Van Leuvan v. Carlisle (In re Singleton)
| Decision Date | 25 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | A13A0784.,Nos. A13A0783,s. A13A0783 |
| Parties | In re: Burleigh L. SINGLETON. Van Leuvan v. Carlisle. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephen Earl Hudson, Atlanta, Allegra J. Lawrence-Hardy, Jeffrey J. Toney, for Appellant.
David Neil Marple, Richard W. Schiffman, Atlanta, for Appellee.
These consolidated appeals arise from an order in an ongoing visitation dispute between Kellie Van Leuvan, the mother of a minor child (hereinafter, “the mother”), and Connie Carlisle, the child's maternal grandmother (hereinafter, “the grandmother”). In the order, the Superior Court of Fulton County found the mother to be in willful civil contempt of its temporary visitation order, and it ordered the mother and her former attorney, Burleigh Singleton, to pay the grandmother the attorney fees that resulted from her having to prosecute two contempt motions against the mother, pursuant to OCGA § 9–15–14(a) and (b). In Case No. A13A0783, Singleton contends that the court erred in ordering him to pay OCGA § 9–15–14 attorney fees. In Case No. A13A0784, the mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the court's contempt ruling; she also challenges the court's order that she pay OCGA § 9–15–14 attorney fees. Because the record supports the court's order and we discern no error or abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment in both cases.
The record shows the following, undisputed facts. In February 2011, the grandmother filed a petition asking for visitation with her granddaughter, who was four years old at the time and was living with her mother, who was divorced from the child's father. On May 31, 2012, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a temporary order (hereinafter, the “visitation order”) in which it found that the grandmother had met her burden, under OCGA § 19–7–3(a), of showing that she was entitled to visitation with the child. The visitation order stated, in relevant part, as follows:
Petitioner [ (i.e., the grandmother) ] shall have the following visitation with the minor child[:] ... 1. Petitioner shall have seven (7) uninterrupted days of visitation with [the child] during the summer months of June, July, or August. Respondent [ (i.e., the mother) ] shall determine within five (5) days of this order when [this visitation shall occur].... 2. During the school year, August through May, Respondent[ 1] shall have one (1) Thursday night with [the child] per month. The designated Thursday night shall correspond with [the child's] visitation with her father ... that is to begin the following Friday. Respondent shall pick [the child] up from school on the designated Thursday and return [the child] to school the following Friday morning.
The mother filed an application for interlocutory review of the visitation order, and this Court granted the application. Pursuant to that appeal, this Court vacated the visitation order because it did not contain the court's specific findings of fact, as required by OCGA § 19–7–3(c). See Van Leuvan v. Carlisle, 322 Ga.App. 576, 578 (1), 745 S.E.2d 814 (2013). This Court remanded the case back to the trial court with directions to issue an order that complied with OCGA § 19–7–3(c). Id.
While the appeal from the visitation order was pending, the mother notified the grandmother that she had designated the week beginning August 13, 2012, for the grandmother's seven uninterrupted days of “summer” visitation, as required by the order. The grandmother immediately filed an objection to this designation of dates, however, because the child's school year was scheduled to begin before then, so she would be attending school throughout that week. The trial court, however, did not rule on the objection prior to August 13, the date the designated week of visitation was to begin.
On August 13, the mother's attorney, Singleton, sent a letter to the grandmother's attorney stating that the mother had just learned that the grandmother intended to pick up the child from school each afternoon that week and to keep her overnight, pursuant to the mother's designation of dates. Singleton's letter stated that, based upon the grandmother's objection to the dates and the absence of either a court order ruling on the objection or any communication between the parties' attorneys regarding visitation dates while the mother's appeal from the visitation order was pending, “there does not appear to be a legal basis for [the child's] school to release [her] into [the grandmother's] custody.” Singleton also stated that the mother was going to pick up the child from school each day of that week, as she was entitled to do pursuant to the parenting plan executed by her and the child's father. In other words, the letter notified the grandmother that she would not be allowed to exercise her seven days of uninterrupted summer visitation with the child that week after all. In response, the grandmother's attorney notified Singleton that he was going to file a contempt petition against the mother due to her actions, which, according to the letter, “defy a polite description.”
The grandmother, however, was apparently not aware of the attorneys' communications when she went to the child's school to pick her up for visitation on the afternoon of August 13. At that time, school officials told her that the school's policies did not allow it to release the child to her because she was not the child's parent. It is undisputed that the mother had spoken with school officials earlier that day and had given them copies of certain documents, including the visitation order, her designation of dates for summer visitation, and the grandmother's objection to such dates.
The next afternoon, August 14, the grandmother again went to the child's school to pick her up for visitation. She was unable to do so, however, because, unbeknownst to the grandmother, the mother had gone to the school and had picked up the child before the end of the school day. School officials again informed the grandmother that the school would not release the child to her, and, in support of such refusal, they showed her a copy of a letter written by Singleton that the school had received. They also showed the grandmother a copy of an e-mail the school had received from its Executive Director. The August 14 e-mail stated, in relevant part, that the Executive Director had been
made aware of the various letters, emails, phone calls, and other correspondence over the past few days with staff at the elementary campus where [the child] is a student. To be honest, the sheer volume and types of communication about who is able to pick up [the child] from school is overwhelming and confusing and places [the child] and our school staff in a potentially uncomfortable situation. Clearly, no matter what the school does, one party will be angry and upset. Though there are various legal points being made in all of the correspondence we have received, there does not appear to be clearly established visitation with [the child's] grandmother for this week, so, our position would be that [the child's] mother and/or father can pick [the child] up from school until another court order clearly states otherwise.
(Emphasis supplied.) Given these circumstances, the grandmother decided not to make any further attempts to exercise her summer visitation that week.
A few days later, however, the grandmother's attorney sent a letter to Singleton stating that the grandmother had selected August 23 as the date she wanted to exercise her monthly, Thursday overnight visitation (hereinafter, “monthly visitation”), pursuant to paragraph 2 of the visitation order. Singleton responded with a two-sentence letter, stating that paragraph 2 of the visitation order “does not appear to grant [the grandmother] the rights referenced in your letter.” 2 The grandmother's attorney immediately responded with a letter that threatened to file a second petition for civil and criminal contempt and OCGA § 9–15–14 attorney fees if the grandmother was not allowed to exercise her monthly visitation, and it stated, in part, as follows:
If you are referring to the clear typo [in paragraph 2 of the visitation order] that references “Respondent” rather than “Petitioner” having the right to have the child, would that mean that [the trial court] changed custody from [the mother] to the child's father? This would be as preposterous as the position you and your client seem to be now taking.... [B]y the clear terms and intent of the [Visitation] Order, [the grandmother] gets to have [the child] with her tomorrow [ (Thursday, August 23) ] until Friday morning.(Emphasis supplied.) On August 23, Singleton responded that,
with respect to seeking contempt against [the mother], your letter characterizes the language in paragraph 2 of the [Visitation] Order as a “typo.” [The mother], however, is “entitled to rely on the plain terms of a court order until such provisions are modified by the court.” [Cit.] Thus, there does not appear to be a legal basis for filing [a] contempt motion.
That same day, the grandmother went to the school to pick up her granddaughter, but school officials refused to release the child to her. They showed her a copy of Singleton's August 23 letter (above) that they had received and informed her that, because of the apparent error in the visitation order regarding the term “respondent,” the school would not release the child to her until the order was corrected.
Following this incident, the grandmother filed a second motion asking the court to find the mother in contempt of the visitation order and to award her attorney fees associated with bringing the motion against the mother, Singleton or both, pursuant to OCGA § 9–15–14(a) and/or (b). During the contempt hearing, Singleton defended the mother's designation of the week of August 13 for the grandmother's week of summer...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Smith v. Pearce
...to the Father's attorney,” the award plainly was made “to the Father.” “It follows that there was no error.” In re Singleton,323 Ga.App. 396, 407(7), 744 S.E.2d 912 (2013). ...
-
McCarthy v. Ashment
...its order had been violated, this Court is without power to disturb the judgment absent an abuse of discretion." In re Singleton , 323 Ga. App. 396, 403 (2) (b), 744 S.E.2d 912) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). The relevant facts show that Ashment and McCarthy divorced in 2012. As......
-
McCarthy v. Ashment
...that its order had been violated, this Court is without power to disturb the judgment absent an abuse of discretion." In re Singleton , 323 Ga. App. 396, 403 (2) (b), 744 S.E.2d 912)((2013). The relevant facts show that Ashment and McCarthy divorced in 2012. Ashment was given primary physic......
-
Bentley v. Moore
...of the court, and their statements in their place, if not objected to, serve the same function as evidence." In re Singleton , 323 Ga. App. 396, 406 (5), 744 S.E.2d 912 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). Bentley argues that Moore's statement in his place cannot serve as evidence sin......