Venegas v. Argueta
| Decision Date | 29 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-20-00285-CV,01-20-00285-CV |
| Parties | JUAN MIGUEL VENEGAS, Appellant v. JOSE ARGUETA, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 129th District Court Harris County, Texas
In this suit for personal injuries from a motor-vehicle collision, appellant, Juan Miguel Venegas, challenges the trial court's orders (1) granting partial summary judgment on negligence and (2) striking his counter-affidavits.
We reverse and remand.
In 2016, appellee, Jose Argueta, alleged that as he proceeded into an intersection on a green light, Venegas, proceeding the opposite way, turned left into the intersection, failed to yield the right-of-way, and struck Argueta's vehicle. Argueta sued Venegas for negligence and negligence per se as a result of the accident. Venegas answered the suit and generally denied the allegations.
Argueta sought partial summary judgment on Venegas's negligence, arguing that "Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law regarding the legal duty, breach, and causation portions of h[is] negligence claim."1 In support of his motion, Argueta relied on his deposition, his medical records, and a peace officer's crash report. Based on his motion, Argueta claimed that Venegas owed him a duty not to strike his vehicle and that "[a]s a result of the collision, [Argueta] sought treatment with Southwest Accident & Injury Clinic for injuries sustained in the collision."
Venegas responded to the motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that it was not appropriate to enter summary judgment and even if it was, his discovery responses raised an issue of fact:
Argueta moved to strike Venegas's response to his motion for partial summary judgment because the response was untimely.2 Argueta also objected to Venegas's answers to interrogatories, claiming that Venegas could not rely on his own answers to raise a fact issue and that the trial court not consider the evidence attached to his summary judgment response.
In his first amended answer, Venegas generally denied the allegations, asserted a number of actions that Argueta should have taken to avoid the collision, and alleged comparative responsibility under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.3
On April 1, 2019, the trial court granted Argueta's motion for partial summary judgment without stating its reasons, and it sustained Argueta's objections to Venegas's summary judgment evidence.
The parties proceeded to trial with Argueta testifying by deposition, and he called two doctors to testify as to his medical expenses. After Argueta rested, Venegas did not call any witnesses and rested. Before the charge conference,Venegas's counsel stated on the record that Venegas then testified that he was involved in the September 9, 2016 collision, that he was turning left on a green light, that Argueta did not have his headlights on, and that if had seen the headlights on, he would not have turned. He received a ticket that was later dismissed.
After jury deliberations, the trial court read the verdict, which awarded Argueta $29,543.68 for past medical care, $15,000 for past physical impairment, and $20,000 for past physical pain. On December 20, 2019, Argueta filed a "Motion for Entry of Final Judgment," stating that the jury had rendered a verdict in his favor and that opposing counsel had not signed the final judgment. Venegas responded, arguing in relevant part that the motion for entry of final judgment should be denied because the trial court's granting of a partial motion for summary judgment prior to trial as to liability resulted in reversible error and Argueta presented no evidence of damages as part of the partial summary judgment motion.
Once the trial court signed the final judgment on January 8, 2020, Venegas filed a motion for new trial and an amended motion for new trial, raising three issues. In relevant part, Venegas argued that there were genuine issues of material fact as tothe liability of plaintiff and defendant and that no conclusive evidence on the question of whether Venegas "acted as an ordinarily prudent person faced with the same or similar circumstances." On February 24, 2020, the trial court denied Venegas's amended motion for new trial and Venegas timely filed a notice of appeal.
In his first issue on appeal, Venegas argues that the trial court erroneously granted partial summary judgment on Argueta's claim for negligence and liability for damages. Venegas contends that Argueta did not include any conclusive evidence of specific acts of negligence by Venegas.
We review a trial court's summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). In reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference, and we resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985). Where, as here, the trial court grants the judgment without specifying the grounds, we affirm the summary judgment if any of the grounds presented are meritorious. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872-873 (Tex. 2000). "Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal." TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). A plaintiff is entitled tosummary judgment on a cause of action if it conclusively proves all essential elements of a claim and, thereby, establishes its right to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a), (c); MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). A matter is conclusively established for summary judgment purposes if ordinary minds cannot differ regarding the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. Price v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 113 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). In a traditional motion for summary judgment, if the movant's motion and summary judgment evidence facially establish its right to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine, material fact issue sufficient to defeat summary judgment. M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000).
To prevail on a negligence cause of action, Argueta had to establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. W. Invs. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005). To establish a breach of duty, the plaintiff must show either that the defendant did something an ordinarily prudent person exercising ordinary care would not have done under the particular circumstances or that the defendant failed to do something that an ordinarily prudent person would have done in the exercise of ordinary care. Douglas v. Aguilar, 599 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); Mata v. Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc., No. 01-17-00509-CV, 2018 WL 3150869, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 28, 2018, no pet.). The resolution of a defendant's possible breach of duty is a question of fact. Aguirre v. Vasquez, 225 S.W.3d 744, 757 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Establishing causation in a personal injury case requires a plaintiff to "prove that the conduct of the defendant caused an event and that this event caused the plaintiff to suffer compensable injuries." JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza, 466 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995)). Proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury, but may be established as a matter of law if the circumstances are such that reasonable minds could not arrive at a different conclusion. Boyd v. Fuel Distribs., Inc., 795 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, writ denied) (citing Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Am. Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 104-05 (Tex. 1977)). When an accident victim seeks to recover medical expenses, he must show "what all the conditions were that generated the expenses and 'that all the conditions were caused by the accident.'" JLG Trucking, 466 S.W.3d at 162 (quoting Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 669 (Tex. 2007)).
"A driver has a general duty to exercise the ordinary care a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same circumstances to avoid a foreseeable risk of harm to others." Ciguero v. Lara, 455 S.W.3d 744, 748 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). "Motorists [also] have a general duty to keep a proper lookout." Montes v. Pendergrass, 61 S.W.3d 505, 509 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.). Theduty to keep "[a] proper lookout encompasses the duty to observe, in a careful and intelligent manner, traffic and the general situation in the vicinity, including speed and proximity of other vehicles as well as rules of the road and common experience." Id. (quoting Carney v. Roberts Inv. Co., 837 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, writ denied)). "The failure to keep a proper lookout can be a proximate cause of an accident where the motorist should have seen something in time to have avoided the accident by evasive action and but for such failure the collision could have been avoided." Ciguero, 455 S.W.3d at 748 (quoting Montes, 61 S.W.3d at 510).
A driver's failure to yield the right-of-way or the mere occurrence of a collision does not give rise to negligence as a matter of law. See Middleton v. Palmer, ...
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