Vorse v. Jersey Plate Glass Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1903
• Citation: 93 N.W. 569,119 Iowa 555
• Parties: AUGUSTA T. VORSE, Appellee, v. THE JERSEY PLATE GLASS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

93 N.W. 569

119 Iowa 555

AUGUSTA T. VORSE, Appellee, v. THE JERSEY PLATE GLASS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 10, 1903

Appeal from Polk District Court.--HON. CHAS. A. BISHOP, Judge.

ACTION at law upon a policy of insurance. Trial to the court without a jury. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

McVey McVey & Graham for appellant.

Edward Davis and C. C. & C. L. Nourse for appellee.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

The action is on a policy insuring plain tiff against loss or damage by breakage, through accident, of certain plate glass in a building owned by her in the city of Des Moines. The policy contained these, among other, stipulations: "This company is not liable to make good any loss or damage which may happen by or in consequence of any fire, * * * and is not liable for any loss or damage to glass caused by the blowing up of buildings." During the life of the policy the insured property was broken and destroyed, and the cause thereof, according to the agreed statement of facts on which the case was tried, was as follows: "Third. That the cause of said breakage and destruction in said west storeroom was the explosion of gas generating from gasoline being used in the rear of said room for the purpose of cleaning clothes which gas was ignited by a match or light in the room, and said explosion was not caused willfully or by intention on the part of this plaintiff or her tenant; that the said breakage and destruction of the glass and explosion in said west room occurred prior to the fire in said building. Fourth. That on the same day other plate glass in the said building was broken and destroyed as set out in count two of plaintiff's petition as amended and substituted; that said glass was broken by firemen intentionally, and in order to gain access to the building for the purpose of extinguishing a fire which was then burning in the said storeroom; that the doors were fastened, and it was necessary to break in the front of the building for the purpose of gaining admission to put out the fire." During the trial the plaintiff withdrew the second count of her petition; hence we have nothing to consider but the statements above made as to how the damage occurred.

I. Defendant contends that the damage was caused by the "blowing up" of the building. These words should be given their ordinary signification, in arriving at the intent of the parties; and we think, when defined in this light, and applied to the agreed facts which we have quoted, that it does not sufficiently appear that the building was blown up. Ordinarily the term means to scatter or destroy by an explosion of some kind. When we speak of a building as having been blown up, we ordinarily intend to convey the notion that its constituent parts have been scattered, and the integrity of the structure destroyed. This is evidently what is meant by the terms employed in the policy now before us. In any event, the policy, if susceptible of two constructions, should be given that one which is most favorable to the insured. Collins v. Insurance Co., 95 Iowa 540, 64 N.W. 602; Goodwin v. Association, 97 Iowa 226, 66 N.W. 157. With this rule in mind, we have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the breakage was not due to the blowing up of the building. See, as supporting these conclusions, Breuner v. Insurance Co., 51 Cal. 101 (21 Am. Rep. 703).

II. The next contention made by defendant is much more difficult of satisfactory solution. It is argued that the damage to the glass happened by, or was in consequence of fire. The real point made is that the explosion was due to, or was in consequence of fire, if not fire itself. The term "explosion" has no fixed and definite meaning either in ordinary speech or in law. It may be described, in a general way, as sudden and rapid combustion, causing violent expansion of the air, and accompanied by a report. It may and does vary in degrees of intensity and in the vehemence of the report, and it is not always due to the presence of fire. Indeed, it may result from decomposition or chemical action. In the case before us, it was undoubtedly caused by fire, or as stated in the agreed statement of facts "by a match or light in the room" which transformed the gasoline gas into heat which was propagated from one particle of air to another and finally against the glass, the shock of which caused the breakage complained of. The stipulation says that the breakage and explosion occurred prior to the fire in the building which we assume means that the glass was broken before any part of the structure or of the goods stored therein were ignited for it is clear that there must have been a match or light in the room which caused the explosion. Did the breakage then happen by or was it in consequence of any fire?

The question is a nice one and by no means free from doubt; but we are inclined to the view that the loss did not happen by nor was it in consequence of any fire as those terms are used in the policy in suit. Of course but for the lighted match or other light in the room the explosion would not have happened and the explosion itself was due to rapid combustion. But in ordinary parlance the damage was due to the explosion or to the concussion produced thereby or as said in the agreed statement of facts the explosion and breakage occurred prior to the fire in the building. The lighted match or other light in the building was not contemplated by the parties as the fire which was excepted by the terms of the policy. It was not a destructive fire against the immediate effects of which the condition in the policy was intended as a protection. It was, it is true, the possible means of putting the destructive force in motion but was not the excepted peril. Had there been no fire after the explosion it seems to us it could not fairly be claimed that...