Venable v. Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 40939.,40939.
• Citation: 329 P.3d 356,156 Idaho 574
• Parties: Tina VENABLE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. INTERNET AUTO RENT & SALES, INC., and John and Jane Does 1 through X, whose true identities are unknown, Defendants–Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

156 Idaho 574

329 P.3d 356

Tina VENABLE, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.INTERNET AUTO RENT & SALES, INC., and John and Jane Does 1 through X, whose true identities are unknown, Defendants–Respondents.

No. 40939.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, April 2014 Term.

June 17, 2014.

Review Denied July 31, 2014.

Johnson & Monteleone, LLP, Boise, for appellant. Sam Johnson argued.

Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht, P.A., Boise, for respondents. Phillip S. Oberrecht argued.

J. JONES, Justice.

This appeal arises from Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc.'s, termination of an employee, Tina Venable. Venable appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment against her on her claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and denial of her motion for reconsideration. Both Venable and Internet Auto request attorney fees on appeal.

I.BACKGROUND

Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc., an automobile dealership, hired Tina Venable as an Internet Manager on March 15, 2011. Venable has worked in the auto sales industry for approximately 15 years, holding a variety of management level positions. Venable states that after she began working for Internet Auto, she observed violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICPA") and the federal Truth in Lending Act. Specifically, she claims:

• Internet Auto illegally passed on acquisition fees to consumers which were in fact owed by the dealership and then illegally charged the consumer interest thereon;

• Internet Auto illegally charged for auto warranties in transactions where the consumer was purchasing the vehicle in the "As Is" condition;

• Internet Auto illegally charged for gap insurance in transactions where the consumer opted out of gap coverage;

• Internet Auto falsely advertised vehicles "for sale" which did not even exist in the inventory and falsely misrepresented the history of pre-owned vehicles to consumers;

• Internet Auto sold vehicles to consumers in excess of their advertised prices;

• Internet Auto engaged in the deceptive practice of failing to disclose all material contractual and financial terms to consumers, engaging in what is known in the industry as "packed payments";

• Internet Auto deceived consumers into believing the dealership had agreed to lower the sales price of units when in fact it had only extended the term of the loan, and thereby reduced the monthly payment amount disclosed to the consumer;

• Internet Auto further deceived consumers by employing a variety of "bait and switch" tactics designed to trick consumers into believing they were to receive one vehicle only to then substitute it later for another vehicle of lesser quality and value.

Venable stated that she "reported the occurrence of the above acts and practices to the General Sales Manager, Mr. Chris Plaza, and other members of the management team but was first told that I should mind my own business and was later told that this is how ‘we do business' and to get on board or words to that affect." Venable claims that "[s]hortly after reporting the deceptive acts and practices to Mr. Plaza," she "discovered" that her "access to key programs used by the dealership had been denied which made it more difficult" for her "to complete sales transactions on behalf of Internet Auto."

A little over a month after hiring Venable, Internet Auto discharged her. After her termination, Venable filed a complaint against Internet Auto alleging breach of contract claims, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She later filed an amended complaint to additionally allege slander.

Internet Auto was granted summary judgment on all of Venable's claims except for slander and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Venable filed a motion for reconsideration of the wrongful discharge claim, which was denied. At trial, the jury found for Internet Auto on both of her remaining claims. Following the jury verdict, Venable filed a second motion for reconsideration of the wrongful discharge claim, which was denied. Venable timely appealed.

II.ISSUES ON APPEAL

I. Did the district court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Internet Auto on Venable's claim for wrongful discharge of employment in violation of public policy?

II. Did the district court err when it denied Venable's second motion for reconsideration of her wrongful discharge claim?

III. Is either party entitled to an award of attorney fees?

III.STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002). "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 Idaho 162, 164, 879 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court exercises free review over questions of law. Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 132, 233 P.3d 61, 63 (2010).

IV.ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Venable contends that Internet Auto was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of wrongful discharge because she identified sufficient law and facts to show that she was protected under the public policy exception to Idaho's at-will employment doctrine. Under Idaho law, "[u]nless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment, or limits the reasons why the employee may be discharged, the employee is ‘at will.’ " Thomas, 138 Idaho at 206, 61 P.3d at 563 (quoting Nilsson v. Mapco, 115 Idaho 18, 22, 764 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct.App.1988) ) (quotation marks omitted). Venable does not dispute that her employment with Internet Auto was at-will. An at-will employee may be terminated by his or her "employer at any time for any reason without creating liability." Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products,

139 Idaho 172, 176, 75 P.3d 733, 737 (2003). That an employee was at-will "is not, however, an absolute bar to a claim of wrongful discharge." Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 333, 563 P.2d 54, 57 (1977). Idaho recognizes "a narrow exception to the at-will employment presumption where the employer's motivation for the termination contravenes public policy." Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 640, 272 P.3d 1263, 1271 (2012).

A termination contravenes public policy "only where an employee is terminated for engaging in some protected activity, which includes (1) refusing to commit an unlawful act, (2) performing an important public obligation, or (3) exercising certain legal rights and privileges." Id. This exception exists to "balance the competing interests of society, the employer, and the employee in light of modern business experience." Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175, 178, 16 P.3d 272, 275 (2000). A claim for wrongful discharge presents issues of law and fact—to bring a successful claim under the public policy exception, an employee must show that she was engaged in a legally protected activity and that there is a causal relationship between her engagement in the protected activity and her termination. Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 640, 272 P.3d at 1271.

The public policy exception has been protected in Idaho on several occasions. E.g., Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., Inc., 111 Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986) (protecting participation in union activities); Ray v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 814 P.2d 17 (1991) (protecting reports of electrical building code violations); Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 923 P.2d 981 (1996) (protecting compliance with a court issued subpoena). This Court has also indicated that the public policy exception would be applicable if an employee were discharged, for example for refusing to date her supervisor, for filing a worker's compensation claim, or for serving on jury duty. Sorensen [v. Comm Tek, Inc. ], 118 Idaho [664] at 668, 799 P.2d [70] at 74 [ (1990) ] (citations omitted).

Thomas, 138 Idaho at 208, 61 P.3d at 565.

Nonetheless, "contravention of public policy is a narrow exception to the at-will employment rule." McKay v. Ireland Bank, 138 Idaho 185, 189, 59 P.3d 990, 994 (Ct.App.2002). If the exception is "not narrowly construed," it "could eviscerate the rule." Id. Although "many activities and interests engaged in by employees benefit the community.... not all of them are recognized as falling within the public policy exception." Id.

To determine whether an employee was engaged in a protected activity, "this Court analyzes (1) whether there is a public policy at stake sufficient to create an exception to at-will employment, and (2) whether the employee acted in a manner sufficiently in furtherance of that policy." Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 640, 272 P.3d at 1271 (quotation marks omitted). "The determination of what constitutes public policy sufficient to protect an at-will employee from termination is a question of law." Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 147 Idaho 552, 561, 212 P.3d 982, 991 (2009). "Once the court defines the public policy, the question of whether the public policy was violated is one for the jury." Id.

With regard to the first issue, the Idaho Consumer Protection Act does establish public policy for the State of Idaho. Idaho Code § 48–601 states it to be the purpose of the ICPA to "protect both consumers and businesses against unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce, and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection." Venable...