Vanslyke v. State

• Decision Date: 13 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2D05-2380.,2D05-2380.
• Citation: 936 So.2d 1218
• Parties: Christopher M. VANSLYKE, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

936 So.2d 1218

Christopher M. VANSLYKE, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D05-2380.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

September 13, 2006.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Coombs Cline, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

CANADY, Judge.

Christopher M. Vanslyke, Sr., appeals his judgment and sentence for possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver.¹ Vanslyke entered a no contest plea, reserving the right to appeal based on the trial court's denial of a dispositive motion to suppress cannabis seized by police during a warrantless search of Vanslyke's dwelling. The search was based on a report of child abuse. Vanslyke contends the denial of the suppression motion was erroneous because (1) a child abuse report did not give police probable cause and did not establish that exigent circumstances existed so as to permit police to conduct a warrantless entry and search of Vanslyke's residence; and (2) even if the entry was legal, the police exceeded the scope of the purpose of the search. We conclude that the warrantless search was unlawful because the State failed to prove that there was an emergency which necessitated the warrantless entry.

I. Background

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Jamie Schoolnik, a Department of Children and Families (DCF) investigator, testified that she received a report concerning children residing with Vanslyke that had been phoned in to the department's central abuse hotline.² The report "alleg[ed] substances exposed and conditions hazardous to the children." The report "was not concerning injury to the children." After the call was received by the hotline, a follow-up call was made to the person who phoned in the report. According to Schoolnik's testimony, the report of abuse was classified as a "24 hour report," requiring investigation within twenty-four hours of receipt of the report of abuse, rather than an "immediate" report, which would require investigation within three hours of the abuse report.³

Schoolnik and Tampa police officer Mark McGowan went to Vanslyke's residence to investigate the allegations. When Vanslyke opened the door, Schoolnik and Officer McGowan identified themselves. Vanslyke told Schoolnik and Officer McGowan that no children were inside the residence and that he [Vanslyke] did not live at the residence. Vanslyke then shut the door. Believing that Vanslyke was lying, Schoolnik and McGowan called for backup and waited outside.

Tampa police sergeant William Rousseau testified he responded to the scene after Schoolnik advised him about a report involving "drugs and guns, I believe, in the house with children." A few minutes after Sergeant Rousseau arrived, Vanslyke and another man walked out of the residence. Officer McGowan and Sergeant Rousseau immediately detained the men to determine whether Vanslyke lived at the residence and if he knew anything about the children. While handcuffing Vanslyke, McGowan smelled marijuana on Vanslyke's clothing and hair. Officer McGowan and Sergeant Rousseau then accompanied the men back into the residence and proceeded to search for the children.

During the search, Schoolnik, Officer McGowan, and Sergeant Rousseau noticed children's clothing and toys in two bedrooms, although they never located any children. Officer McGowan looked inside a bedroom closet and noticed a child's backpack. Officer McGowan testified he then looked inside the backpack to determine if it contained any information that would reveal the whereabouts of the children. Officer McGowan discovered marijuana in the backpack.⁴

The trial court denied the motion to suppress the marijuana found in the backpack. The trial court determined that Schoolnik had reason to believe the children were in danger and had reason to go through the home to investigate the children's welfare. Regarding the search of the backpack, the trial court stated:

I think its reasonable to look at a child's—inside a child's backpack because that corresponds with something that was—that a child uses to take things back and forth to school, whatever, that could have its name in it so that an officer, and more so the DCF investigator, could tell whether or not the child lived there so they can conclude their investigation properly.

II. Argument on Appeal

For his first point on appeal, Vanslyke argues that the warrantless entry and search of his home were illegal because the police lacked probable cause and because there were no exigent circumstances. He contends the police were acting on an anonymous tip that did not include specific allegations of child abuse and for which there was no indicia of reliability. Vanslyke also contends that even if the police had probable cause, the tip failed to establish that exigent circumstances existed so as to permit the police to enter the house without a warrant.

The State responds that based on the totality of the circumstances, the police were justified in entering and searching the home under the basis of the "emergency exception" to the warrant requirement, which permits the police to enter and investigate a person's home in order to preserve life or render first aid.

For his second point on appeal, Vanslyke contends that even if the police lawfully entered the house based on probable cause and exigent circumstances, they exceeded the scope of the purpose of the search by looking in areas where a child could not be found, such as in a backpack. Vanslyke argues that once the children were not located within the house, the police lacked authority to continue the search.

On this point, the State contends that the exigent circumstances which justified the initial entry also justified the search of the backpack because Officer McGowan believed it might contain information about the children's whereabouts.

III. Analysis

In Brigham City v. Stuart, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), the Supreme Court set forth the principles of Fourth Amendment law that are the starting point for our analysis:

It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness," the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.... [W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.

Id. at 1947 (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

Whether a warrantless search is justified by such an emergency does not turn on the "subjective motivation" of the police. Id. at 1948. "An action is `reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action." Id. (some internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Accordingly, "[the] police may enter a residence without a warrant if an objectively reasonable basis exists for the [police] to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life." Seibert v. State, 923 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla.2006). "In other words, where safety is threatened and time is of the essence, . . . `the need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides justification for an otherwise invalid entry.'" Riggs v. State, 918 So.2d 274, 279 (Fla.2005) (quoting Arango v. State, 411 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla.1982)). "[A] key ingredient of the exigency requirement is that the police lack time to secure a search warrant." Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293 (Fla.1997). In addition, "an entry based on an exigency must be limited in scope to its purpose. Thus, an officer may not continue her search once she has determined that no exigency exists." Id. "[T]he burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

A phone call reporting child abuse may, of course, provide the basis for conducting a warrantless entry to render emergency assistance to an injured child or to protect a child from imminent injury. But for a report to justify a warrantless entry, the report—considered in the context of the totality of relevant circumstances—must provide "an objectively reasonable basis" for the police "to believe that there is an immediate need for police assistance," Seibert, 923 So.2d at 468, to "render emergency assistance" to an injured child or to protect a child from a threat of "imminent injury," Brigham City, 126 S.Ct. at 1947.

In State v. Boggess, 115 Wis.2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the sufficiency of an anonymous report of abuse to justify a warrantless entry of the house where the allegedly abused children resided. The anonymous caller reported that two named children who were living with the defendant "may have been battered and were in need of medical attention." Id. at 519. "The caller also indicated that one of the children . . . was limping, and that because of bruises the caller witnessed...