Walley v. State
| Decision Date | 12 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 02-1002.,CR 02-1002. |
| Citation | 353 Ark. 586,112 S.W.3d 349 |
| Parties | Johnny WALLEY v. STATE of Arkansas. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
On May 23, 2002, a jury found Johnny Walley guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture and possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. He was sentenced to serve a total of eight years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Walley raises the following five points on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to prove actual or constructive possession; (2) the circuit court erred in overruling his objection to the trial being held in a courtroom located in the same building as the jail and the sheriff's office; (3) the circuit court erred in refusing his proffered jury instructions; (4) the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his house after it was searched pursuant to a warrant; and (5) the circuit court erred in denying him bail pending appeal. We find no merit to any of his points for reversal and affirm.
On September 25, 2000, Arkansas Forestry Commission agent Larry Reinhart found five trash bags, containing what he believed to be drug paraphernalia, dumped alongside a road. He notified Terry Clark, a narcotics investigator for the Thirteenth Judicial District Drug Task Force. Agent Clark examined the trash and found what appeared to be discarded supplies from a drug lab along with a receipt from Wal-Mart for the purchase of some items that could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. After determining that the Wal-Mart purchases were made with Walley's credit card, Clark went to Walley's rented residence in El Dorado. Walley answered the door, and Clark pretended to be interested in renting the residence. Shortly thereafter, Clark obtained a municipal arrest warrant for Walley on charges of littering. Clark and Russell Lamb, a deputy with the Union County Sheriff's Office assigned to the Thirteenth Judicial Drug Task Force, attempted to serve the warrant, but no one was home, and the door was padlocked. Clark could smell an odor he recognized as distinctive of a methamphetamine lab emanating through a broken window in the door of the residence. Clark spoke with Walley's landlord and neighbor, who told him she had heard that some people were "cooking dope" at Walley's house. The landlord also stated there had been an unusual amount of traffic at the house. Clark then looked into a burn barrel located at the back of the property. Upon finding more drug paraphernalia in the barrel and also smelling the odor of a methamphetamine lab at the back of the residence, Clark left Lamb at the scene and obtained a search warrant.
On March 14, 2001, Walley was charged on five drug-related counts. Prior to trial, the circuit court denied Walley's motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his residence. On May 23, 2002, Johnny Walley was sentenced to serve eight years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction following a jury trial on May 20-21. The jury convicted him of possessing drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture and possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. He was found not guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine. The charges of maintaining a drug premises and simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms were nolle prossed prior to trial. Walley filed a timely notice of appeal.
In his directed-verdict motion after the State's case-in-chief, Walley argued, as he does on appeal, that the State did not present sufficient evidence to the jury to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Walley was in actual or constructive possession of the items seized during the search of his residence. Therefore, he contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict.
A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Smith v. State, 352 Ark. ___, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Id. Furthermore, "[a] jury need not lay aside its common sense in evaluating the ordinary affairs of life, and it may infer a defendant's guilt from improbable explanations of incriminating conduct." Burley v. State, 348 Ark. 422, 431, 73 S.W.3d 600, 606 (2002); Terrell v. State, 342 Ark. 208, 27 S.W.3d 423 (2000); Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (1997); Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 96, 106, 925 S.W.2d 768, 773 (1996) ().
Walley was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine under § 5-64-401(c) of the Arkansas Criminal Code: "It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance...." Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-401(c) (Supp.2001). He was also found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine under § 5-64-403(c)(2)(A): "It is unlawful for any person to ... possess ... drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to ... manufacture ... a controlled substance...." Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-403(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2001).
We recently explained how we conduct an appellate review in connection with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to possession when two or more persons occupy the residence where the contraband was found:
Under our law, it is clear that the State need not prove that the accused physically possessed the contraband in order to sustain a conviction for possession of a controlled substance if the location of the contraband was such that it could be said to be under the dominion and control of the accused, that is, constructively possessed. Heard v. State, 316 Ark. 731, 876 S.W.2d 231 (1994); Crossley v. State, 304 Ark. 378, 802 S.W.2d 459 (1991). We have further explained:
Constructive possession can be implied when the controlled substance is in the joint control of the accused and another. Joint occupancy, though, is not sufficient in itself to establish possession or joint possession. There must be some additional factor linking the accused to the contraband. The State must show additional facts and circumstances indicating the accused's knowledge and control of the contraband.
Hendrickson v. State, 316 Ark. 182, 189, 871 S.W.2d 362, 365 (1994) (citations omitted). See also Jacobs v. State, 317 Ark. 454, 878 S.W.2d 734 (1994); Nichols v. State, 306 Ark. 417, 815 S.W.2d 382 (1991). When seeking to prove constructive possession, the State must establish (1) that the accused exercised care, control, and management over the contraband, and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Darrough v. State, 322 Ark. 251, 908 S.W.2d 325 (1995); Plotts v. State, 297 Ark. 66, 759 S.W.2d 793 (1988).
Darrough v. State, 330 Ark. 808, 811, 957 S.W.2d 707, 708-09 (1997). Darrough v. State is consistent with a long line of cases holding that "it cannot be inferred that one in non-exclusive possession of premises knew of the presence of drugs and had joint control of them unless there were other factors from which the jury can reasonably infer the accused had joint possession and control." Ravellette v. State, 264 Ark. 344, 346, 571 S.W.2d 433, 434 (1978). In Ravellette, we held that where marijuana was found in a living room and dining room of a rented house jointly shared, there must be some factor in addition to the joint control of the premises to link the accused with the controlled substance. Id.; see also Hicks v. State, 327 Ark. 652, 659, 941 S.W.2d 387, 391 (1997); Pyle v. State, 314 Ark. 165, 862 S.W.2d 823 (1993); Bailey v. State, 307 Ark. 448, 821 S.W.2d 28 (1991); Embry v. State, 302 Ark. 608, 611, 792 S.W.2d 318, 319 (1990); Plotts v. State, 297 Ark. 66, 759 S.W.2d 793 (1988); Westbrook v. State, 286 Ark. 192, 194, 691 S.W.2d 123, 124 (1985); Osborne v. State, 278 Ark. 45, 643 S.W.2d 251 (1982).
Walley does not dispute the fact that he rented the residence, purchased the padlocks for the residence, and maintained his El Dorado office in the residence. Thus, the issue is whether the State presented the jury with additional evidence linking Walley to the contraband. The instant case is distinguishable from those cases in which the jury was asked to find that the accused possessed the contraband based on the discovery of a small cache of drugs in the residence. See, e.g., Ravellette v. State, supra. Instead, the jury was presented with evidence of an operational methamphetamine lab in the kitchen. Agent Clark described in great detail the items seized from Walley's residence. During the search, the agents discovered numerous items used for the manufacture of crystal methamphetamine including: matchbook striker plates soaking to remove the red phosphorus, jars containing iodine crystals, jars containing two layer liquids (later identified as including methamphetamine), a measuring cup with the residue from ephedrine tablets, along with organic solvents and heat lamps for drying the drugs. The cabinets and tables were stained from the chemicals, and the kitchen windows were covered with black plastic. Drug paraphernalia was also found in a burn barrel near the residence and in the trash can on...
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