Cooper v. Lombard

• Decision Date: 15 September 1978
• Citation: 64 A.D.2d 130,409 N.Y.S.2d 30
• Parties: Regina COOPER et al., Plaintiffs, Carol Ann Lewin, Doris McNair, Elaine Reed, for themselves, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. William LOMBARD, Individually and as Sheriff of the County of Monroe, Robert Stanwick, Individually and as Superintendent of the Monroe County Jail, Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 30

409 N.Y.S.2d 30

64 A.D.2d 130

Regina COOPER et al., Plaintiffs Carol Ann Lewin, Doris McNair, Elaine Reed, for themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. William LOMBARD, Individually and as Sheriff of the County of Monroe, Robert Stanwick, Individually and as Superintendent of the Monroe County Jail, Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Sept. 15, 1978.

Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp., Rochester, for appellants; David W. Beier, Rochester, of counsel.

John D. Doyle, County Atty., Rochester, for respondents.

Before MARSH, P. J., and MOULE, DILLON, DENMAN and SCHNEPP, JJ.

DILLON, Justice.

This is a class action instituted by certain female inmates of the Monroe County Jail. The class certified by Special Term consists of all women inmates of the facility from February, 1974 until the resolution of the action. In 1974 and 1975 92% Of such inmates were pretrial detainees; the others were sentenced prisoners. Despite the difference in inmate status, the plaintiffs have focused upon the class as constituting pretrial detainees. The trial court considered plaintiffs' arguments in that light, as do we.

Of the various conditions of plaintiffs' confinement which formed the bases for the several causes of action under the Federal Civil Rights Act (U.S.Code, tit. 42, § 1983), our present concern, as limited by plaintiffs' appeal, is with those portions of the judgment which denied declaratory and injunctive relief with regard to visitation restrictions, recreational opportunities and disciplinary proceedings, and which also denied plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees.

The Monroe County Jail is a modern detention facility which has been in use since its construction was completed in April, 1971. It was originally designed to house only nonsentenced prisoners but because of the closing of the antiquated and inadequate county penitentiary in the fall of 1971, it became necessary to include sentenced prisoners among the facility's population. Consequently, a section of the county jail which had been intended for the use of female prisoners was employed for the housing of the unanticipated additional male population. In order to accommodate female inmates, the county arranged to use existing lockup facilities on the third floor of the abutting city Public Safety Building. Direct physical access was provided to and from the Monroe County Jail, and since March, 1972, with the approval of the State Commission of Correction, female inmates have been housed in the converted city facilities. The female confinement area consists of 26 cells, including two isolation units, and two day rooms. During 1974 the average daily female population was 20 and in 1975 it was 17. At no time during those years did the population exceed 31.

Initially, we note that the circumstances of plaintiffs' confinement may not be described as intolerable or inhumane (compare, e. g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594, affd. in part 507 F.2d 333, on remand 396 F.Supp. 1195, affd. 527 F.2d 1041; Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676, affd. 494 F.2d 1196, cert. den. 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 189; see Hutto v. Finney, --- U.S. ----, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522. There has been no demonstration that any aspect of their incarceration offends the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. ¹ Indeed, according to a study done by a jail consultant of the American Correctional Association, the Monroe County Jail is a "well operated and managed facility in which there is total effort to meet the needs of the prisoners." ²

To the extent that plaintiffs' causes of action are premised upon claimed violations of the Eighth Amendment, they were properly rejected by the trial court and have not been further advanced on this appeal. Our attention, then, is directed to plaintiffs' assertions that certain restrictions imposed upon them by virtue of their incarceration deprived them of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is largely in the last decade that prisoners have sought relief from conditions of confinement on grounds other than the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Judicial review of such complaints requires in the first instance a recognition that " '(l)awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.' Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights" (Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 53 L.Ed.2d 629).

It has been repeatedly held that the courts should defer to the discretion of correction officials in matters concerning prison administration and the needs of institutional security (see, e. g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-229, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-492, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439; Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263; Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718; Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 62, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 312 N.E.2d 158). This does not imply, however, that either sentenced prisoners or pretrial detainees are stripped of all constitutional protection. Prisoner complaints relating to jail restrictions or procedures must be examined "in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law" (Pell v. Procunier, supra, 417 U.S. p. 822, 94 S.Ct. p. 2804), and the courts will intervene "to put a stop * * * to practices that are unconstitutional or illegal" (Wilkinson v. Skinner, supra, 34 N.Y.2d p. 62, 356 N.Y.S.2d p. 24, 312 N.E.2d p. 164).

Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to contact visitation; expanded periods of visitation; outdoor recreation; access to the gymnasium equal to that afforded male prisoners; and the promulgation of rules designed to guarantee that a sanction imposed for violation of a jail rule is proportionate to and reflective of the nature of the violation.

Insofar as plaintiffs' claims are premised upon an alleged denial of equal protection, we find them to be without merit. Plaintiffs' argument is the product of a comparison between conditions of confinement of sentenced prisoners in state correctional facilities and those afforded to plaintiffs in the Monroe County Jail. They conclude that since a judgment of conviction has not been imposed upon them, the conditions of their confinement must, as a matter of equal protection, be of equivalent or higher quality than those enjoyed by state prisoners.

An obvious impediment to plaintiffs' position arises from their reliance upon the treatment of members of a class distinct from their own. Significantly, in McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 35 L.Ed.2d 282, it was acknowledged that the purpose, usage and availability of state prisons markedly differ from that of county jails. Those differences afforded a rational basis for the disparate treatment complained of in McGinnis and in our view serve to proscribe relief under the equal protection clause in this case (see Collins v. Schoonfield, D.C., 344 F.Supp. 257, 285).

We turn then to a consideration of plaintiffs' claims under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is argued that the restrictive nature of visitation rights at the Monroe County facility constitutes an unconstitutional limitation upon the liberty of pretrial detainees.

The parties stipulated that the visiting hours for pretrial detainees are from 1 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays, and that each visit may be limited to ten minutes. Inmates and visitors are separated by a steel wall and a glass window. They communicate by use of a telephone system through which it is sometimes difficult to hear. There was also evidence that the glass window is at a level which impedes or precludes its use by those of short physical stature.

There is abundant authority that the failure to provide a program of contact visitation constitutes a deprivation of the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees (see, e. g., Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741; Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333; Jordan v. Wolke, 444 F.Supp. 599; Ambrose v. Malcolm, 440 F.Supp. 51; O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, 437 F.Supp. 582; Forts v. Malcolm, 426 F.Supp. 464; Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F.Supp. 886; Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 421 F.Supp. 832; Inmates, D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 416 F.Supp. 119; Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225). Additionally, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York has recently held that contact visitation in the Monroe County Jail "is required by law" and has directed the Monroe County Sheriff to submit to the County Manager an estimate of the cost of providing contact visitation for male inmates of that facility (Marcera v. Chinlund, U.S.Dist.Ct., WDNY, June 5, 1978, Burke, J.; and see Marcera v. Chinlund, 565 F.2d 253).

Although plaintiffs' contention that they are entitled to contact visitation is unsupported by any authority binding upon this court, it is nonetheless our view that the wholesale denial of contact visitation to all pretrial detainees is neither rationally nor constitutionally supportable. Indeed, the record reveals not that prison administrators oppose the concept of contact visitation but rather that its implementation will present administrative and security problems which may only be...