Waits v. Carleson

• Decision Date: 19 March 1973
• Citation: 107 Cal.Rptr. 117,31 Cal.App.3d 153
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: William WAITS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Robert B. CARLESON, Director of the State Department of Social Welfare, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 31694, 32003.

Page 117

107 Cal.Rptr. 117

31 Cal.App.3d 153

William WAITS et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Robert B. CARLESON, Director of the State Department of Social Welfare, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 31694, 32003.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

March 19, 1973.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 18, 1973.

Hearing Granted May 16, 1973.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., David J. Bowie, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for appellants.

Clifford Sweet, William R. Petrocelli, Denis Clifford, Marjorie Gelb, Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, Oakland, for respondents.

Charles C. Marson, Joseph Remcho, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., San Francisco, Karlton, Blease & Vanderlaan, Coleman A. Blease, Sacramento, amicus curiae.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

The appellants are state and county welfare agencies and officials. They have appealed from orders of the Alameda County Superior Court, which, among other things, declare three regulations of appellant State Department of Social Welfare (sometimes hereafter the 'Department') to be invalid. The regulations purport to implement California's 'Burton-Miller Act' (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 11200-11507, inclusive), relating to 'Aid to Families with Dependent Children.' Respondents are dependent children and others acting on their behalf who were successful plaintiffs in the superior court action for an injunction.

California, through the Burton-Miller Act, participates in a federal program entitled 'Aid to Families with Dependent Children,' embraced by subchapter IV of chapter 7 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-610), which latter statute will hereinafter be referred to as the 'Social Security Act.' The comprehensive program is commonly called 'AFDC.' While it is funded in part by federal grants, it is administered by the state through its Department of Social Welfare. (See Welf & Inst.Code,s 11209; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118.)

In its administration of the AFDC program California is, of course, bound by the Social Security Act and such valid regulations as the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare may promulgate thereunder. (See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 601, 92 S.Ct. 1932, 32 L.Ed.2d 352; King v. Smith, supra, 392 U.S. 309, 316-317, 333, fn. 34, 88 S.Ct. 2128; Ramos v. Montgomery, D.C., 313 F.Supp. 1179, 1181, affd. 400 U.S. 1003, 91 S.Ct. 572, 27 L.Ed.2d 618; 42 U.S.C.A., § 1302.)

The Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 601) states that it is enacted for 'the purpose of encuraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the hones of relatives . . ..' (Emphasis added.) The California statute expresses a similar objective stating, 'It is the object and purpose of this chapter . . . to provide the best substitute for their own homes for those children who must be given foster care.' (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 11205.)

The Social Security Act also provides that the state shall, in determining needs of dependent children 'take into consideration any . . . income and resources of [the] child . . ..' (Emphasis added; 42 U.S.C.A. § 602, subd. (a)(7).)

The equal protection clause of the Constitution demands that any distinction made by a state in the amount of welfare benefits for dependent shall bear some reasonable relation to their needs. (Williams v. Field, 9 Cir., 416 F.2d 483, 486, cert. den., 397 U.S. 1016, 90 S.Ct. 1252, 25 L.Ed.2d 431; Anderson v. Burson, D.C., 300 F.Supp. 401, 404; Vincent v. State of California, 22 Cal.App.3d 566, 572, 99 Cal.Rptr. 410.)

The respondent dependent children are of a class who are deprived of parental support and who live with relatives (usually aunts, uncles or grandparents) who are not themselves needy, and who are under no legal duty to support the children.

The State Department of Social Welfare by its AFDC Regulation 44-212.2 has fixed the 'minimum basic standard of adequate care' of such dependent children as follows:

                Number of Children  Amount Required
                                 1             $125
                                 2              210
                                 3              255
                                 4              314
                                 5              362
                                 6              408
                                 7              449
                                 8              496
                                 9              543
                                10              590
                

One of the Department's regulations found invalid by the court is AFDC Regulation 44-115.611, which reads as follows:

'The excess of the in-kind income value for housing and utilities (see .9 below) included in the minimum basic standard of adequate care figure . . . for the appropriate size Family Budget Unit over the increased cost of housing and utilities to the nonneedy relative caused by the presence of the AFDC child(ren) in his household shall be considered a contribution in-kind to the Family Budget Unit.'

This regulation is interpreted by the Department as providing:

1. To the extent that housing and utilities furnished dependent children are not attended by increased costs to their nonneedy relatives, they shall be considered as gifts to, and therefore resources of, the dependent children. The relatives are not to be compensated for the value, as distinguished from increased cost, of such housing and utilities.

2. As to increased costs of the housing and utilities a presumption attaches that there were none. This presumption may be rebutted by relatives who are allowed to 'demonstrate that they have incurred increased housing and utilities costs because of the children's presence.' Such demonstrated increased costs will not be considered resources of the children and the relatives will be compensated therefor.

The above Regulation 44-115.611 has been given a stricter interpretation by respondent Alameda County Welfare Department. That agency has advised relatives caring for respondent dependent children that 'House and utilities are no longer allowed on nonneedy caretaker cases,' and that in such cases 'state law' requires that 'free rent and utilities [are] mandatory.'

The Department's Regulations 44-115.91 and 44-115.92 evaluate the presumed resources, or 'contributions in kind,' as follows:

                Number of Children  Value of Housing and Utilities
                                 1                             $67
                                 2                              87
                                 3                              95
                                 4                             101
                                 5                             101
                                 6                             101
                                 7                             101
                                 8                             101
                                 9                             101
                                10                             101
                

These regulations are the remaining two found to be invalid by the superior court.

The broad issue before us is whether the questioned regulations are contrary to the stated purposes of the Social Security Act. The problem is a perplexing one, but contrary to the insistence of respondents we find no fault in the motives of appellants. The disputed regulations are an obvious attempt to control the ever increasing burden of welfare costs of the state.

By the Social Security Act's definition, a "dependent child' means a needy child who has been deprived of parental support' for any of several stated reasons. It includes such a child living in a home 'maintained by one or more [nonneedy] relatives as his or their own home.' (42 U.S.C.A. § 606.) The statute provides that the nonneedy relatives may apply for AFDC aid for dependent children living in their homes. But, as we have indicated, in determining the amount of the children's need the state agency shall 'take into consideration any . . . income and resources of [the] child.'

A threshold question arises whether partial support, voluntarily and in fact being furnished a dependent child, by one under no legal obligation so to do, may be considered a 'resource' of the child, thus permitting a lesser amount of aid.

This question has frequently been considered. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 90 S.Ct. 1282, L.Ed.2d 561, has held that under the Social Security Act's AFDC program, support actually furnished by a man without legal obligation to do so, who is living with a dependent child and its mother, may be considered a resource of the child by the state. In King v. Smith, supra, 392 U.S. 309, 319 -320, 88 S.Ct. 2128, supra, 392 U.S. 309, 319-320, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2134, the same court earlier reached a similar conclusion, stating: '[T]here is no question that regular and actual contributions to a needy child, including contributions from the kind of person Alabama calls a substitute father, can be taken into account in determining whether the child is needy. In other words, if by reason of such a man's contribution, the child is not in financial need, the child would be ineligible for AFDC assistance . . ..' (See also People v. Lockett, 25 Cal.App.3d 433, 440-441, 102 Cal.Rptr. 41.) In Solman v. Shapiro, D.C., 300 F.Supp. 409, 415, affd. 396 U.S. 5, 90 S.Ct. 25, 24 L.Ed.2d 5, it was said: 'With respect to children who are beneficiaries of AFDC payments, the income of a stepparent cannot be assumed to be available to his stepchildren living in the same home with him. The stepfather is neither a 'relative claiming aid' nor an essential person. His income or his resources may be taken into consideration only if they are actually available for the use of the children. . . .' In County of San Diego v. Montgomery, 23 Cal.App.3d 174, 99 Cal.Rptr. 921, the court, relying on King v. Smith, supra, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, held that support voluntarily and actually furnished by an organization known as 'Synanon,' was good cause for denying AFDC payments for an otherwise dependent child. And in People v. Shirley, 55 Cal.2d 521,...