Vitela v. State
| Decision Date | 29 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 04-19-738-CR,04-19-00737-CR |
| Parties | Aidan VITELA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 5942 & 6023 Honorable Kirsten B. Cohoon Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Luz Elena Chapa Justice, Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
In this appeal from a consolidated guilty verdict for one count of criminally negligent homicide and one count of aggravated assault, Appellant Aidan Vitela argues that the trial court abused its discretion 1) by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his car's "black box" event data recorder, 2) by allowing the State's expert witnesses to testify and admitting black box evidence after a Daubert hearing, and 3) committed reversible error by denying a request for a mistrial due to improper closing statements by the prosecutor. He also argues that the evidence against him was legally insufficient to support a conviction for criminally negligent homicide. For the reasons given below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
On March 12, 2015, Vitela was driving his two friends, Victoria Snell and Sydney Smith, down Scenic Loop in Boerne. He sped around a curve and lost control of his car, crashing into a tree. Smith died due to her injuries in the crash. As part of the police investigation, officers obtained a search warrant to recover Vitela's black box event data recorder from his car. Once officers collected the evidence, they performed a download of the recorder's data to gain information on the car's speed at and before the time of the crash.
In preparation for trial, Vitela challenged the officers' authority to seize his car's black box and access its information. He also challenged the black box's reliability. But the trial court denied Vitela's pretrial motion to suppress as well as his pretrial request to disqualify the State's expert witnesses or exclude the black box data as unreliable evidence. After the jury heard the State's evidence, the prosecutor argued that Vitela had driven recklessly, which Vitela disputed. The jury convicted Vitela of the lesser offense of criminally negligent homicide and found him guilty of aggravated assault for injuring Snell. Vitela now appeals, arguing for this court to reverse and remand his case for a new trial.
Vitela argues that the warrant police used to seize his car's black box was not based on probable cause and that the black box was not found in the place where police expected to find it. Consequently, he argues that his motion to suppress the evidence should have been granted. The State responds that Vitela abandoned his car and had no standing to complain of any seizure related to it.
A trial court's ruling refusing to suppress evidence is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). But the appellate court uses a bifurcated standard, reviewing applications of law de novo. State v. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). This standard gives almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts, especially when resolving the mixed questions of law and fact turning on evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48 (citing St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
To collect evidence from a suspect's vehicle, police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See Gonzales v. State, 190 S.W.3d 125, 134 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). However, if a suspect has abandoned a vehicle, he may have no standing to challenge any evidence collected from it. See Gonzales, 190 S.W.3d at 135 (citing Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). The test to determine whether a suspect has abandoned his vehicle turns on whether the suspect showed intent to abandon it and whether the suspect's intent was based on any police misconduct. Gonzales, 190 S.W.3d at 135 ().
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court found that Vitela's car was towed to a wrecker's lot following the crash and that the company notified Vitela he could collect his car after he paid the towing and storage fees. Vitela made no effort to collect the car, and his insurer sent it to an auto auction. The auto auction is where law enforcement officers discovered the car, and it is where they ultimately collected the black box evidence. The State is correct that the record reflects Vitela's apparent intent to abandon his car by his lack of effort to collect it or to communicate with anyone about whether he planned to collect it. When the police obtained evidence from the car, it was about to be sold by Geico. Therefore, Vitela maintained no standing to challenge the evidence collected. See Gonzales, 190 S.W.3d at 135. We overrule his argument regarding the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress the black box evidence.
Vitela argues that the State's expert witnesses lacked adequate expertise and should not have been permitted to testify. He also argues that the black box evidence associated with his car was unreliable because the black box police discovered on the passenger seat of his car was not of the same make as his car, [1] the data itself showed many errors, and it was unclear how the data related to Vitela's crash, if it corresponded at all. At trial, he challenged the admissibility of this evidence under Daubert, but the trial court overruled his objection.
The State argues that Vitela waived his argument in part by not objecting to the science underlying the black box evidence at trial. The State further argues that its expert witnesses were qualified to assist the jury in deciding the case, and that Vitela suffered no prejudice from the evidence admitted through the State's expert witnesses because Vitela offered and admitted similar evidence.
An appellate court reviews a trial court's admission of evidence and expert testimony for an abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the trial court's ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
"A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Tex. R. Evid. 702; Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); Wooten v. State, 267 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd). In other words, to testify as an expert, a witness must be qualified in their area of testimony, the area of testimony must be appropriate for an expert witness, and the anticipated testimony should help the jury decide the case. Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669 (citing Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). But "[t]his is not the same thing as requiring every expert to be the best possible witness." Id. at 670. For example, additional education might make a witness more authoritative on a topic but may not be necessary to adequately help a jury decide a case. See id. In fact, "experience alone can provide a sufficient basis to qualify a person as an expert." Carter v. State, 5 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). Ultimately, the decision to allow a witness to testify as an expert lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See id. at 320.
Furthermore, the data that an expert might analyze is not likely to be precluded at trial or censured on review unless it is too unreliable to help the jury decide the case. See Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 862 S.W.2d 61, 105 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1995) (citing Thompson v. Mayes, 707 S.W.2d 951, 956 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Evidence is usually accepted in relevant scientific fields which are not new or novel. LaBorde v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 80 So.3d 1, 1-2 (La. Ct. App. 2011). Introducing black box evidence in a collision case, for example, is not new or novel. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. Zimmermann, 873 N.E.2d 1215 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); Matos v. State, 899 So.2d 403 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Shabazz, 946 A.2d 626 (N.J.Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005)). Such evidence may be subjected to rigorous cross-examination at trial. See, e.g., In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 903-04 (D.C. 1991). But objections to its reliability will most likely go to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. Id. (citing Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503, 1517 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032 (1990)).
The State's expert witnesses in this case were...
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