Village Laguna of Laguna Beach, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors

• Decision Date: 12 August 1982
• Citation: 185 Cal.Rptr. 41,134 Cal.App.3d 1022
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: VILLAGE LAGUNA OF LAGUNA BEACH, INC., a California nonprofit corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF ORANGE COUNTY, California, Defendant and Respondent, ALISO VIEJO COMPANY, a California corporation, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Civ. 25486.

Page 41

185 Cal.Rptr. 41

134 Cal.App.3d 1022

VILLAGE LAGUNA OF LAGUNA BEACH, INC., a California nonprofit corporation, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF ORANGE COUNTY, California, Defendant and Respondent ALISO VIEJO COMPANY, a California corporation, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Civ. 25486.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California Aug. 12, 1982.

[134 Cal.App.3d 1025] Shute, Minaly & Weinberger and E. Clement Shute, Jr., San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants.

[134 Cal.App.3d 1026] Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel, and John R. Griset, Santa Ana, Deputy County Counsel, for defendant and respondent.

McKenna, Conner & Cuneo, Bernard Kolbor, Aaron M. Peck, Edward Lasker, Edmond M. Connor and Douglas M. Rawlings, Los Angeles, for real party in interest and respondent.

OPINION

MORRIS, Presiding Justice.

Aliso Viejo Company owns a 6,623-acre property that occupies a significant portion of southwest Orange County near Laguna Beach. On this land, the company proposes to build a new city, Aliso Viejo, with a population of possibly 60,000 persons. A precondition to this massive development is the amendment of the Orange County General Plan for that area. And, before the General Plan can be amended, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requires that an adequate environmental impact report (EIR) be prepared. An EIR concerning the amendment of the General Plan was submitted to and approved by the Orange County Board of Supervisors, who then adopted the proposed amendment. Appellants sought a writ of mandate to annul the approval of the EIR and the adoption of the amendment. The writ was denied and appellants have appealed, claiming that the EIR is legally insufficient and that the Board of Supervisors failed to make required findings prior to adopting the amendment. We find the EIR to be sufficient, but reverse because the Board's findings are inadequate.

SUFFICIENCY OF EIR

As this court recently stated in Santiago County Water Dist. v. County of Orange (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 818, 822-823, 173 Cal.Rptr. 602, "An express purpose of CEQA is that state agencies give 'major consideration' to preventing damage to the environment when conducting their regulatory functions. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000, subd. (g).) ¹ To accomplish this, an environmental impact report is required to be written prior to a project's approval. (§§ 21100, 21151.) The EIR identifies significant effects of a project on the environment, the way those effects can be mitigated or avoided, and the alternatives to the project. (§ 21002.1, subd. (a).) It is 'an informational document which ... will inform public decisionmakers and the general public of the environmental effects of projects they propose to carry out or approve.' (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14, § 15012.) ² The EIR has been referred to as 'the heart of CEQA' and as 'an environmental "alarm bell" whose purpose it is to alert the public and its responsible officials to environmental changes before they have reached ecological points of no return.' (County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 795, 810 .)

"In reviewing the [Board of Supervisors' actions], we are limited to deciding 'whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion ... [which] is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.' (§ 21168.5.) Thus, we do 'not pass upon the correctness of the EIR's environmental conclusions, but only upon its sufficiency as an informative document.' (County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185, 189 .) However, we must be satisfied that the [Board] has fully complied with the procedural requirements of CEQA, because only in this way 'can a subversion of the important public purposes of CEQA be avoided.' (People v. County of Kern (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 830, 842 .)"

We further stated in Santiago that "the ultimate decision of whether to approve a project, be that decision right or wrong, is a nullity if based upon an EIR that does not provide the decision-makers, and the public, with the information about the project that is required by CEQA." (Id., 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 829, 173 Cal.Rptr. 602.) In the present case, petitioners contend that the EIR for the amendment of the county's General Plan is inadequate in that the EIR does not evaluate all reasonable alternatives to the proposed amendment and that it does not discuss the environmental impacts which could occur should any of several assumptions in the EIR fail to be fulfilled.

One of the required features of an EIR is a "detailed statement setting forth ... [a]lternatives to the proposed project." (§ 21100(d).) The Guidelines state that "all reasonable alternatives" should be described, including the "no project" alternative. (Guidelines, § 15143(d).)

Prior to the amendment at issue here, the land use element of the General Plan allowed for just over 10,000 dwelling units to be developed over about 1,310 acres of the Aliso Viejo property. After the adoption of the amendment, over 28,000 dwelling units may be developed over 2,472 acres. The company plans to build 20,000 dwelling units.

The EIR discusses four alternatives to the 20,000 dwelling unit proposal of the company. The first is the "no development" alternative, which the Guidelines expressly require to be examined. This alternative would maintain the property in its present condition of having only four residences and of being used for barley production and cattle grazing. The second alternative discussed is the maintenance of the prior land use element which allowed just over 10,000 dwelling units. The third is described as the "low density" alternative, which calls for 7,500 dwelling units. The fourth alternative is a "high density" plan envisioning 25,000 dwelling units.

Appellants' claim of inadequacy is based on the failure of the EIR to consider as an alternative the development of "some number" of dwelling units between the 10,000 authorized by the prior land use element and the 20,000 proposed by the company. Appellants contend that this omission is significant, because the development of an intermediate number of homes is the most obvious alternative. Indeed, they point to a proposal that was made by one member of the Board of Supervisors that only 16,000 dwelling units be authorized. We conclude, however, that the EIR evaluation of plans for the development of 0, 7,500, 10,000, 20,000, and 25,000 dwelling units was sufficient to satisfy the informational goal of CEQA.

In the present case, there are literally thousands of "reasonable alternatives" to the proposed project. Certainly, if the building of 0 and 25,000 homes are reasonable alternatives to the proposed 20,000 dwelling unit plan, then the building of 1,000, 16,000, 22,500, and 20,001 homes are reasonable alternatives. But, no one would argue that the EIR is insufficient for failure to describe the 20,001 home alternatives. Thus, as both the California and federal ³ courts have recognized, "[t]he statutory requirements for consideration of alternatives must be judged against a rule of reason." (Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage v. City and County of San Francisco (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 893, 910, 165 Cal.Rptr. 401; see also Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Com. v. Board of Trustees (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 274, 286, 152 Cal.Rptr. 585; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC (1978) 435 U.S. 519, 551, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1215, 55 L.Ed.2d 460; Coalition For Canyon Preservation v. Bowers (9th Cir. 1980) 632 F.2d 774, 783.)

It is significant that no claims of deficiencies are made concerning the discussions of the four alternatives that were considered in the EIR. Therefore, it must be assumed that decision makers and the public could make an informed comparison of the environmental effects of those various plans. It is not then unreasonable to conclude that an alternative not discussed in the EIR could be intelligently considered by studying the adequate descriptions of the plans that are discussed. ⁴ This EIR should "not become vulnerable because it fails to consider in detail each and every conceivable variation of the alternatives stated." (Brooks v. Coleman (9th Cir. 1975) 518 F.2d 17, 19.)

"Absolute perfection is not required; what is required is the production of information sufficient to permit a reasonable choice of alternatives so far as environmental aspects are concerned." (Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage, supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 910, 165 Cal.Rptr. 401.) The requirement has been fulfilled here.

Appellants further fault the EIR for making assumptions about the proposed project but failing to consider the environmental effects should any of those assumptions prove erroneous. Specifically, they note the following assumptions: (1) that the San Joaquin Hills Transportation Corridor, which would bisect Aliso Viejo and would serve as one of "the primary access routes linking coastal and southern areas with inland and northern points," will be built; (2) that the Greenbelt, which encompasses "[o]ver one-half of the total acreage of the project, including some of the more important physical, biological and scientific/cultural resources," will be preserved; and (3) that 25 percent of the proposed 20,000 dwelling units will be affordable housing units. ⁵

Appellants are asking more of the EIR than is legally required. The "assumptions" referred to are actually integral portions of the proposed project. If they fail to become reality (e.g., if the Transportation Corridor is not built), we are dealing with a different project. However, CEQA only requires that an EIR discuss "[t]he significant environmental effects of the proposed project." (§ 21100(a), emphasis added.) The proposed project, which includes the Transportation Corridor, a preserved Greenbelt and 25 percent affordable housing,...