Von Holden v. Chapman

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: Before SIMONS; DENMAN; SIMONS
• Citation: 87 A.D.2d 66,450 N.Y.S.2d 623
• Decision Date: 21 May 1982
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application of Martin H. VON HOLDEN, Respondent, v. Mark David CHAPMAN, Appellant.

Page 623

450 N.Y.S.2d 623 87 A.D.2d 66 In the Matter of the Application of Martin H. VON HOLDEN, Respondent,
v.
Mark David CHAPMAN, Appellant. Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
Fourth Department. May 21, 1982.

Page 624

Antonio Faga, Utica, for appellant.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., for respondent; Aniela Carl, Dept. of Law, Utica, of counsel.

Before SIMONS, J. P., and CALLAHAN, DENMAN, BOOMER and MOULE, JJ.

DENMAN, Justice.

Mark David Chapman, who is serving a sentence of 20 years to life in Attica Correctional Facility for the killing of John Lennon, the former Beatle, appeals from an order at Special Term which authorized Martin Von Holden, the Director of the New York Psychiatric Center, where Chapman is temporarily in custody, to take all steps necessary to force-feed Chapman in order to sustain his life. Invoking a constitutional right to privacy and to freedom of expression, Chapman claims that such state intervention is an unwarranted invasion of those rights. Under the circumstances presented here, we hold that the obligation

Page 625

of the State to protect the health and welfare of persons in its care and custody, its interest in the preservation of life, and its interest in maintaining rational and orderly procedures in its institutions, are countervailing considerations of such importance as to outweigh any claimed rights of appellant. BACKGROUND

On February 10, 1982 Chapman was transferred to the Psychiatric Center pursuant to section 402 (subd. 9) of the Correction Law, upon the certification of two examining physicians that he was suffering from a mental illness which was likely to result in serious harm to himself. That certification resulted from his refusal to eat for several days prior to the transfer and his expressed intention to take his life by starvation. Von Holden applied to Special Term for an order authorizing him to feed Chapman intravenously or by means of a nasal gastric tube and a hearing on the petition was held on February 25, 1982, at which time Chapman had not eaten for 22 days. The only witness at the hearing was Dr. Daniel N. Uwah, Chapman's treating physician and psychiatrist. According to his testimony and to the affidavit of Von Holden, Chapman was competent; had frequently expressed an intention to commit suicide; was fully aware that his refusal to eat would result in death; had stated that he was attempting to draw attention to the starving children in the world; that although he was not in imminent danger of death, delay would run the risk of irreversible brain damage, blindness and ultimately death; that the point at which his condition would become irreversible could not be predicted with certainty; and that because this condition could deteriorate rapidly, immediate intervention was indicated in order to prevent death or irreversible brain damage. There was further evidence that Chapman's hunger strike had caused disruption in the procedures in his unit, resentment among other patients, and had resulted in other patients adopting the starvation technique in order to gain attention.

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Relying on a line of cases of which Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 is the wellspring, Chapman contends that he has a constitutional right of privacy derived from the penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, "formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance" (Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, p. 484, 85 S.Ct. p. 1681). Even overlooking the fact that Chapman's status as a prisoner severely delimits his constitutional privileges (Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356; Cooper v. Lombard, 64 A.D.2d 130, 134, 409 N.Y.S.2d 30), it is self-evident that the right to privacy does not include the right to commit suicide. For, as has been repeatedly stated, " * * * only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy" (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726, 35 L.Ed.2d 147). To characterize a person's self-destructive acts as entitled to that Constitutional protection would be ludicrous. On the contrary, the State has a duty to protect the health and welfare of those persons in its custody (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251) and...