Valline v. Murken
| Decision Date | 13 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-137/02-0843.,3-137/02-0843. |
| Parties | TERRI VALLINE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINDA MURKEN, JEFF LARSON, LINDA HALL, STATE OF IOWA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joel E. Swanson, Judge.
The defendants appeal an adverse judgment awarding Terry Valline damages for gender discrimination.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Julie Burger and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.
Blake Parker of Blake Parker Law Office, Fort Dodge, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
The defendants appeal an adverse judgment awarding Terri Valline damages for gender discrimination in a combined action under state and federal civil rights acts. They claim: (1) Valline failed as a matter of law to prove she was the victim of intentional discrimination and (2) the trial judge abused his discretion by awarding Valline front pay damages. We reverse.
Valline is employed as a residential counselor at the Fort Dodge Residential Facility, a correctional institution operated by the Second Judicial District Department of Correctional Services. Linda Murken is the director of the department, Jeff Larson is the residential division manager, and Linda Hall was formerly the residential manager of the Fort Dodge facility.
In 2001 Valline applied for a promotion to residential supervisor at the Fort Dodge facility. Larson and Hall interviewed Valline and the other applicants. Don Sorensen, a residential officer at the Fort Dodge Facility, was ultimately hired instead of Valline.
Valline filed this lawsuit alleging Murken, Larson, Hall, and the department engaged in illegal gender discrimination in violation of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994) (Title VII), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code chapter 216 (1999).1 Valline claimed she should have been promoted because she was better qualified than Sorensen. The defendants denied Valline's allegations, claiming Sorensen was hired for legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons. Valline claimed the defendants' stated reasons for hiring Sorensen were a pretext to conceal their discriminatory motives.
Defendants' stated reasons for hiring Sorensen instead of Valline included Sorensen's support for implementing cognitive group facilitation at the Fort Dodge facility and Valline's reluctance to train in this area or to lead such groups.2 They also cited Sorensen's willingness to accept duties beyond those found in his job description, specifically noting Valline's reluctance to serve as acting manager in Hall's absence. Other factors cited included Sorensen's greater familiarity with security and maintenance issues, better interview, and human insight.
The trial judge denied the defendants' motions for directed verdict and submitted Valline's gender discrimination claims to the jury. The jury found Valline's gender was a determining factor in the defendants' decision not to promote her and that their stated reasons for not promoting Valline were a pretext to conceal their discriminatory motives. Valline was awarded $7792 for back pay and $4375 for mental pain and suffering.
The defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. The trial judge subsequently determined Valline was entitled to front pay to compensate her for the difference between compensation for her current position and that for which she applied. Judgment was entered accordingly resulting in this appeal. On appeal defendants argue: (1) Valline failed to prove as a matter of law she was the victim of intentional gender discrimination and (2) the district court abused its discretion in ordering front pay.
Our review of rulings on motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. On both motions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(b); Midwest Home Distrib. v. Domco Indus. Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1998). We consider whether substantial evidence exists to support the plaintiff's claim, justifying submission of the case to the jury. Channon v. United Parcel Serv., 629 N.W.2d 835, 859 (Iowa 2001). Evidence is substantial if a jury could reasonably infer a fact from the evidence. Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Iowa 2000).
As noted earlier, Valline sued under both state and federal civil rights acts. The elements and methods of proof are basically the same under both acts. Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1999); Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1990); Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989).
There are two methods by which a plaintiff can establish discrimination under state and federal law. Under the direct evidence mixed-motive standard, a plaintiff must produce "direct evidence" that an illegitimate criterion such as gender played a motivating part in the employment decision. Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268, 293 (1989)). Direct evidence demonstrates a specific link between the challenged employment action and the alleged animus.3 Michaelson v. Waitt Broad., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1068 (N.D. Iowa 2002). Once direct evidence has been presented, the employer has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of an improper motive. Vaughn v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 538-39 (Iowa 1996); Boelman v. Manson State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73, 78 (Iowa 1994).
Because discrimination is difficult to prove by direct evidence, state and federal courts have recognized an alternate method of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824-25, 36 L. Ed. 668, 677-79 (1973); Harman v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 479 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Iowa 1991). To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination in employment under the McDonell Douglas method of proof, the plaintiff must initially prove (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the employment at issue; (3) the plaintiff suffered adverse employment action, and (4) it is more likely than not that the adverse employment action was based on an impermissible consideration, such as gender. Hamer v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 472 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Iowa 1991) (citing Reeb v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1980)); see also Channon, 629 N.W.2d at 861. The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 215 (1981).
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendants to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. Board of Supervisors v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1998). This burden involves producing evidence; it is enough if defendants raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they discriminated against the plaintiff. Hamilton v. First Baptist Elderly Housing Found., 436 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa 1989). "The defendant is not required to persuade the court that the defendant was actually motivated by the proffered reason." Id. The plaintiff's prima facie case will be rebutted if the defendants offer admissible evidence "which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus." Id. at 339 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S. Ct. at 1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 216).
Valline's gender discrimination was tried under the McDonnell Douglas method. We review the challenged trial court rulings accordingly to determine whether each was supported by substantial evidence.
As noted earlier, Valline's discrimination theory was premised on the fact that she was more qualified than Sorensen. Valline offered evidence of her seniority, that she was better educated than Sorensen, scored higher than he did on a written screening test administered to all applicants, and her history of better performance evaluations than Sorensen. Valline also offered evidence that Hall was present during conversations by other employees who expressed a preference for a male manager.
Valline disputed the defendants' version of her experience as temporary manager citing union protocol as the true reason she declined to continue serving in that capacity. Valline also claimed the defendants' interest in cognitive groups was overstated, noting their failure to fully implement cognitive group therapy after Sorensen was promoted and that she in fact had been trained for cognitive group therapy and had conducted such groups.
Neither party seriously disputes, and the record abundantly supports, the trial judge's determination that both parties met their respective burdens to establish and rebut Valline's prima facie case of gender discrimination. The fighting issue is therefore whether Valline's evidence of pretext was sufficient as a matter of law to support the trial court's rulings on defendants' motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We, for the following reasons, conclude that Valline's evidence of pretext was insufficient as a matter of law and that the trial judge's contrary rulings were erroneous.
In addressing Valline's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial judge concluded the defendants' proffered reasons for promoting Sorensen were false and that...
To continue reading
Request your trial