Von Holden v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 21 May 1982
• Citation: 87 A.D.2d 66,450 N.Y.S.2d 623
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application of Martin H. VON HOLDEN, Respondent, v. Mark David CHAPMAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 623

450 N.Y.S.2d 623

87 A.D.2d 66

In the Matter of the Application of Martin H. VON HOLDEN, Respondent, v. Mark David CHAPMAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Fourth Department.

May 21, 1982.

Antonio Faga, Utica, for appellant.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., for respondent; Aniela Carl, Dept. of Law, Utica, of counsel.

Before SIMONS, J. P., and CALLAHAN, DENMAN, BOOMER and MOULE, JJ.

DENMAN, Justice.

Mark David Chapman, who is serving a sentence of 20 years to life in Attica Correctional Facility for the killing of John Lennon, the former Beatle, appeals from an order at Special Term which authorized Martin Von Holden, the Director of the New York Psychiatric Center, where Chapman is temporarily in custody, to take all steps necessary to force-feed Chapman in order to sustain his life. Invoking a constitutional right to privacy and to freedom of expression, Chapman claims that such state intervention is an unwarranted invasion of those rights. Under the circumstances presented here, we hold that the obligation

of the State to protect the health and welfare of persons in its care and custody, its interest in the preservation of life, and its interest in maintaining rational and orderly procedures in its institutions, are countervailing considerations of such importance as to outweigh any claimed rights of appellant.

BACKGROUND

On February 10, 1982 Chapman was transferred to the Psychiatric Center pursuant to section 402 (subd. 9) of the Correction Law, upon the certification of two examining physicians that he was suffering from a mental illness which was likely to result in serious harm to himself. That certification resulted from his refusal to eat for several days prior to the transfer and his expressed intention to take his life by starvation. Von Holden applied to Special Term for an order authorizing him to feed Chapman intravenously or by means of a nasal gastric tube and a hearing on the petition was held on February 25, 1982, at which time Chapman had not eaten for 22 days. The only witness at the hearing was Dr. Daniel N. Uwah, Chapman's treating physician and psychiatrist. According to his testimony and to the affidavit of Von Holden, Chapman was competent; had frequently expressed an intention to commit suicide; was fully aware that his refusal to eat would result in death; had stated that he was attempting to draw attention to the starving children in the world; that although he was not in imminent danger of death, delay would run the risk of irreversible brain damage, blindness and ultimately death; that the point at which his condition would become irreversible could not be predicted with certainty; and that because this condition could deteriorate rapidly, immediate intervention was indicated in order to prevent death or irreversible brain damage. There was further evidence that Chapman's hunger strike had caused disruption in the procedures in his unit, resentment among other patients, and had resulted in other patients adopting the starvation technique in order to gain attention.

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

Relying on a line of cases of which Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 is the wellspring, Chapman contends that he has a constitutional right of privacy derived from the penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, "formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance" (Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, p. 484, 85 S.Ct. p. 1681). Even overlooking the fact that Chapman's status as a prisoner severely delimits his constitutional privileges (Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356; Cooper v. Lombard, 64 A.D.2d 130, 134, 409 N.Y.S.2d 30), it is self-evident that the right to privacy does not include the right to commit suicide. For, as has been repeatedly stated, " * * * only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy" (Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726, 35 L.Ed.2d 147). To characterize a person's self-destructive acts as entitled to that Constitutional protection would be ludicrous. On the contrary, the State has a duty to protect the health and welfare of those persons in its custody (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251) and may be cast in civil damages for its failure to observe such duty (see, e.g., Lee v. Downs, 4th Cir., 641 F.2d 1117; Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F.Supp. 37; Polkovitz v. State of New York, 87 A.D.2d 984, 450 N.Y.S.2d 448; Wilson v. Sponable, 81 A.D.2d 1, 439 N.Y.S.2d 549, app. dsmd. 54 N.Y.2d 834; Gioia v. State of New York, 16 A.D.2d 354, 288 N.Y.S.2d 127).

The fact that the State has a legitimate and compelling interest in preventing suicide is demonstrated by several statutes. A person may be involuntarily committed if he has a mental illness likely to result in serious harm to himself (Mental Hygiene Law, §§ 9.37, 9.39, 9.41). Aiding another to commit suicide is a felony The preservation of life has a high social value in our culture and suicide is deemed "a grave public wrong" (Stiles v. Clifton Springs Sanitarium Co., 74 F.Supp. 907, 909; Hundert v. The Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Assn. of America, 244 App.Div. 459, 279 N.Y.S. 555). Even a perfunctory perusal of the case law of our sister states indicates the universality of that principle: Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Massachusetts Supreme Court acknowledged an interest in preserving life and preventing suicide); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, cert. den. 424 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1429, 47 L.Ed.2d 360. (Tennessee Court said that attempted suicide was a grave public wrong adverse to the State's compelling interest in protecting life and promoting the life of its citizens); Wallace v. State (232 Ind. 700, 116 N.E.2d 100 (Indiana court announced suicide was against the law of God and man); Commonwealth v. Root, 191 Pa.Super. 238, 156 A.2d 895, revd. on other grds. 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (the Pennsylvania court said that the policy of the law is to protect human life, including that of a person who wishes to destroy his own life); Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 173 Or. 592, 147 P.2d 227 (self-destruction ordinarily involves moral turpitude and is regarded as being wrong); JFK Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (the state had an interest in preventing a suicide by a competent person).

(Penal Law, § 125.15 ), as is promoting a suicide attempt (Penal Law, § 120.30). Conversely, a person is justified in using the physical force necessary to thwart a person who is about to commit suicide (Penal Law, § 35.10 subd. ). Correction Law §§ 402 (subd. 9) and 508 (subd. 3) provide procedures whereby an inmate may be transferred to a psychiatric hospital when it appears likely that he will cause serious harm to himself.

Our attention has been directed to four cases in which the issue of whether the...