention was unreasonable, and that Defendant Officers used excessive force in arresting Plaintiff. See PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT [Doc. 31] (Doc. No. 40)(Response).1 Plaintiff contends that the evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to him, illustrate Defendant Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's § 1983 claims.
The Court concludes that the traffic stop of Plaintiff's vehicle was reasonable. Officer De Luca's belief that Plaintiff was driving at night with only parking lights, although mistaken, was justified. The video evidence shows that Plaintiff's headlights appeared dimmer and more amber in color compared to other vehicles on the same street. Therefore, Officer De Luca acted reasonably in his stop of Plaintiff's vehicle. Once Plaintiff's vehicle was stopped, both Officer De Luca and Sergeant Strahon, who arrived at the stop to assist Officer De Luca, immediately detected an odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. Thereafter, the detention of Plaintiff and his passengers, one of whom admitted to smoking and possessing marijuana, was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Furthermore, the evidence shows that during the investigative detention, Officer Salazar ordered Plaintiff to exit his vehicle, but Plaintiff refused, wrapped his arms around the steering wheel, and wedged his legs under the steering wheel. Officers Salazar and De Luca pulled Plaintiff out of the vehicle using physical force. However, the force used to extricate Plaintiff from his vehicle was reasonable; thus, the Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claim of excessive force. Since Plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated during his detention and subsequent arrest, the Court will dismiss the federal §1983 claims. The Court will also dismiss the claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, which depend on the existence of an illegal seizure andexcessive force. Finally, since all state law claims fail, the state law vicarious liability and negligent hiring, training, and retention claims against the City also must be dismissed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials who are required to exercise their discretion by shielding them from liability for harm caused by reasonable exercises of their authority. Herrera v. City of Albuquerque, 589 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009). When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of defendant's conduct. Courtney v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 722 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir. 2013). The first prong is met if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows that defendants violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The second prong requires a plaintiff to show that it "would be clear to a reasonable officer that [the officer's] conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Courtney, 722 F.3d at 1222. Under Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit decisions, a law is not clearly established unless existing precedent places the right in question "beyond debate." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011). If a "plaintiff successfully carries his two-part burden," then the burden shifts to the defendant, who "bears the burden, as an ordinary movant for summary judgment, of showing no material issues of fact remain that would defeat the claim of qualified immunity." Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 412(10th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
In this case, the Court will first determine whether Defendant Officers' actions violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (). A necessary component in this first step is to outline the material undisputed or indisputable facts. Thomas v. Durasanti, 607 F.3d 655, 659 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 ( 2007)). In reviewing the facts, the Court must be careful not to weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). At this stage, the Court's central task is to "determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.2
The parties tell different versions of the events surrounding the traffic stop and detention of Plaintiff and his passengers. Defendant Officers have submitted several video recordings from their in-unit cameras, which recorded video and audio of the traffic stop. See Mot. Exs. A-E. This recorded evidence is significant and highly relevant in determining whether Plaintiff has met his burden of establishing a constitutional violation. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81 (). In short, the Court cannot accept either Plaintiff's or Defendants' version if "there is clear contrary video evidence of the incident at issue." Thomas, 607 F.3d at 659. Where there is a video recording of a particular fact at issue, the Court will rule based on the recording.
Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . or any other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 749 n. 9 (1999) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)).
Plaintiff alleges that Officer De Luca had no reasonable basis to initiate the traffic stop of Plaintiff's vehicle, and that the investigative detention and arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Ordinarily, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from conducting seizures without probable cause. United States v. Whitley, 680 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2012). However, the Supreme Court has created an exception for investigative detentions, which are brief detentions conducted for investigative purposes. Id. Routine traffic stops are considered investigative detentions and as such are governed by the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under Terry, courts make a dual inquiry, asking first whether the detention was "justified at its inception," and second whether the detention "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
Under the first step, the evidence must show that an officer's decision to stop a vehicle was "justified at its inception." United States v. Solzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 1998). A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop was based on an observed trafficviolation or "if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995).
A traffic stop based on an officer's incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Thus, if an officer makes a traffic stop based on a mistake of fact, the only question is whether his mistake of fact is reasonable. Great deference is given to the judgment of trained law enforcement officers on the scene.
United States v. Fowler, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1340 (D. Utah 2005) (quoting United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003)). See also United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (). "It is enough if the court believes [the officer] made an objectively reasonable mistake in fact and so had reasonable suspicion of a traffic stop." U.S. v. Lopez-Estrada, No. 10-40013-02-SAC, 2010 WL 2079813, *5 (D. Kan. May 25, 2010) (unreported) (citing United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d...
To continue reading
Request your trial