Vazquez v. State

• Decision Date: 29 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. A12–0204.,A12–0204.
• Citation: 822 N.W.2d 313
• Parties: Aeropajito Castro VAZQUEZ, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

822 N.W.2d 313

Aeropajito Castro VAZQUEZ, petitioner, Appellant,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. A12–0204.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Oct. 29, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

A motion for correction or reduction of sentence based solely on a challenge to the accuracy of the criminal-history score is properly brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, and is not subject to the two-year postconviction statute of limitations.

Aeropajito Castro Vazquez, Bayport, MN, pro se appellant.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by HALBROOKS, Presiding Judge; KALITOWSKI, Judge; and HUDSON, Judge.

OPINION

HUDSON, Judge.

On appeal from the postconviction court's denial of appellant's motion for correction or reduction of sentence, appellant argues that the postconviction court erred by treating his motion, brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, as a postconviction petition and dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Pro se appellant Aeropajito Castro Vazquez was convicted of second-degree murder in January 2001.¹ At sentencing, appellant's criminal-history score was determined to be five, and appellant was sentenced to 406 months pursuant to the sentencing guidelines.

Vazquez filed petitions for postconviction relief in 2003 and 2007, and both were denied by the district court. Vazquez appealed the denial of his second petition, and this court affirmed. Vazquez v. State, No. A07–1994, 2008 WL 4471521 (Minn.App. Oct. 7, 2008), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2008) ( Vazquez I ).

In 2010, appellant filed a motion for correction or reduction of sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Appellant claimed that his criminal-history score had been incorrectly calculated and that he was entitled to a lesser sentence. The district court treated appellant's motion as a petition for postconviction relief and ruled that it was barred by State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 243 N.W.2d 737 (1976).

This court reversed the postconviction court's ruling and concluded that Knaffla did not bar review of Vazquez's motion because a sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score is illegal, and therefore, a defendant cannot waive review of his criminal-history-score calculation. Vazquez v. State, No. A10–865, 2011 WL 134966, at *2 (Minn.App. Jan. 18, 2011) ( Vazquez II ). This court further concluded that, because the record did not conclusively show that appellant was not entitled to a correction of his criminal-history score, “we reverse and remand for consideration of Vazquez's motion for correction or reduction of sentence on the merits.” Id. at *4. The state had additionally argued that Vazquez's motion was untimely under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2008). Id. This court declined to consider the timeliness argument because the postconviction court denied Vazquez's motion for correction or reduction of sentence without addressing the application of Minn. Stat. § 590.01. Id.

On remand, the postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing and denied appellant's motion. The court determined that Vazquez's motion, although brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, was instead a postconviction petition pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2. The postconviction court determined that the state's challenge to the timeliness of appellant's motion was properly before it and addressed that challenge as a jurisdictional issue. The postconviction court concluded that, because Vazquez did not bring his petition for postconviction relief within the two-year statutory time frame set out in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition.

The postconviction court noted in its order that the court of appeals “instructed this Court to consider Mr. Vazquez's motion for correction or reduction of sentence on the merits.” But, the postconviction court stated that

[t]he record upon which Mr. Vazquez seeks to have his score recalculated is complete, as the parties' evidence and arguments have been fully submitted after a hearing. Therefore if the Court has erred in its jurisdictional analysis, it will dutifully address the merits of Mr. Vazquez's challenge to his criminal history score upon another remand. Until then, the Court must refrain from exercising jurisdiction it has found not to exist.

This appeal follows.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in determining that Vazquez's motion for correction or reduction of sentence brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, was an untimely postconviction petition?

ANALYSIS

Vazquez argues that the postconviction court erred in treating his motion for correction or reduction of sentence brought under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, as a postconviction petition subject to the two-year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, and concluding that, because the petition was filed outside the two-year time period, the court did not have jurisdiction to consider it.

We review de novo the interpretation of a procedural rule. Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn.2011). In reviewing the district court's denial of postconviction relief, including a denial based on the two-year statutory limit, we review issues of law de novo but will not reverse factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn.2012).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently held that the time limit in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c), “does not operate as a jurisdictional bar.” Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 606 (Minn.2012). Here, the district court relied on language in Stewart v. State, 764 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn.2009), suggesting that the postconviction time limit was jurisdictional. But Carlton noted that, although Stewart could be read to “suggest that the time limitations in the postconviction statute may be jurisdictional requirements,” the court had not “expressly address[ed] and analyz[ed]” the limitations provision in Stewart as it has now done in Carlton.Carlton, 816 N.W.2d at 606 n. 6. The Carlton court concluded “that the time limitation in subdivision 4(c) does not operate as a jurisdictional bar, and that it therefore is subject to waiver.” Id. at 606.

The district court's order was prior to the supreme court's holding in Carlton that the two-year time limit in the postconviction statute is not jurisdictional. But the two-year limit, considered as a statute of limitations under Carlton, could still bar Vazquez's claim, allowing this court to affirm on other grounds. Thus, we must address the broader issue of whether the two-year limitations provision applies to Vazquez's challenge to his criminal-history score. That challenge was brought in a motion for correction or reduction of sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, not in a postconviction petition presented as such.

Rule 27.03, subdivision 9, states that a “court may at any time correct a sentence not authorized by law.” ² The supreme court has permitted motions made under rule 27.03, subdivision 9, to be treated as postconviction petitions. See Bonga v. State, 765 N.W.2d 639, 642–43 (Minn.2009); Powers v. State, 731 N.W.2d 499, 501 n. 2 (Minn.2007). But neither Powers nor Bonga holds that a rule 27.03, subdivision 9, motion must be treated as a postconviction petition. And we have not found any case squarely holding that such motions are governed by the postconviction statute, including its two-year limitations provisions.

We note that the supreme court has held that, when a defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing, “the motion to withdraw the plea must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief.” James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn.2005). No such rule, however, has been established for sentence-modification motions. The supreme court in James found “no reason to treat timeliness under [Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, governing plea-withdrawal motions,] differently from the manner in which delays in filing petitions for postconviction relief are treated.” Id. at 728. The James opinion was released before the effective date of the 2005 amendment adding the two-year statute of limitations. The supreme court recently reaffirmed the James rule that a “motion to withdraw a guilty plea made after sentencing must be raised in a petition for postconviction relief” and is governed by the new timeliness requirements of the postconviction statute. Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 586 n. 2 (Minn.2012). But Lussier, like James, involves a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rather than a sentence-modification motion.

The supreme court discussed this issue in the context of sentence-modification motions in Johnson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 173 (Minn.2011). In Johnson, the defendant filed a motion under rule 27.03, subdivision 9, but one in which he challenged the validity of his conviction as well as the terms of his sentence. Id. at 175. The district court corrected the sentence but denied Johnson's challenge to his guilty plea and conviction. Id. The supreme court noted: “Because he obtained relief on the sentencing issue, Johnson does not continue to claim that the court imposed an illegal sentence. The only remaining issues in the case concern the validity of his guilty plea.” Id.

The Johnson court went on to address the interplay between rule 27.03, subdivision 9, and the postconviction statute. But it did so after noting that “the plain language of [rule 27.03, subdivision 9] does not allow a defendant to challenge his conviction.” Id. at 176. The court discussed the “exclusive remedy” provision of the postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 2, and concluded that Johnson's “exclusive remedy for review of his claims is in a proceeding for postconviction relief, not in a proceeding to correct a sentence under Rule 27.03, subd. 9.” Id.

Despite this...