Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 4-95-CV-20875.,4-95-CV-20875.
• Citation: 972 F.Supp. 483
• Parties: Nancy Peery BALES, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., and Robert Vallejo, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

972 F.Supp. 483

Nancy Peery BALES, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., and Robert Vallejo, Defendants.

No. 4-95-CV-20875.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

June 19, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Thomas J. Jackowski, Des Moines, IA, for Nancy Peery Bales.

Fred L. Morris, Des Moines, IA, for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Edward N. McConnell, Des Moines, IA, for Robert Lee Vallejo.

RULING ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS, AND APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES

BREMER, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Robert Lee Vallejo's Combined Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial (Clerk's No. 37), Defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'s, Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Clerk's No. 40), and Plaintiff Nancy Peery Bales' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses (Clerk's No. 36).

I. Background and Facts

This case was tried to a jury from March 6 to 10, 1997. The parties consented to proceed before a U.S. Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Bales asserted claims against both defendants for sexual harassment based on quid pro quo and hostile-work-environment theories under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); and the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code Chapter 216 (ICRA). She also alleged that constructive discharge entitled her to front and back pay.

At trial, Bales introduced testimony and other evidence, including admissions by Vallejo, who was the store's pharmacist and Bales' supervisor, that he made unwelcome sexual advances toward Bales at work. These advances included his repeated sexual innuendoes and descriptions of his dreams about her; pulling her hair; twisting her smock "playfully;" offering to come to her home to console her when she was having personal problems; changing "six" to "sex" in material Bales read over a loudspeaker; stating he would leave his wife and stay with Bales in the hotel in which she was temporarily living; calling her at home to say he had "Nancy withdrawal;" and purchasing copies of Glamour ShotsTM photographs of her without her permission.

The evidence at trial showed various Wal-Mart supervisors were advised of some of Vallejo's harassing behaviors toward Bales. The supervisors, however, did little to investigate or end the harassment, beyond advising Bales to ignore and avoid Vallejo, or encouraging her to talk with other Wal-Mart supervisors about the problem. After the sexual harassment had occurred for several months, Wal-Mart management investigated Bales' complaint triggered by the Glamour ShotsTM incident, transferred her out of the pharmacy, and gave Vallejo a written warning for unprofessional behavior. A few months later, Bales transferred to another Wal-Mart store to avoid working in the same store as Vallejo. She quit after not receiving a suitable schedule. She claimed constructive discharge.

The jury returned a verdict on March 10, 1997, finding in favor of Bales on her claims for hostile-work-environment sexual harassment, and in favor of the defendants on the quid pro quo claims and the allegation of constructive discharge. The jury awarded Bales $1 nominal damages against Wal-Mart and $28,000 for past emotional damages against Vallejo on the hostile-work-environment harassment claims. The jury did not award punitive damages.

Bales resisted Vallejo's Combined Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial and Defendant Wal-Mart's Motion for Judgment after Trial. A hearing was held on the motions on April 9, 1997.

Defendants resisted Bales' Motion for Attorney Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses. This matter is fully submitted.

II. Analysis

A. Post-trial Motion Standards

1. Judgment as a Matter of Law

A motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) poses a legal question concerning whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a jury verdict. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1478 (8th Cir.1996). The motion is properly granted only if the nonmoving party has not offered sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Parrish v. Immanuel Med. Ctr., 92 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.1996); Gray, 86 F.3d at 1478; Abbott v. Crocker, Mo., 30 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir.1994). Before ruling on such a motion, a court must (a) resolve direct factual conflicts in favor of the nonmovant; (b) assume as true all facts supporting the nonmovant that the evidence tended to prove; (c) give the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences; and (d) deny the motion if the evidence would allow reasonable jurors to differ as to the conclusions that could be drawn. Parrish, 92 F.3d at 731; Gray, 86 F.3d at 1478; Sherlock v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 79 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir.1996).

Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal issue. Tidwell v. Meyer's Bakeries, Inc., 93 F.3d 490, 494 (8th Cir.1996) (citing White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir.1992)). In determining the issue, a court views the evidence "in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." Tidwell, 93 F.3d at 494; McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1400 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting White, 961 F.2d at 779). The Court does not weigh the evidence on a Rule 50 motion or assess its credibility. White, 961 F.2d at 779; see Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 1337-38, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Butler v. French, 83 F.3d 942, 943 (8th Cir.1996); Abbott, 30 F.3d at 997. "Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of the evidence points one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inference sustaining the position of the nonmoving party." Kehoe v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 96 F.3d 1095, 1100 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Tidwell, 93 F.3d at 494).

2. New Trial

A new trial may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 for several reasons, including the ground that the jury's verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, so that granting a new trial would prevent a miscarriage of justice. Shaffer v. Wilkes, 65 F.3d 115, 117 (8th Cir.1995); Century Wrecker Corp. v. E.R. Buske Mfg. Co., Inc., 913 F.Supp. 1256, 1267-68 (N.D.Iowa 1996). Although the power of the trial court is broad, the court should not,

substitute its judgment for the jury's, granting a new trial whenever it would find differently than the jury has.... The court should reject a jury's verdict only where, after a review of all the evidence giving full respect to the jury's verdict, the court is left with the firm conviction that the jury has erred.

Ryan v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 734 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir.1984) (citations omitted).

In determining whether a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, "the trial court can rely on its own reading of the evidence — it can `weigh the evidence, disbelieve witnesses, and grant a new trial even where there is substantial evidence to sustain a verdict.'" Century Wrecker, 913 F.Supp. at 1268 (citations omitted).

The district court's discretion in denying or granting a motion for new trial is, however, limited by several factors. Id. at 1268. In weighing testimony, for example, the court must find that evidence supporting the verdict is not credible, or that evidence can be otherwise properly rejected. Id.

A federal court is guided by the law of the forum state in determining questions as to the adequacy or excessiveness of a verdict. See Keenan v. Computer Assoc. Int'l., Inc., 13 F.3d 1266, 1273 (8th Cir.1994); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1070 (8th Cir.1992); Johnson v. Cowell Steel Structures, Inc., 991 F.2d 474, 477 (8th Cir.1993). In Iowa, a party may obtain a new trial where the damages awarded are "[e]xcessive or inadequate ... appearing to have been influenced by passion or prejudice," or where the verdict "is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is contrary to law." Iowa R. Civ. P. 244(d)(f).

A court will not set aside or alter a verdict unless it is: "(1) flagrantly excessive or inadequate; or (2) so out of reason as to shock the conscience or sense of justice; or (3) raises a presumption it is the result of passion, prejudice or other ulterior motives; or (4) is lacking in evidential support." Kautman v. Mar-Mac Community Sch. Dist., 255 N.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Iowa 1977) (internal citations omitted); see Cowan v. Flannery, 461 N.W.2d 155, 157-58 (Iowa 1990); Jackson v. Roger, 507 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa.Ct.App.1993). The key question is the amount and sufficiency of evidence to support the award made. Id. "[W]here the verdict is within a reasonable range as indicated by the evidence the courts should not interfere with what is primarily a jury question." Id. The determinative question is whether, under the record, "the verdict effects substantial justice between the parties." Id.

B. Vallejo's Motions

Vallejo bases his Rule 50(b) and 59 motions on the following grounds: the Court should have dismissed the Title VII and Iowa Code Chapter 216 claims against Vallejo individually as a matter of law, because Vallejo bears no individual liability under either statute; insufficient evidence supported the claim against him; and the Court should consider the jury's verdict against Vallejo on the hostile-work-environment claim as advisory, rather than binding, and should enter judgment in favor of Defendants.

1. Individual Liability

a. Federal Claims

Vallejo asserts that while he may be sued in his official capacity as a supervisor, he may not be held individually liable under Title VII or Iowa Code Chapter 216. Specifically, Vallejo contends he is not an employer and thus cannot be held personally liable under either statute.

Noting that the law is unclear regarding whether Vallejo as supervisor may be held individually liable under Title VII, Bales does not contend that Vallejo should...