Walker v. Gambrell

• Decision Date: 16 July 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Case No. RWT 08-3065.
• Citation: 647 F.Supp.2d 529
• Parties: Yatana M. WALKER, Plaintiff v. Donna GAMBRELL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

647 F.Supp.2d 529

Yatana M. WALKER, Plaintiff v. Donna GAMBRELL, et al., Defendants.

Civil Case No. RWT 08-3065.

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division.

July 16, 2009.

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Yatana M. Walker, Upper Marlboro, MD, pro se.

Melanie L. Glickson, Maryland Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROGER W. TITUS, District Judge.

On August 28, 2008, Plaintiff Yatana Walker filed this action pro se in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County against Defendants Donna Gambrell and then Secretary Henry Paulson, both of the United States Department of the Treasury ("Treasury"). Defendants removed the action to this court on November 13, 2008. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the Privacy Act of 1974 ("Act") and the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), improperly disclosed information related to her medical condition and sick leave, and invaded her privacy when Ms. Gambrell, Plaintiff's supervisor, disclosed Plaintiff's medical condition to Plaintiff's coworkers. Plaintiff now seeks $5,000 in damages.

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Plaintiff subsequently filed a response. For the reasons outlined below, Defendants' motion will be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff is the Chief Financial Officer of the Community Development Financial Institution Fund ("CDFI"), an office within the Treasury, and Defendant Donna Gambrell is her supervisor. [Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 2-3]. On the morning of April 16, 2008, Plaintiff, who was pregnant at the time [Compl. 2-3], notified Ms. Gambrell and Nancy Pollack, Ms. Gambrell's Staff Assistant, by email that she would not be able to come into work that day due to a doctor's appointment. [Compl. Ex. B]. At 3:35 p.m. that same day, Plaintiff's husband called Ayisa Crowe, one of Plaintiff's subordinates, informing her that the Plaintiff was in the hospital and "losing her baby" (i.e., having a miscarriage). [Compl. 2]. He asked Ms. Crowe to convey this to Ms. Gambrell and Ms. Pollack. Id. Plaintiff's husband called Ms. Crowe rather than Gambrell directly because he did not have Ms. Gambrell's number with him at the hospital. Id. At 3:40 p.m., Ms. Crowe informed Ms. Pollack of Plaintiff's miscarriage and five minutes later, as Ms. Crowe was leaving for the day, she ran into Ms. Gambrell at the elevator where they "had an encounter." Id. Ms. Gambrell elaborated on the interaction further in her declaration stating that "Ms. Crowe was crying hysterically. I understood that she was upset after hearing the news .... It was clear to me that other employees on the floor had likely heard Ms. Crowe crying." [Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1 ¶¶ 7-8]. Following her exchange with Ms. Crowe, Ms. Gambrell gathered all 8th floor staff and contractors into a conference room to inform them that Plaintiff had miscarried.¹ [Compl. 2]. At 4:32 p.m., Ms. Gambrell sent an email to all CDFI employees, contractors, and temporary employees informing them of the same and at 5:12 p.m., sent an email to Plaintiff's staff referring them to the Treasury's counselor [Compl. Ex. B & C].

On April 20, 2008, Plaintiff sent an email to Ms. Gambrell notifying her that she had been released from the hospital and would return to work after receiving permission from her physician. [Compl. Ex. D]. Ms. Gambrell replied that Plaintiff could take as long as she needed before returning to work. Id. On June 3, 2008, Plaintiff provided Ms. Gambrell with a copy of the FMLA form completed by her physician on May 5, 2008, which certified that she would need six weeks of convalescent leave due to the miscarriage. [Compl. Ex. E].

Plaintiff had filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Ms. Gambrell prior to this event. [Pl's. Resp. 4]. Plaintiff specifies neither the date on which the EEOC charge was filed nor its contents except to claim generally that Ms. Gambrell had made "a hostile working environment" for her. [Compl. 3]. Plaintiff further contends that the disclosures were "another form of retaliation" against her. Id.

Defendants, by contrast, claim that the disclosures were made to explain to affected staff members the reason for Ms. Crowe's disruption, enabling them to continue performing their duties given that the office was "small and somewhat close-knit." [Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 7]. Ms. Gambrell, however, did not mention this reasoning during the course of the meeting with CDFI staff and instead commenced by informing them of the Plaintiff's miscarriage. [Pl's. Resp. 2]. Plaintiff claims that the staff called into the meeting were unaware of the disruption caused by Ms. Crowe. Id. She further contends that many CDFI employees were not aware that she was pregnant prior to Ms. Gambrell's disclosures and that her staff were confused and offended by Ms. Gambrell's handling of the situation. [Compl. 3]. Ms. Gambrell claims that she was unaware that the Plaintiff was upset by the disclosures prior to the filing of the Complaint [Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 5]; however, Plaintiff refused to accept flowers sent by CDFI following the disclosures, and in April 2008, Plaintiff contacted the Privacy Act Office within the Treasury to prompt an investigation into Ms. Gambrell's disclosures. [Pl.'s Resp. 3].

In May 2008, Plaintiff contacted the EEOC in order to amend her pending charge to reflect Ms. Gambrell's disclosures and Ms. Gambrell was accordingly contacted by an EEOC investigator regarding the incident. [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff claims without specificity that she has suffered $5,000 in damages as a result of the disclosures. [Compl. 1].

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court declared the "retirement" of the long-cited "no set of facts" standard first announced in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).² The Court in Twombly looked instead to whether the plaintiff stated "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, observing that "plaintiff's obligation to provide grounds for his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In sum, "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Id.

The Court must consider all well-pled allegations in a complaint as true, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and must construe factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson County, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.2005). Nevertheless, the Court is not required to accept as true "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986), conclusory allegations devoid of any reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.1979), or "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact or unreasonable inferences," Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir.2002). If "matters outside the pleading are presented and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment." Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(d).

Summary judgment is proper if there are no issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir.2006). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A dispute of material fact is only "genuine" if sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, the nonmoving party "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985). The Court may only rely on facts supported in the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings, in order to fulfill its "affirmative obligation . . . to prevent `factually unsupported claims or defenses' from proceeding to trial." Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added).

III. Analysis

A. Privacy Act Claim

Plaintiff first claims that the disclosure of her medical condition violated the Privacy Act of 1974 ("Act"). [Compl. 1]. As an initial matter, civil actions under the Act are properly commenced only against agencies, not individuals. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (2006); McLeod v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 43 Fed.Appx. 70, 71 (9th Cir.2002); Wren v. Harris, 675 F.2d 1144, 1148 n. 8 (10th Cir.1982); Kotmair v. I.R.S, No. J-79-1784, 1981 WL 1750, at *3 (D.Md. Feb. 10, 1981). In certain cases it can be proper to name...