Vavrek v. Parks
| Decision Date | 10 April 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 435--II,435--II |
| Parties | Islah M. VAVREK, Respondent, v. Walter T. PARKS and H. Edward Sherman, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Beale, of Murray, Scott, McGavick, Graves, Lane & Lowry, Tacoma, for appellants.
B. Rolf Espedal, Aberdeen, for respondent.
This is another case involving disputed ownership of accreted land along the Pacific Ocean. The particular dispute centers around the meaning of a 1952 deed in which the plaintiff granted certain premises to defendants' predecessors in interest. The description in the deed was:
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Government Lot 4, Section 22, Township 18 North Range 12 West W.M.; thence Northerly on the West line of said Government Lot 4, 208 feet; thence North 89 51 East 208 feet; thence Southerly parallel to the West line of said Government Lot 4, 208 feet to the South Line of Government Lot 4; thence South 89 51 West on the South line of Government Lot 4, 208 feet to the place of beginning.
(Emphasis added.)
Government Lot 4 in Section 22, Township 18 North, Range 12 West of the Willamette Meridian is a tract of land in Grays Harbor County, whose westerly border faces the Pacific Ocean. It was originally surveyed, established and patented by the federal government prior to statehood. 1 For many years accretions have been building up westerly of the original boundary of this lot, to the extent that there are now an estimated 1500 to 1600 feet of accreted land lying between the 1859 meander line (traverse marking the sinuosities of the Pacific Ocean at the time of the original survey) and the present line of mean high tide at that location on the Pacific Ocean.
For several years prior to 1951, plaintiff, Islah M. Vavrek, had been the owner of all of government lot 4. In March, 1951, Mrs. Vavrek was approached by Frank and Anna Parks, husband and wife, with the request that she sell to them one acre of land 'on the water' in Grays Harbor near Ocean City. Mrs. Vavrek advised the prospective purchasers that there was a dispute as to ownership of property in government lot 4 lying west of the meander line which, even at that time, consisted of a considerable amount of accreted land. She offered to sell to Mr. and Mrs. Parks one acre of land east of the meander line, the same being the property most westerly and southerly in said lot to which she could convey good and clear title.
Mrs. Vavrek and the Parks went to the ground where the one-acre parcel was located and the prospective purchasers were shown a survey marker located on the south line of section 22 at the point where it intersected the meander line. She indicated that she would be willing to sell approximately one acre consisting of lands described by metes and bounds with the beginning point at the said marker, thence northerly along the meander line 208 feet, then generally easterly 208 feet, then generally southerly 208 feet, then westerly 208 feet to the point of beginning.
Upon the agreement of Mr. and Mrs. Parks to purchase said land, Mrs. Vavrek procured the survey of said property and all four corners were marked with stakes on said property. The parties entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of said property. Thereafter, both seller and purchasers, together with Walter T. Parks, defendant herein, the son of Frank and Anna Parks, went to the property where the said acre, as staked, was again pointed out to them. The southwest and southeast corner survey stakes were pointed out and although the purchasers thought they were getting waterfront property, the trial court found, but defendants assign error to the finding, that 'they (defendants' predecessors) nevertheless accepted the acre as staked and accepted the plaintiff's (Mrs. Vavrek's) statement that the state of Washington contested the plaintiff's claim of title to the Westerly accretions.' The purchasers paid the balance of the purchase price of $1,500 and on February 4, 1952 accepted the deed from Mrs. Vavrek with the description as set forth above.
Thereafter, Frank and Anna Parks conveyed the said property by the same description to the defendants herein, Walter T. Parks and wife, and H. Edward Sherman and wife. In recent years the defendants have begun using and occupying the land west of the meander line. The foregoing recitation of facts is a faithful recital of the findings made by the trial court. Except as noted later in this opinion, they are the essential facts.
Plaintiff commenced this action to quiet title in her to that strip of land 208 feet wide and approximately 1500 feet long lying between the meander line and the line of mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean. Defendants have cross-claimed seeking to quiet title in the disputed strip to themselves. Based on the foregoing facts, the court concluded that the defendants' predecessors in title 'intended to limit the grant of the property to the lines described by metes and bounds using the meander line as the westerly line of the said tract'; and reformed the description in the deed 2 to read as follows:
Beginning at the Point where the Meander Line in Government Lot 4 intersects with the South line of Section 22, Township 18 North Range 12 West W.M.; Thence Northerly on the West lne of said Government Lot 4, 208 feet; Thence North 89 51 East 208 feet; Thence Southerly parallel to the West line of said Government Lot 4, 208 feet to the South line of Government Lot 4; Thence South 89 51 West on the South line of Government Lot 4, 208 feet to the place of beginning.
(Emphasis added.) Thereafter the court entered a decree quieting title to the disputed strip in the plaintiff, Mrs. Vavrek. Defendants have appealed and have assigned error (1) to that portion of the finding of fact which declared that their predecessors in title 'accepted the acre as staked', on the theory that there is no substantial evidence to support it; and (2) to the entry of the decree quieting title to the disputed strip in the plaintiff on the theory that as a matter of law title to the disputed strip passed to defendants' predecessors in 1952. Defendants have not challenged the reformed description of the 1952 deed, but they do contend that the reformed description also supports a conclusion of law that title to the contested strip of land be quieted in them.
We approach resolution of the issue presented by this appeal by first recognizing that the waterside boundaries of fractional governmental lots were determined by traverses laid out by the original surveyors who marked the major sinuosities of the body of water. These traverse lines are designated meander lines. They are fixed, determinable lines on the surface of the earth and, if lost, can be re-established by any competent surveyor. Their primary role is somewhat historical, to ascertain the acreage enclosed in the original grant of land. They do not ordinarily designate the boundary of the land granted. Unless there is clear indication to the contrary, the watercourse itself constitutes the boundary of the upland tract. Harris v. Swart Mortgage Co., 41 Wash.2d 354, 249 P.2d 403 (1952); 1 Patton on Land Titles, § 117 at page 297 (2d ed. 1957).
Thus, the owner of these fractional lots has title to the 'water's edge'--in this instance to the line of mean high tide--and when accretion or reliction occurs, title to the affected land moves to the same extent as accretion or reliction takes place. Smith Tug & Barge Co. v. Columbia-Pacific Towing Corp., 78 Wash.2d 975, 482 P.2d 769 (1971); Harper v. Holston, 119 Wash. 436, 205 P. 1062 (1922); J. Grimes, Clark on Surveying and Boundaries, § 238 et seq., (3d ed. 1959).
As a general rule, a deed conveying land, which employs a meander line (the waterside boundary of a government lot) as one of the calls in its description, will be construed against the grantor, and if he owns to the water, he will be deemed not to have cut off the grantee from the water. This rule is subject to the qualification that if the parties to the deed appear to have intended that the meander line should be the...
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Ray v. King County
...P.2d 526 (1979). 13. Veach, 92 Wash.2d at 573, 599 P.2d 526. 14. Veach, 92 Wash.2d at 573, 599 P.2d 526 (citing Vavrek v. Parks, 6 Wash.App. 684, 690, 495 P.2d 1051 (1972); Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 35, 96 Cal.Rptr. 317 15. Veach, 92 Wash.2d at 573, 599 P.......
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Nielson v. Robbins, No. 63479-8-I (Wash. App. 6/1/2010)
...of the statute of frauds, Robbins's reliance on it is misplaced. The other cases cited by Robbins are similarly distinguishable. Vavrek v. Parks53 and Thomas v. Nelson54 are cases in which parol evidence was to explain the use of a meander line as a call in a legal description. Again, in th......
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Nielson v. Robbins
...Maxwell, 12 Wn.2d at 592. [50] Maxwell, 12 Wn.2d at 592-93. [51] Maxwell, 12 Wn.2d at 599. [52] Maxwell, 12 Wn.2d at 596, 598-99. [53] 6 Wn.App. 684, 495 P.2d 1051 (1972). [54] 35 Wn.App. 868, 670 P.2d 682 (1983). [55] Thomas, 35 Wn.App. at 871 ("Evidence extrinsic to the deed may be consid......
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Zobrist v. Culp
...purposes. We will not speculate upon the meaning of the deed where the deed is silent on a particular subject. See Vavrek v. Parks, 6 Wash.App. 684, 690, 495 P.2d 1051 (1972). We agree with the statement found in Mitchell v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 384 Ill. 258, 51 N.E.2d 271, 274, 149 A.L.R......
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Table of Cases
...562 P.2d 666, review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1007 (1977): 8.3(3) Van Siclen v. Muir, 46 Wash. 38, 89 P. 188 (1907): 4.24(3) Vavrek v. Parks, 6 Wn. App. 684, 495 P.2d 1051 (1972): 4.4(1) Ventoza v. Anderson, 14 Wn. App. 882, 545 P.2d 1219 (1976), review denied, 87 Wn.2d 1007 (1976): 8.4(1) W_______......
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§ 4.4 - Government Lot Boundaries
...Harris v. Swart Mortg. Co., 41 Wn.2d 354, 249 P.2d 403 (1952); Thomas v. Nelson, 35 Wn.App. 868, 670 P.2d 682 (1983); Vavrek v. Parks, 6 Wn.App. 684, 495 P.2d 1051 (2) Patents after statehood Government lots abutting navigable waters patented into private ownership by the United States afte......