Varela v. Goshen Cnty. Fairgrounds

• Decision Date: 24 September 2020
• Docket Number: S-20-0024
• Citation: 472 P.3d 1047
• Parties: Yolanda VARELA, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. GOSHEN COUNTY FAIRGROUNDS, a Wyoming governmental entity, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

472 P.3d 1047

Yolanda VARELA, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.GOSHEN COUNTY FAIRGROUNDS, a Wyoming governmental entity, Appellee (Defendant).

S-20-0024

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

September 24, 2020

Representing Appellant: Herbert K. Doby, Attorney at Law, Torrington, Wyoming

Representing Appellee: Thomas A. Thompson of MacPherson & Thompson, LLC, Rawlins, Wyoming

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Yolanda Varela filed a negligence action against the Goshen County Fairgrounds (the Fairgrounds) after she fell at an event held in one of its buildings. The district court granted the Fairgrounds summary judgment on its assertion of governmental immunity, after it found no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Ms. Varela's claim fell within the waiver of immunity for negligent operation or maintenance of a building or recreation area. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] Ms. Varela presents two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following single question:

Did the district court err in granting the Fairgrounds summary judgment on the question of whether Yolanda Varela's negligence claim fell within the waiver of governmental immunity for negligent operation or maintenance of a building or recreation area?

FACTS

[¶3] The Rendezvous Center is a building on the Goshen County Fairgrounds, which the Fairgrounds operates and rents to the public as an event venue. On December 16 and 17, 2015, an organization called Santa's Helpers held an event at the Center for children to meet Santa Claus. Yolanda Varela attended the event with her mother, her daughter, and her grandchildren on the evening of December 17. Her daughter dropped her off close to the Center's west side entrance, and she walked to the set of double doors at that entrance while cradling her infant grandson in her arms. When she got to the doors, a man was holding the left door open and she proceeded through that doorway. As she did, she tripped over a brick or block that was between the left door and the post separating it from the right door, and she fell to her knees. She did not drop her grandson, but she fractured her left foot, which subsequently required two surgeries.

[¶4] On August 30, 2018, Ms. Varela filed a complaint against Goshen County, the State of Wyoming, and the Fairgrounds. The complaint alleged:

It was the custom of Goshen County and Goshen County Fairground public employee(s), or their agents, in the operation, maintenance and use of the Rendezvous Center to use, or allow others to use, the large concrete brick/block to prop open the west-side door(s). The brick/block was stored near the west-side doors to facilitate its regular use as a door prop. As a result of such custom and use by Goshen County and Goshen County Fairground public employee(s), or their agents, of said concrete brick/block, to prop open the west-side doors, it was clearly foreseeable that someone would trip and fall over it and be injured. Pursuant to W.S. § 1-39-106, such custom, use, and actions by said public employee(s), or their agents, was negligent and makes Goshen County and Goshen County Fairgrounds liable for the damages suffered by Plaintiff. Such negligent conduct by Goshen County and Goshen County Fairground public employee(s), or their agents, proximately caused the damages suffered by Yolanda Varela.

[¶5] Goshen County and the State of Wyoming were dismissed on stipulation of the parties, and the Fairgrounds then moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. It argued:

... Plaintiff fails to identify a specific employee, or what the alleged act was that was within the scope of the unidentified employee's duties. Even after the completion of discovery in this matter, Plaintiff can still not identify what was done, who performed the alleged negligent act, or how the alleged negligent act was within the statutory requirement of "scope of duties." This initial inquiry is an essential element to prove any claim under the WGCA and the Act does not allow Plaintiff to simply rely upon speculation or conjecture.

[¶6] The Fairgrounds further argued that Ms. Varela did not state a claim for which its immunity had been waived under the Governmental Claims Act. Specifically, it argued that the placement of a brick or block as a door prop is not the "operation or maintenance" of a public building and therefore the Act's waiver of immunity for the operation or maintenance of a building did not apply.

[¶7] Ms. Varela responded to the summary judgment motion with evidence that at least one Fairgrounds employee knew of the patrons’ practice of using a brick or block to prop the Rendezvous Center's doors. She also presented deposition testimony from the patrons themselves that it was a common practice for them to so prop the doors. Based on that evidence, she argued:

Each of the three (3) public employees knew or should have known about the described customary use and practice of the brick/block to prop open doors at the Rendezvous Center and were negligent in allowing it or not taking reasonable steps to prevent it. If any one of the three (3) public employees did not know of the custom and practice, that "not knowing" was itself negligent. Said negligence of each public employee separately or all three combined, also includes, but is not limited to, a failure to inspect the west-side entrance and remove the particular brick/block door prop in this case.

[¶8] At oral argument on the summary judgment motion, Ms. Varela argued that the Rendezvous Center should be considered both a building and a recreation area for purposes of determining whether the Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106 waiver of immunity applies. After argument, she submitted a supplemental memorandum in which she cited to deposition testimony and argued (record citations omitted):

Plaintiff submits that to be operational or functional as a building fit as a venue for events, it must be safe (not unreasonably dangerous) to attend and use in order to accomplish its very function and use. Plaintiff additionally submits here that an unsafe condition due to a physical defect in the building also exists in that patrons, guests, attendees and others of the Rendezvous Center were allowed to (arguably forced to), due to the inherent deficiency of the door(s), create, develop and continue the custom and practice of propping open the doors by use of the brick/block or other objects because of an inherent defect in the doors. The doors could not otherwise be successfully propped open. A person had to hold the door open. To prevent the door(s) from locking, one had to use the brick/block or other objects to prop open the door(s). The door(s) would not stay open unless they were propped open by the brick/block or other objects. There was no other way to keep the doors open except by propping them open with the brick/block or other objects and the built-in door hinge would not work to keep the door(s) open. The door(s) would not stay open except by propping them open with the brick/block or other objects. Such users of the facility propped the doors open for various reasons including: (1) preventing the door from closing and locking, and (2) allowing users to hold the doors open to conveniently and efficiently carry items in and out.

[¶9] The district court granted the Fairgrounds’ motion for summary judgment. It concluded:

Upon close review of Plaintiff's complaint and allegations in this matter, it is apparent Plaintiff is focused on how patrons and guests use the facility by propping the door open as a convenience. Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate, and she offers no material fact, that the doors to the Center are negligently inoperative or negligently maintained by Fairgrounds’ employees. Plaintiff also presents no material fact of any physical defect in the doors that prevent the doors from functioning properly. There is no material fact to support a conclusion that the brick or block is part of the building itself or it is necessary for the Rendezvous Center to function as a venue for events.

[¶10] The district court further concluded that regardless of whether the Rendezvous Center is treated as a building or a recreation area, the result is the same. Ms. Varela timely appealed the summary judgment order to this Court.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[¶11] W.R.C.P. 56 governs summary judgment and imposes obligations on the movant and nonmovant.

The party requesting summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c) ; Throckmartin v. Century 21 Top Realty , 2010 WY 23, ¶ 12, 226 P.3d 793, 798 (Wyo. 2010). Until the movant has made a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the nonmovant has no obligation to respond to the motion with materials beyond the pleadings. Id .

Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present evidence showing that there are genuine issues of material fact. Boehm v. Cody Cntry. Chamber of Commerce , 748 P.2d 704, 710 (Wyo. 1987) (citing England v. Simmons , 728 P.2d 1137, 1140-41 (Wyo. 1986) ). The party opposing the motion must present specific facts; relying on conclusory statements or mere opinion will not satisfy that burden, nor will relying solely upon allegations and pleadings. Boehm , 748 P.2d at 710. However, the facts presented are considered from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party is given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the record. [ Union Pacific R. Co. v. ] Caballo Coal Co. , ¶ 12, 246 P.3d [867], 871 [ (Wyo. 2011) ].

Kaufman v. Rural Health Dev., Inc. , 2019 WY 62, ¶ 14, 442 P.3d 303, 307-08 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Bogdanski v. Budzik , 2018 WY 7, ¶ 18, 408 P.3d 1156, 1160-61 (Wyo. ...